Antonin Macé

Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

8

DOWNLOADS

386

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 40,699

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 40,699

in Total Papers Citations

22

CROSSREF CITATIONS

2

Scholarly Papers (8)

1.

Measuring Influence in Science: Standing on the Shoulders of Which Giants?

Number of pages: 32 Posted: 07 Nov 2017 Last Revised: 02 Feb 2018
Antonin Macé
Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS
Downloads 113 (456,922)

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intellectual influence, network centrality , comparability across fields

2.

On the Weights of Sovereign Nations

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 07 Nov 2017 Last Revised: 23 Sep 2018
Antonin Macé and Rafael Treibich
Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS and University of Southern Denmark - Department of Economics
Downloads 101 (495,210)

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International Unions, Constitutional Design, Veto, Participation Constraints

3.

A Model of Repeated Collective Decisions

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 02 Jun 2022
Antonin Macé and Rafael Treibich
Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS and University of Southern Denmark - Department of Economics
Downloads 72 (608,402)

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Voting, Repeated Games, Logrolling, Unanimity, Consensus

4.

Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare ?

Annual Review of Economics, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 13 Oct 2020 Last Revised: 18 Dec 2020
Alessandra Casella and Antonin Macé
Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics and Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS
Downloads 38 (810,134)

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logrolling, vote trading, storable votes, quadratic voting, bundling, vote markets

Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants

NBER Working Paper No. w22231
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 09 May 2016 Last Revised: 31 Mar 2023
Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, Paris School of Economics (PSE) and Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS
Downloads 21 (991,273)

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Democracy for Polarized Committees. The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11256
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 09 May 2016
Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics, Paris School of Economics (PSE) and Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS
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Citation 4
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Colonel Blotto, Committees, Polarization, Storable Votes, Tyranny of the Majority

Voting Rights, Agenda Control and Information Aggregation

NBER Working Paper No. w29005
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 12 Jul 2021 Last Revised: 26 Oct 2022
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, Queen Mary University of London, Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS and University of Cyprus
Downloads 19 (1,013,194)

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Voting in Shareholders Meetings

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16336
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 14 Jul 2021
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, Queen Mary University of London, Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS and University of Cyprus
Downloads 1 (1,206,950)
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7.
Downloads 18 (991,293)
Citation 6

Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?

Annual Review of Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 57-86, 2021
Posted: 12 Aug 2021
Alessandra Casella and Antonin Macé
Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics and Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS

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Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?

NBER Working Paper No. w27743
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 31 Aug 2020 Last Revised: 22 Apr 2023
Alessandra Casella and Antonin Macé
Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics and Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS
Downloads 18 (1,024,186)
Citation 1

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Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15201
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 12 Sep 2020
Alessandra Casella and Antonin Macé
Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics and Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS
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Citation 5
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bundling, logrolling, quadratic voting, storable votes, vote markets, voting

8.

Public Information as a Source of Disagreement Among Shareholders

NBER Working Paper No. w30757
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 19 Dec 2022 Last Revised: 14 Apr 2023
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, Queen Mary University of London, Paris School of Economics, CNRS and ENS, Yale University, Ivy College of Business, Iowa State University and University of Cyprus
Downloads 3 (1,139,518)

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