Patrick W. Schmitz

University of Cologne

Prof. Dr.

Albertus-Magnus-Platz

Cologne, 50923

Germany

http://schmitz.uni-koeln.de/index.php?s=mitarbeiter&t=schmitz

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Research Fellow

London

United Kingdom

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

81

DOWNLOADS
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14,785

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 2,041

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 2,041

in Total Papers Citations

375

CROSSREF CITATIONS

474

Scholarly Papers (81)

1.

The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 02 Apr 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 3,579 (6,098)
Citation 9

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Incomplete contracts, hold-up problem, contract theory, property rights, theory of the firm

Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach

American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 1, 2006
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 870 (51,625)
Citation 10

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Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5417
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 27 Mar 2006
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 16 (1,031,301)
Citation 1
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Theory of the firm, incomplete contracts, ownership rights

Public-Private Partnerships Versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 28 Feb 2010 Last Revised: 15 Oct 2012
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 800 (57,799)
Citation 6

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Public-Private Partnerships, Integration Versus Separation, Information Gathering, Incomplete Contracts

Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7681
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 10 Feb 2010
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 2 (1,172,092)
Citation 12
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Incomplete contracts, Information gathering, Integration versus separation, Public-private partnerships

Simple Contracts, Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information, and the Hold-Up Problem

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 06 Jun 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 786 (59,248)
Citation 1

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Contract theory, private information, hold-up problem

Simple Contracts, Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information, and the Hold-Up Problem

Posted: 07 Jun 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

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Contract theory, private information, hold-up problem

Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts - the Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 20 Feb 2003
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 619 (80,708)
Citation 1

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Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered

FinanzArchiv, Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 394-411, 2000
Posted: 17 Apr 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

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Partial privatization, incomplete contracts, property rights, joint ownership

On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 17 Dec 2002
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 560 (91,607)
Citation 2

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hidden action, hidden information, moral hazard

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hidden action, hidden information, moral hazard

7.

The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights

Number of pages: 9 Posted: 13 Apr 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 523 (100,979)
Citation 3

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Property rights, Bargaining, Private information, Coase theorem

Workplace Surveillance, Privacy Protection, and Efficiency Wages

Number of pages: 17 Posted: 21 Apr 2004
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 502 (104,985)
Citation 1

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Privacy protection laws, workplace surveillance, moral hazard

Workplace Surveillance, Privacy Protection, and Efficiency Wages

Labour Economics, Vol. 12, No. 6, 2005
Posted: 26 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

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Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 06 Mar 2009 Last Revised: 15 Dec 2010
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 496 (106,580)
Citation 3

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Hold-up problem, option contracts, renegotiation, experiment

Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7205
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 07 Apr 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 5 (1,145,866)
Citation 4
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Experiment, Hold-up problem, Option contracts, Renegotiation

10.
Downloads 444 (122,854)
Citation 4

On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation

Number of pages: 17 Posted: 12 Feb 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 444 (121,534)
Citation 4

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On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation

Posted: 05 Apr 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

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Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 28 Feb 2009 Last Revised: 17 Dec 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 428 (126,961)

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Incomplete contracts, Contractible control, Privatization

Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7056
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 18 Dec 2008
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 2 (1,172,092)
Citation 6
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Contractible control, Incomplete contracts, Privatization

12.

Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases

IZA Discussion Paper No. 3481
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 03 Nov 2008
Joerg Oechssler, Andreas Roider, Andreas Roider and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics, IZA Institute of Labor EconomicsUniversity of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics and University of Cologne
Downloads 373 (149,883)
Citation 16

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behavioral finance, biases, cognitive abilities, cognitive reflection test

Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 01 Apr 2009 Last Revised: 17 Jul 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 359 (155,192)
Citation 1

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Agency theory, adverse selection, information gathering, experiment

Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7252
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 15 Apr 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 4 (1,154,714)
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adverse selection, agency theory, experiment, information gathering

Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods Under Private Information

Number of pages: 18 Posted: 19 Feb 2003
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 332 (168,869)
Citation 12

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excludable public goods, asymmetric information

Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods Under Private Information

Public Finance, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 89-101, 1997
Posted: 19 Feb 2003
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

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Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2005
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 26 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 284 (199,299)

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Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5145
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 17 Aug 2005
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 32 (869,512)
Citation 9
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Contract theory, hidden action, limited liability, moral hazard

Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 21 Apr 2004
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 251 (225,821)

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Job security, employment protection, labor market rigidities

Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 11 Jan 2005
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 26 (925,614)
Citation 2
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Job security, employment protection, labor market rigidities

Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information

Posted: 12 Aug 2004
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

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Job security, employment protection, labor market rigidities

On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies Under Asymmetric Information

Number of pages: 17 Posted: 21 Jan 2003
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 272 (208,297)
Citation 6

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licensing, Innovation, Monopoly, Private Information

On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies Under Asymmetric Information

Posted: 03 Feb 2003
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

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licensing, patents, R&D, asymmetric information, adverse selection

Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments

Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 72-89, January 2004
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 21 Apr 2004
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 244 (232,177)

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Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, Repeated Games

Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 28 Feb 2001
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 18 (1,009,157)
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Incomplete Contracts, Joint Ownership

Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 26 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 224 (252,391)

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Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always Be Enforced?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5292
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 29 Dec 2005
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 17 (1,020,225)
Citation 2
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Contract modification, renegotiation, moral hazard

Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always Be Enforced?

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 315-329, 2005
Posted: 05 Nov 2004
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

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Contract modification, renegotiation, moral hazard

Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Number of pages: 66 Posted: 22 Dec 2012
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 230 (246,034)

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agency theory, adverse selection, information gathering, ultimatum game, social preferences, experiment

Contracting Under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9287
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 01 Feb 2013
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
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Citation 11
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Adverse selection, Agency theory, Experiment, Information gathering, Social preferences, Ultimatum game

The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures

Number of pages: 13 Posted: 15 Jun 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 205 (274,326)
Citation 1

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Hidden information, adverse selection, information gathering

The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7331
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 15 Jul 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 2 (1,172,092)
Citation 4
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adverse selection, Hidden information, information gathering

Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 145 (371,718)
Citation 8

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Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 22 Mar 2001
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 31 (878,453)
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Incomplete contracts, partnerships, property rights, R&D alliances

Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances

Posted: 14 Jan 2003
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne

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Property Rights, R&D alliances, Partnerships, Incomplete Contracts

23.
Downloads 161 (340,615)
Citation 21

Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 115 (445,500)
Citation 2

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Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points

Number of pages: 17 Posted: 25 Feb 2004
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 46 (758,406)
Citation 2
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Behavioural economics, auction theory, reserve prices, reference points

Exclusive Versus Non-Exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard

Economics Letters, Vol. 97, No. 3, 2007
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 26 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 150 (361,495)

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Exclusive versus Non-Exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6207
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 22 May 2008
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (1,181,121)
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Innovation, Licences, Monopoly, Private information

Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information

European Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2007
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 107 (470,363)

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Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5747
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 23 Aug 2006
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 16 (1,031,301)
Citation 4
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mechanism design, hard information

26.
Downloads 122 (424,183)

On Synergies and Vertical Integration

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz and Dirk Sliwka
University of Cologne and University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences
Downloads 122 (425,832)
Citation 1

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On Synergies and Vertical Integration

Posted: 06 Sep 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz and Dirk Sliwka
University of Cologne and University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences

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Vertical integration, incomplete contracts, relationship specificity, core competence, synergies

27.
Downloads 112 (452,230)
Citation 5

Job Design with Conflicting Tasks Reconsidered

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 02 Nov 2012
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 66 (636,977)

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moral hazard, limited liability, conflicting tasks, synergies

Job Design with Conflicting Tasks Reconsidered

European Economic Review, Vol. 57, 2013
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 46 (758,406)
Citation 1

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Moral hazard, Limited liability, Conflicting tasks, Synergies

28.

Know-How Disclosure and Incomplete Contracts

Economics Letters, Vol. 63, No. 2, 1999
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 104 (477,280)
Citation 5

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29.

'Yes Men,' Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts

Number of pages: 17 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Christian Ewerhart and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Zurich, Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 89 (528,334)
Citation 5

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30.

Public Goods, Property Rights, and Investment Incentives: An Experimental Investigation

Number of pages: 60 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
David J. Kusterer and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 87 (535,702)

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Property rights, Public goods, Incomplete contracts, Investment incentives, Laboratory experiments

31.
Downloads 86 (539,619)
Citation 3

On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 65 (642,238)

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On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 28 Mar 2003
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 21 (976,471)
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Auctions, duopoly, selling mechanisms, private information

On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition

Posted: 30 Apr 2004
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

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Auctions, Duopoly, Selling mechanisms, Private information

Contracting under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study

Experimental Economics, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 72 Posted: 30 Oct 2023 Last Revised: 02 Nov 2023
Petra Nieken and Patrick W. Schmitz
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and University of Cologne
Downloads 81 (566,082)

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contracts, externalities, bargaining, communication, laboratory experiments

Contracting Under Asymmetric Information and Externalities: An Experimental Study

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15492
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 23 Dec 2020
Petra Nieken and Patrick W. Schmitz
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and University of Cologne
Downloads 0
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33.

Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 109, 2018, pp. 544-564
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 21 Aug 2019
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 81 (559,558)
Citation 3

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Moral hazard, Hidden action, Contract theory, Incentive theory, Laboratory experiments

34.

Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction?

Economics Letters, Vol. 224, No. 111012, 2023
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 07 Feb 2023
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 80 (563,699)

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moral hazard, limited liability, hidden action, incentive contracts, job design

Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 182, 2021
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 06 Feb 2021
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 73 (602,165)

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Contracting, Asymmetric information, Adverse selection, Screening, Information gathering

Contracting Under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15514
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 23 Dec 2020
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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36.

Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory

Economics Letters, Vol. 226, No. 111103, 2023
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 22 Apr 2023
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 64 (636,742)

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incomplete contracts, investment incentives, ownership rights, relationship specificity, transaction costs

37.

Participation Costs for Responders Can Reduce Rejection Rates in Ultimatum Bargaining

University of Zurich Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No. 398
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 11 Dec 2008
Philipp C. Wichardt, Daniel Schunk and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Rostock - Department of Economics, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz - Gutenberg School of Economics and Management and University of Cologne
Downloads 63 (641,760)

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Cognitive dissonance, participation costs, sunk costs, ultimatum

On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries

Economics Letters, Vol. 202, No. 109823, 2021
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 06 Apr 2021
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 58 (681,288)
Citation 1

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Incomplete contracts, Make-or-buy decision, Property rights approach, Private information, Outsourcing

On the Optimality of Outsourcing When Vertical Integration Can Mitigate Information Asymmetries

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15970
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 31 Mar 2021
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm

Economics Letters, Vol. 186, No. 108514, 2020
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 17 Jan 2020
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 57 (687,141)

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incomplete contracts, ownership rights, investment incentives, relationship specificity, moral hazard

Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13841
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 30 Jul 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 0
Citation 1
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Incomplete Contracts, Investment incentives, moral hazard, Ownership rights, relationship specificity

How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 123 (1), pp. 238-266.
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 18 Feb 2021
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 56 (693,183)

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contract theory, procurement, public-private partnerships, moral hazard, renegotiation

How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13406
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 07 Jan 2019
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 0
Citation 5
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innovations, moral hazard, Procurement, public-private partnerships, Renegotiation

41.

The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts

European Economic Review, Vol. 157, No. 104511, 2023
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 26 Jun 2023
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 54 (690,953)

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incomplete contracts, privatization, control rights, asymmetric information, investment incentives

Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information

Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 198, No. 104424, 2021
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 10 May 2021
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 44 (772,964)

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incomplete contracts, control rights, public goods, private information, investment incentives

Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Under Asymmetric Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16003
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 14 May 2021
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 0
Citation 3
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How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts

Economic Journal, Vol. 132 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueac024
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 03 May 2022
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 32 (869,512)

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contract theory, specific performance, at-will contracts, asymmetric information, ex-post inefficiencies

How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP17109
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 29 Mar 2022
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 0
Citation 1
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Asymmetric information, at-will contracts, Contract Theory, ex-post inefficiencies, specific performance

Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership

Economics Letters, Vol. 183, No. 108558, 2019
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 22 Aug 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 29 (896,754)

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property rights, incomplete contracts, limited liability, rent seeking, joint ownership

Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13881
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 02 Aug 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (1,181,121)
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Incomplete Contracts, joint ownership, limited liability, Property rights, rent seeking

Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: The Role of Bargaining Frictions

Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 132, 2015
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 29 (896,754)

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Ownership, Incomplete Contracts, Investment Incentives, Bargaining Frictions, Public Goods

Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: The Role of Bargaining Frictions

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10686
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 08 Jul 2015
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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bargaining frictions, incomplete contracts, investment incentives, ownership, public goods

Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 144, 2017
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 27 (915,792)

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Property Rights, Incomplete Contracts, Investment Incentives, Partnership Dissolution, Shared Ownership

Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12258
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 11 Sep 2017
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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Incomplete Contracts, Investment incentives, partnership dissolution, Property rights, shared ownership

Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments

European Economic Review, Vol. 110, 2018, pp. 211-222
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 24 Aug 2019
Susanne Goldlücke and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Mannheim and University of Cologne
Downloads 26 (925,614)
Citation 4

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Coasian contracting, negative externalities, hidden information, limited liability, overproduction

Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11217
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 18 Apr 2016
Susanne Goldlücke and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Mannheim and University of Cologne
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Coasean bargaining, externalities, hidden information, incentive contracting, limited liability

Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered

Economics Letters, Vol. 121, 2013
Number of pages: 4 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, Procurement Contracts, Bundling, Public Goods Provision

Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9676
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 07 Oct 2013
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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bundling, limited liability, moral hazard, procurement contracts, public goods provision

Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm

Economics Letters, Vol. 159, 2017
Number of pages: 4 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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Citation 8

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Property Rights, Relationship Specificity, Investment Incentives, Private Information, Incomplete Contracts

Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12174
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 25 Jul 2017
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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Incomplete Contracts, Investment incentives, private information, Property rights, relationship specificity

50.

Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 31 Mar 2004
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
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Hold-up problems, bargaining, contracts, taxation, externalities

The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 184, 653-669
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 05 Mar 2021
Daniel Müller and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Würzburg and University of Cologne
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Moral hazard, Incentive theory, Labor contracts, Efficiency wages, Law and economics

The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15567
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 23 Dec 2020
Daniel Müller and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Würzburg and University of Cologne
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52.
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Citation 4

Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered

Economics Letters, Vol. 125, 2014
Number of pages: 4 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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Ownership, Incomplete Contracts, Investment Incentives, Public Goods, Bargaining

Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10110
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 25 Sep 2014
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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bargaining, incomplete contracts, investment incentives, ownership, public goods

53.

Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 13 Aug 2002
Anke S. Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann and Patrick W. Schmitz
Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
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Limited liability, ex post information, adverse selection

The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information

Economics Letters, Vol. 145, 2016
Number of pages: 5 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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Transaction Costs, Property Rights, Bargaining, Incomplete Information, Joint Ownership

The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11276
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 16 May 2016
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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Bargaining, incomplete information, joint ownership, Property rights, transaction costs

55.

Garbled Elections

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5958
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 03 Jan 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz and Thomas Tröger
University of Cologne and University of Bonn - Institute of Economic Theory III - Department of Economics
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Majority rule, public goods

56.

Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6725
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 11 Jun 2008
Susanne Ohlendorf and Patrick W. Schmitz
affiliation not provided to SSRN and University of Cologne
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Dynamic moral hazard, hidden actions, limited liability

57.

Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does it Work?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6807
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 12 Jun 2008
Joerg Oechssler, Andreas Roider, Andreas Roider and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics, IZA Institute of Labor EconomicsUniversity of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics and University of Cologne
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behavioural biases, cognitive abilities, cooling-off, emotions, internet experiment, negotiations, ultimatum game

58.

Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6322
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 23 May 2008
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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hold-up problem, incomplete contracts, investment incentives

59.

Investments in Physical Capital, Relationship-Specificity, and the Property Rights Approach

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9396
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 19 Mar 2013
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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incomplete contracts, investment incentives, ownership, relationship-specificity, theory of the firm

60.

The Hold-Up Problem, Innovations, and Limited Liability

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9050
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 28 Sep 2012
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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hold-up problem, incomplete contracts, limited liability, research and development

61.

Repeated Moral Hazard and Contracts with Memory: A Laboratory Experiment

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8241
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 09 Feb 2011
Petra Nieken and Patrick W. Schmitz
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology and University of Cologne
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Laboratory experiment, Repeated moral hazard, Sequential hidden actions

62.

Contractual Solutions to Hold-Up Problems with Quality Uncertainty and Unobservable Investments

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7584
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 11 Jan 2010
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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common values, hidden action, hidden information, hold-up problem

63.

Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6988
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 02 Dec 2008
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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complete contracting, hold-up problem, Information gathering

64.

Bargaining Position, Bargaining Power, and the Property Rights Approach

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9281
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 01 Feb 2013
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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bargaining, incomplete contracts, investment incentives, ownership

65.

Public-Private Partnerships Versus Traditional Procurement: An Experimental Investigation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8167
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 18 Jan 2011
Eva I. Hoppe, David J. Kusterer and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics, University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
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experiment, incomplete contracts, procurement, public-private partnerships

66.

Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6476
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 30 May 2008
Andreas Roider, Andreas Roider and Patrick W. Schmitz
IZA Institute of Labor EconomicsUniversity of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics and University of Cologne
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auction theory, emotions, reserve prices

67.

Joint Ownership and the Hold-Up Problem under Asymmetric Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6478
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 30 May 2008
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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investment incentives, joint ownership, Property rights

68.

Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6467
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 30 May 2008
Tymofiy Mylovanov and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Bonn and University of Cologne
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hidden actions, Job design, limited liability, task assignment

69.

Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13204
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 02 Oct 2018
David J. Kusterer and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
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Incomplete Contracts, Investment incentives, Laboratory experiments, Property rights, Public Goods

70.

Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9510
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 21 Jun 2013
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
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Incentive theory, Laboratory experiment, Mechanism design, Private information

71.

Incomplete Contracts and Optimal Ownership of Public Goods

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9141
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 28 Sep 2012
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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incomplete contracts, investment incentives, ownership, public goods

72.

Public Goods and the Hold-Up Problem Under Asymmetric Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9065
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 28 Sep 2012
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, investment incentives, public goods

73.

Investments as Signals of Outside Options

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8366
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 04 May 2011
Susanne Goldlücke and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Mannheim and University of Cologne
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Citation 5
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hold-up problem, incomplete contracts, relationship-specific investments, signaling games

74.

Should a Principal Hire One Agent or Two Agents to Perform Two Sequential Tasks?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7976
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 25 Aug 2010
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
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conflicting tasks, moral hazard, synergies

75.

Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11632
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 14 Nov 2016
Daniel Müller and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Würzburg and University of Cologne
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Bargaining, Incomplete Contracts, Property rights, Public Goods, transaction costs

76.

The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11215
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 18 Apr 2016
David J. Kusterer and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
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Incomplete Contracts, Investment incentives, Laboratory experiments, Property rights

77.

Overdeterrence of Repeat Offenders When Penalties for First-Time Offenders are Restricted

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10249
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 17 Nov 2014
Daniel Müller and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Bonn and University of Cologne
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incentives, law enforcement, limited liability, penalties, repeat offenders

78.

Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10207
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 21 Oct 2014
Daniel Müller and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Bonn and University of Cologne
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incomplete contracts, joint ownership, property rights approach, transaction costs, vertical integration

79.

Randomization in Coalition Contracts

Public Choice, Vol. 94, Nos. 3-4, 1998
Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

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80.

Ex Post Liability for Harm Vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment

American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 4, 1998
Posted: 23 Nov 2007
Christian Ewerhart and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Zurich, Department of Economics and University of Cologne

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81.

'Yes Men', Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts

Posted: 15 May 2001
Christian Ewerhart and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Zurich, Department of Economics and University of Cologne

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Yes men, Incentive contracts, Integrity