Patrick W. Schmitz

University of Cologne

Prof. Dr.

Albertus-Magnus-Platz

Cologne, 50923

Germany

http://schmitz.uni-koeln.de/index.php?s=mitarbeiter&t=schmitz

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Research Fellow

London

United Kingdom

  • University of Cologne

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

74

DOWNLOADS
Rank 2,991

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 2,991

in Total Papers Downloads

12,550

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 1,786

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 1,786

in Total Papers Citations

98

CROSSREF CITATIONS

505

Scholarly Papers (74)

Actions:
Email selected abstracts
1.

The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory

Bulletin of Economic Research, Vol. 53, No. 1, January 2001
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 02 Apr 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 3,377 (3,153)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete contracts, hold-up problem, contract theory, property rights, theory of the firm

2.

Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach

Downloads 810 ( 30,558)
Citation 43

Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach

American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 1, 2006
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 794 (30,916)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5417
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 27 Mar 2006
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 16 (587,471)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Theory of the firm, incomplete contracts, ownership rights

3.

Simple Contracts, Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information, and the Hold-Up Problem

Downloads 731 ( 35,173)
Citation 1

Simple Contracts, Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information, and the Hold-Up Problem

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 06 Jun 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 731 (34,642)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Contract theory, private information, hold-up problem

Simple Contracts, Renegotiation Under Asymmetric Information, and the Hold-Up Problem

European Economic Review, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 169-188, 2002
Posted: 07 Jun 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

Abstract:

Loading...

Contract theory, private information, hold-up problem

4.

Public-Private Partnerships Versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering

Downloads 717 ( 36,117)
Citation 19

Public-Private Partnerships Versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 28 Feb 2010 Last Revised: 15 Oct 2012
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 715 (35,687)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Loading...

Public-Private Partnerships, Integration Versus Separation, Information Gathering, Incomplete Contracts

Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gathering

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7681
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 10 Feb 2010
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 2 (694,740)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete contracts, Information gathering, Integration versus separation, Public-private partnerships

5.

Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts - the Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered

Downloads 583 ( 47,614)

Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts - the Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 20 Feb 2003
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 583 (46,980)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered

FinanzArchiv, Vol. 57, No. 4, pp. 394-411, 2000
Posted: 17 Apr 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

Abstract:

Loading...

Partial privatization, incomplete contracts, property rights, joint ownership

6.

The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights

European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2001
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 13 Apr 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 475 (61,629)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Property rights, Bargaining, Private information, Coase theorem

7.

On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems

Downloads 473 ( 62,130)
Citation 2

On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 17 Dec 2002
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 473 (61,482)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

hidden action, hidden information, moral hazard

On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 103, No. 2, pp. 444-460, 2002
Posted: 17 Dec 2002
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

Abstract:

Loading...

hidden action, hidden information, moral hazard

8.

Workplace Surveillance, Privacy Protection, and Efficiency Wages

Downloads 458 ( 64,482)

Workplace Surveillance, Privacy Protection, and Efficiency Wages

Number of pages: 17 Posted: 21 Apr 2004
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 458 (63,835)

Abstract:

Loading...

Privacy protection laws, workplace surveillance, moral hazard

Workplace Surveillance, Privacy Protection, and Efficiency Wages

Labour Economics, Vol. 12, No. 6, 2005
Posted: 26 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

Abstract:

Loading...

9.

Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence

Downloads 446 ( 66,692)
Citation 26

Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 06 Mar 2009 Last Revised: 15 Dec 2010
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 441 (66,956)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Hold-up problem, option contracts, renegotiation, experiment

Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7205
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 07 Apr 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 5 (667,304)
Citation 2
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Experiment, Hold-up problem, Option contracts, Renegotiation

10.

On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation

Downloads 442 ( 67,244)
Citation 2

On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation

Number of pages: 17 Posted: 12 Feb 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 442 (66,579)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation

International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 371-382, 2000 and Vol. 20, No. 4, P. 575, 2000
Posted: 05 Apr 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

Abstract:

Loading...

11.

Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks

Downloads 391 ( 77,816)
Citation 12

Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 28 Feb 2009 Last Revised: 17 Dec 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 389 (77,585)

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete contracts, Contractible control, Privatization

Public versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7056
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 18 Dec 2008
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 2 (694,740)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Contractible control, Incomplete contracts, Privatization

12.

Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence

Downloads 331 ( 94,216)

Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 01 Apr 2009 Last Revised: 17 Jul 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 327 (94,862)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Agency theory, adverse selection, information gathering, experiment

Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7252
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 15 Apr 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 4 (675,143)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

adverse selection, agency theory, experiment, information gathering

13.

Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases

IZA Discussion Paper No. 3481
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 03 Nov 2008
Joerg Oechssler, Andreas Roider and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics, University of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics and University of Cologne
Downloads 307 (102,348)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Loading...

behavioral finance, biases, cognitive abilities, cognitive reflection test

14.

Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods Under Private Information

Downloads 294 (107,323)
Citation 10

Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods Under Private Information

Number of pages: 18 Posted: 19 Feb 2003
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 294 (106,730)
Citation 10

Abstract:

Loading...

excludable public goods, asymmetric information

Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods Under Private Information

Public Finance, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 89-101, 1997
Posted: 19 Feb 2003
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

Abstract:

Loading...

15.

Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions

Downloads 288 (109,727)
Citation 39

Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2005
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 26 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 256 (123,654)

Abstract:

Loading...

Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5145
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 17 Aug 2005
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 32 (487,519)
Citation 4
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Contract theory, hidden action, limited liability, moral hazard

16.

Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information

Downloads 274 (115,679)
Citation 3

Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 21 Apr 2004
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 248 (127,741)

Abstract:

Loading...

Job security, employment protection, labor market rigidities

Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4031
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 11 Jan 2005
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 26 (521,456)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Job security, employment protection, labor market rigidities

Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information

European Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 5, pp. 1027-1046, 2004
Posted: 12 Aug 2004
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

Abstract:

Loading...

Job security, employment protection, labor market rigidities

17.

On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies Under Asymmetric Information

Downloads 270 (117,470)

On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies Under Asymmetric Information

Number of pages: 17 Posted: 21 Jan 2003
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 270 (116,876)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

licensing, Innovation, Monopoly, Private Information

On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies Under Asymmetric Information

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 106, No. 1, pp. 177-189, 2002
Posted: 03 Feb 2003
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

Abstract:

Loading...

licensing, patents, R&D, asymmetric information, adverse selection

18.

Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments

Downloads 240 (132,612)
Citation 5

Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments

Schmalenbach Business Review, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 72-89, January 2004
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 21 Apr 2004
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 222 (142,656)

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete Contracts, Property Rights, Repeated Games

Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2679
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 28 Feb 2001
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 18 (574,038)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete Contracts, Joint Ownership

19.

Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?

Downloads 222 (143,064)
Citation 5

Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 26 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 205 (154,014)

Abstract:

Loading...

Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always Be Enforced?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5292
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 29 Dec 2005
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 17 (580,784)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Contract modification, renegotiation, moral hazard

Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always Be Enforced?

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 315-329, 2005
Posted: 05 Nov 2004
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

Abstract:

Loading...

Contract modification, renegotiation, moral hazard

20.

Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Downloads 187 (167,894)
Citation 8

Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Number of pages: 66 Posted: 22 Dec 2012
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 187 (167,822)

Abstract:

Loading...

agency theory, adverse selection, information gathering, ultimatum game, social preferences, experiment

Contracting Under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9287
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 01 Feb 2013
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 0
Citation 2
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Adverse selection, Agency theory, Experiment, Information gathering, Social preferences, Ultimatum game

21.

The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures

Downloads 187 (167,894)

The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures

Number of pages: 13 Posted: 15 Jun 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 185 (169,489)

Abstract:

Loading...

Hidden information, adverse selection, information gathering

The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7331
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 15 Jul 2009
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 2 (694,740)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

adverse selection, Hidden information, information gathering

22.

Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points

Downloads 137 (218,740)
Citation 15

Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points

Number of pages: 22 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 81 (317,421)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4264
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 25 Feb 2004
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 46 (425,030)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Behavioural economics, auction theory, reserve prices, reference points

Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points

Economic Journal, Vol. 117, No. 520, pp. 637-653, April 2007
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 01 Jun 2007
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 10 (630,468)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

23.

Exclusive Versus Non-Exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard

Downloads 114 (251,299)
Citation 2

Exclusive Versus Non-Exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard

Economics Letters, Vol. 97, No. 3, 2007
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 26 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 113 (254,129)

Abstract:

Loading...

Exclusive versus Non-Exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6207
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 22 May 2008
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (708,521)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Innovation, Licences, Monopoly, Private information

24.

Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances

Downloads 112 (254,506)
Citation 7

Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 81 (317,421)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2698
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 22 Mar 2001
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 31 (492,804)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete contracts, partnerships, property rights, R&D alliances

Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 43(1), 2003, pp. 153-173
Posted: 14 Jan 2003
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne

Abstract:

Loading...

Property Rights, R&D alliances, Partnerships, Incomplete Contracts

25.

Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information

Downloads 101 (273,443)

Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information

European Economic Review, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2007
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 85 (308,038)

Abstract:

Loading...

Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5747
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 23 Aug 2006
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 16 (587,471)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

mechanism design, hard information

26.

Know-How Disclosure and Incomplete Contracts

Economics Letters, Vol. 63, No. 2, 1999
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 85 (305,412)

Abstract:

Loading...

27.

On Synergies and Vertical Integration

Downloads 84 (307,649)
Citation 1

On Synergies and Vertical Integration

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz and Dirk Sliwka
University of Cologne and University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences
Downloads 84 (310,326)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

On Synergies and Vertical Integration

International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 19, No. 8, Pp. 1281-1295, 2001
Posted: 06 Sep 2001
Patrick W. Schmitz and Dirk Sliwka
University of Cologne and University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences

Abstract:

Loading...

Vertical integration, incomplete contracts, relationship specificity, core competence, synergies

28.

On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition

Downloads 63 (361,338)
Citation 3

On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 42 (441,382)

Abstract:

Loading...

On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3774
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 28 Mar 2003
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 21 (553,671)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, duopoly, selling mechanisms, private information

On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition

Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 39, No. 8, pp. 901-909, 2003
Posted: 30 Apr 2004
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, Duopoly, Selling mechanisms, Private information

29.

'Yes Men,' Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts

Number of pages: 17 Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Christian Ewerhart and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Zurich, Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 47 (413,518)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Loading...

30.

Job Design with Conflicting Tasks Reconsidered

Downloads 39 (444,859)
Citation 1

Job Design with Conflicting Tasks Reconsidered

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 02 Nov 2012
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 38 (458,919)

Abstract:

Loading...

moral hazard, limited liability, conflicting tasks, synergies

Job Design with Conflicting Tasks Reconsidered

European Economic Review, Vol. 57, 2013
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (708,521)

Abstract:

Loading...

Moral hazard, Limited liability, Conflicting tasks, Synergies

31.

Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?

Downloads 36 (457,448)
Citation 2

Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4263
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 31 Mar 2004
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 24 (534,061)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Hold-up problems, bargaining, contracts, taxation, externalities

Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?

Economica, Vol. 74, No. 296, pp. 573-585, November 2007
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 22 Oct 2007
Stephanie Rosenkranz and Patrick W. Schmitz
Utrecht University - School of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 12 (616,063)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

32.

Participation Costs for Responders Can Reduce Rejection Rates in Ultimatum Bargaining

University of Zurich Institute for Empirical Research in Economics Working Paper No. 398
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 11 Dec 2008
Philipp C. Wichardt, Daniel Schunk and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Rostock - Department of Economics, Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz - Gutenberg School of Economics and Management and University of Cologne
Downloads 31 (480,333)

Abstract:

Loading...

Cognitive dissonance, participation costs, sunk costs, ultimatum

33.

Public Goods, Property Rights, and Investment Incentives: An Experimental Investigation

Number of pages: 60 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
David J. Kusterer and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 30 (495,559)

Abstract:

Loading...

Property rights, Public goods, Incomplete contracts, Investment incentives, Laboratory experiments

34.

Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3428
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 13 Aug 2002
Anke S. Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann and Patrick W. Schmitz
Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics, University of Bonn - Economic Science Area and University of Cologne
Downloads 20 (541,658)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Limited liability, ex post information, adverse selection

35.

Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory

Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 109, 2018, pp. 544-564
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 21 Aug 2019
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 17 (560,105)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Moral hazard, Hidden action, Contract theory, Incentive theory, Laboratory experiments

36.

Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm

Downloads 15 (572,395)

Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm

Economics Letters, Vol. 186, No. 108514, 2020
Number of pages: 11 Posted: 17 Jan 2020
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 15 (594,390)

Abstract:

Loading...

incomplete contracts, ownership rights, investment incentives, relationship specificity, moral hazard

Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13841
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 30 Jul 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete Contracts, Investment incentives, moral hazard, Ownership rights, relationship specificity

37.

Endogenous Punishments in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information

International Economic Review, Vol. 46, No. 4, pp. 1207-1231, November 2005
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 07 Nov 2005
Anke S. Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann and Patrick W. Schmitz
Simon Fraser University (SFU) - Department of Economics, University of Bonn - Economic Science Area and University of Cologne
Downloads 14 (578,873)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

38.

Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership

Downloads 9 (611,713)

Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership

Economics Letters, Vol. 183, No. 108558, 2019
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 22 Aug 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 8 (645,030)

Abstract:

Loading...

property rights, incomplete contracts, limited liability, rent seeking, joint ownership

Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13881
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 02 Aug 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (708,521)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete Contracts, joint ownership, limited liability, Property rights, rent seeking

39.

Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments

Downloads 9 (611,713)

Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments

European Economic Review, Vol. 110, 2018, pp. 211-222
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 24 Aug 2019
Susanne Goldlücke and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Mannheim and University of Cologne
Downloads 8 (645,030)

Abstract:

Loading...

Coasian contracting, negative externalities, hidden information, limited liability, overproduction

Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11217
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 18 Apr 2016
Susanne Goldlücke and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Mannheim and University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (708,521)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Coasean bargaining, externalities, hidden information, incentive contracting, limited liability

40.

Garbled Elections

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5958
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 03 Jan 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz and Thomas Tröger
University of Cologne and University of Bonn - Institute of Economic Theory III - Department of Economics
Downloads 9 (611,713)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Majority rule, public goods

41.

Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered

Downloads 8 (618,435)
Citation 4

Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered

Economics Letters, Vol. 121, 2013
Number of pages: 4 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 7 (652,342)

Abstract:

Loading...

Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, Procurement Contracts, Bundling, Public Goods Provision

Public Procurement in Times of Crisis: The Bundling Decision Reconsidered

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9676
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 07 Oct 2013
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (708,521)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

bundling, limited liability, moral hazard, procurement contracts, public goods provision

42.

Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives

Downloads 6 (631,919)

Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 144, 2017
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 6 (659,707)

Abstract:

Loading...

Property Rights, Incomplete Contracts, Investment Incentives, Partnership Dissolution, Shared Ownership

Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12258
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 11 Sep 2017
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete Contracts, Investment incentives, partnership dissolution, Property rights, shared ownership

43.

Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: The Role of Bargaining Frictions

Downloads 5 (638,830)
Citation 4

Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: The Role of Bargaining Frictions

Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 132, 2015
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 5 (667,304)

Abstract:

Loading...

Ownership, Incomplete Contracts, Investment Incentives, Bargaining Frictions, Public Goods

Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: The Role of Bargaining Frictions

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10686
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 08 Jul 2015
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

bargaining frictions, incomplete contracts, investment incentives, ownership, public goods

44.

Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6725
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 11 Jun 2008
Susanne Ohlendorf and Patrick W. Schmitz
affiliation not provided to SSRN and University of Cologne
Downloads 5 (638,830)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Dynamic moral hazard, hidden actions, limited liability

45.

Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm

Downloads 4 (645,964)
Citation 3

Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm

Economics Letters, Vol. 159, 2017
Number of pages: 4 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 4 (675,143)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Property Rights, Relationship Specificity, Investment Incentives, Private Information, Incomplete Contracts

Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12174
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 25 Jul 2017
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete Contracts, Investment incentives, private information, Property rights, relationship specificity

46.

Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does it Work?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6807
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 12 Jun 2008
Joerg Oechssler, Andreas Roider and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics, University of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics and University of Cologne
Downloads 4 (645,964)
Citation 2
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

behavioural biases, cognitive abilities, cooling-off, emotions, internet experiment, negotiations, ultimatum game

47.

Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6322
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 23 May 2008
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 4 (645,964)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

hold-up problem, incomplete contracts, investment incentives

48.

The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information

Downloads 3 (653,833)
Citation 1

The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information

Economics Letters, Vol. 145, 2016
Number of pages: 5 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 3 (683,929)

Abstract:

Loading...

Transaction Costs, Property Rights, Bargaining, Incomplete Information, Joint Ownership

The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11276
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 16 May 2016
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 0
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Bargaining, incomplete information, joint ownership, Property rights, transaction costs

49.

Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered

Downloads 3 (653,833)
Citation 4

Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered

Economics Letters, Vol. 125, 2014
Number of pages: 4 Posted: 14 Mar 2019
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 3 (683,929)

Abstract:

Loading...

Ownership, Incomplete Contracts, Investment Incentives, Public Goods, Bargaining

Optimal Ownership of Public Goods Reconsidered

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10110
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 25 Sep 2014
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 0
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

bargaining, incomplete contracts, investment incentives, ownership, public goods

50.

Investments in Physical Capital, Relationship-Specificity, and the Property Rights Approach

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9396
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 19 Mar 2013
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 3 (653,833)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

incomplete contracts, investment incentives, ownership, relationship-specificity, theory of the firm

51.

The Hold-Up Problem, Innovations, and Limited Liability

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9050
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 28 Sep 2012
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 3 (653,833)
Citation 2
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

hold-up problem, incomplete contracts, limited liability, research and development

52.

Repeated Moral Hazard and Contracts with Memory: A Laboratory Experiment

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8241
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 09 Feb 2011
Petra Nieken and Patrick W. Schmitz
Chair of Human Resource Management and University of Cologne
Downloads 3 (653,833)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Laboratory experiment, Repeated moral hazard, Sequential hidden actions

53.

Contractual Solutions to Hold-Up Problems with Quality Uncertainty and Unobservable Investments

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7584
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 11 Jan 2010
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 3 (653,833)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

common values, hidden action, hidden information, hold-up problem

54.

Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6988
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 02 Dec 2008
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 3 (653,833)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

complete contracting, hold-up problem, Information gathering

55.

Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices

Downloads 3 (653,833)
Citation 1

Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6476
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 30 May 2008
Andreas Roider and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics and University of Cologne
Downloads 2 (694,740)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

auction theory, emotions, reserve prices

Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, Issue 3, pp. 808-830, 2012
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 23 Aug 2012
Andreas Roider and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics and University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (708,521)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Auction theory, emotions, reserve prices

56.

Bargaining Position, Bargaining Power, and the Property Rights Approach

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9281
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 01 Feb 2013
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 2 (663,307)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

bargaining, incomplete contracts, investment incentives, ownership

57.

Public-Private Partnerships Versus Traditional Procurement: An Experimental Investigation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8167
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 18 Jan 2011
Eva I. Hoppe, David J. Kusterer and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics, University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 2 (663,307)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

experiment, incomplete contracts, procurement, public-private partnerships

58.

Joint Ownership and the Hold-Up Problem under Asymmetric Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6478
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 30 May 2008
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 2 (663,307)
Citation 2
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

investment incentives, joint ownership, Property rights

59.

Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6467
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 30 May 2008
Tymofiy Mylovanov and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Bonn and University of Cologne
Downloads 2 (663,307)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

hidden actions, Job design, limited liability, task assignment

60.

Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13204
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 02 Oct 2018
David J. Kusterer and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (675,288)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete Contracts, Investment incentives, Laboratory experiments, Property rights, Public Goods

61.

Do Sellers Offer Menus of Contracts to Separate Buyer Types? An Experimental Test of Adverse Selection Theory

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9510
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 21 Jun 2013
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (675,288)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Incentive theory, Laboratory experiment, Mechanism design, Private information

62.

Incomplete Contracts and Optimal Ownership of Public Goods

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9141
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 28 Sep 2012
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (675,288)
Citation 2
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

incomplete contracts, investment incentives, ownership, public goods

63.

Public Goods and the Hold-Up Problem Under Asymmetric Information

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9065
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 28 Sep 2012
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (675,288)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

asymmetric information, incomplete contracts, investment incentives, public goods

64.

Repeated Moral Hazard and Contracts with Memory: The Case of Risk‐Neutrality

International Economic Review, Vol. 53, Issue 2, pp. 433-452, 2012
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 23 May 2012
Susanne Ohlendorf and Patrick W. Schmitz
affiliation not provided to SSRN and University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (675,288)
Citation 3
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

65.

Investments as Signals of Outside Options

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8366
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 04 May 2011
Susanne Goldlücke and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Mannheim and University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (675,288)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

hold-up problem, incomplete contracts, relationship-specific investments, signaling games

66.

Should a Principal Hire One Agent or Two Agents to Perform Two Sequential Tasks?

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7976
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 25 Aug 2010
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne
Downloads 1 (675,288)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

conflicting tasks, moral hazard, synergies

67.

How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13406
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 07 Jan 2019
Eva I. Hoppe and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 0 (692,420)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

innovations, moral hazard, Procurement, public-private partnerships, Renegotiation

68.

Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11632
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 14 Nov 2016
Daniel Müller and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Würzburg and University of Cologne
Downloads 0 (692,420)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Bargaining, Incomplete Contracts, Property rights, Public Goods, transaction costs

69.

The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11215
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 18 Apr 2016
David J. Kusterer and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne - Department of Economics and University of Cologne
Downloads 0 (692,420)
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

Incomplete Contracts, Investment incentives, Laboratory experiments, Property rights

70.

Overdeterrence of Repeat Offenders When Penalties for First-Time Offenders are Restricted

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10249
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 17 Nov 2014
Daniel Müller and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Bonn and University of Cologne
Downloads 0 (692,420)
Citation 1
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

incentives, law enforcement, limited liability, penalties, repeat offenders

71.

Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10207
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 21 Oct 2014
Daniel Müller and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Bonn and University of Cologne
Downloads 0 (692,420)
Citation 3
  • Add to Cart

Abstract:

Loading...

incomplete contracts, joint ownership, property rights approach, transaction costs, vertical integration

72.

Randomization in Coalition Contracts

Public Choice, Vol. 94, Nos. 3-4, 1998
Posted: 25 Nov 2007
Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Cologne

Abstract:

Loading...

73.

Ex Post Liability for Harm Vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment

American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 4, 1998
Posted: 23 Nov 2007
Christian Ewerhart and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Zurich, Department of Economics and University of Cologne

Abstract:

Loading...

74.

'Yes Men', Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 43, No. 1, September 2000
Posted: 15 May 2001
Christian Ewerhart and Patrick W. Schmitz
University of Zurich, Department of Economics and University of Cologne

Abstract:

Loading...

Yes men, Incentive contracts, Integrity