Rene van den Brink

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics

De Boelelaan 1105

Amsterdam, 1081HV

Netherlands

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

15

DOWNLOADS

214

SSRN CITATIONS

4

CROSSREF CITATIONS

0

Scholarly Papers (15)

1.

An Axiomatic Analysis of Joint Liability Problems with Rooted ― Tree Structure

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 16-042/II
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 01 Jun 2016
Takayuki Oishi, Gerard van der Laan and Rene van den Brink
Meisei University - School of Economics, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics
Downloads 53 (443,742)

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Liability Problems, Tort Law, Rooted-Tree Graph, Axiomatization, Nucleolus

2.

Games with a Permission Structure: A Survey on Generalizations and Applications

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 2017-016/II
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 31 Jan 2017
Rene van den Brink
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics
Downloads 28 (558,521)
Citation 1

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Cooperative TU-game, hierarchy, permission structure, antimatroid, local permission structure, applications

3.

The Shapley Value and Games with Hierarchies

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2019-064/II
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 17 Sep 2019
Encarnacion Algaba and Rene van den Brink
University of Seville and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics
Downloads 20 (609,677)

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cooperative transferable utility game, permission structures, precedence constraints, Shapley value, hierarchical solution, power measures

4.

The Degree Measure as Utility Function over Positions in Networks

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. 17-065/II
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 22 Aug 2017
Rene van den Brink and Agnieszka Rusinowska
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics and University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)
Downloads 19 (616,400)

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Weighted network, network centrality, utility function, degree centrality, von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility function, cooperative TU-game, weighted directed network

5.

The Shapley Value, Proper Shapley Value, and Sharing Rules for Cooperative Ventures

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2018-089/II
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 10 Dec 2018
Rene van den Brink, Rene Levinsky and Miroslav Zeleny
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics, Charles University in Prague - CERGE-EI (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute) and Charles University in Prague - Faculty of Mathematics and Physics
Downloads 16 (636,994)
Citation 1

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Equity principle, Cooperative venture game, Shapley value, proper Shapley value

6.

Interval Solutions for TU-Games

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 17094/II
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 09 Oct 2017
Rene van den Brink, Osman Palanci and Sirma Zeynep Alparslan-Gok
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics, Suleyman Demirel University and Suleyman Demirel University
Downloads 15 (644,098)
Citation 1

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Cooperative TU-game, interval game, Moore subtraction, Moore-Shapley interval solution

7.

The Family of Ideal Values for Cooperative Games

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2018-002/II
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 17 Jan 2018
Wenna Wang, Hao Sun, Rene van den Brink and Genjiu Xu
Northwestern Polytechnical University, China, Northwestern Polytechnical University, China, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics and Northwestern Polytechnical University, China
Downloads 14 (651,303)
Citation 1

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Game theory, m-Individual expected reward, The family of ideal values, Dynamic process, CIS and EANS values

Valuation Monotonicity, Fairness and Stability in Assignment Problems

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2018-071/II
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 28 Sep 2018
Rene van den Brink, Marina Núñez and Francisco Robles
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics, University of Barcelona and University of Barcelona
Downloads 7 (732,024)

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assignment problems, stability, valuation monotonicity, valuation fairness, fair division rule, optimal rules

Valuation Monotonicity, Fairness and Stability in Assignment Problems

UB Economics Working Papers E18/378
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 24 Sep 2018
Rene van den Brink, Marina Núñez and Francisco Robles
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics, University of Barcelona and University of Barcelona
Downloads 6 (740,301)

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Assignment problem, valuation monotonicity, valuation fairness, stability, fair division rules, optimal rules.

9.

The Reverse TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 16-108/II
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 08 Dec 2016
Rene van den Brink and Juan D. Moreno Ternero
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics and Universidad Pablo de Olavide
Downloads 10 (680,564)
Citation 1

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Bankruptcy problems, reverse TAL-family, reverse Talmud rule, Equal awards, Equal losses

10.

Winning Coalitions in Plurality Voting Democracies

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2019-062/II
Number of pages: 29 Posted: 30 Aug 2019
Rene van den Brink, Dinko Dimitrov and Agnieszka Rusinowska
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics, University of Munich and CNRS - Paris School of Economics
Downloads 7 (702,792)

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plurality game, plurality voting, precise support, simple game in partition function form, winning coalition

11.

Networks, Communication and Hierarchy: Applications to Cooperative Games

Tinbergen Institute Discusion Paper 2021-019/II
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 25 Feb 2021
Encarnacion Algaba and Rene van den Brink
University of Seville and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics
Downloads 6 (710,433)

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Networks, games, communication, hierarchy, cooperative TU-game, Shapley value

12.

Individual Weighted Excess and Least Square Values

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2020-033/II
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 14 Jul 2020
Xia Zhang, Rene van den Brink, Arantza Estevez-Fernandez and Hao Sun
Northwestern Polytechnical University, China, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics, VU University Amsterdam - Department of Econometrics and Operations Research and Northwestern Polytechnical University, China
Downloads 5 (718,010)

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Individual weighted excess, Prenucleolus, Least square value, Weighted super core, Shapley value

13.

Peaceful Agreements to Share a River

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2020-016/II
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 29 Apr 2020
Rene van den Brink and Saish Nevrekar
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
Downloads 4 (725,799)

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River sharing, peaceful agreement, contest success function, subgame perfect equilibrium

14.

Sharing the cost of cleaning up a polluted river

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2021-028/II
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 06 Apr 2021
Wenzhong Li, Genjiu Xu and Rene van den Brink
Northwestern Polytechnical University, Northwestern Polytechnical University, China and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics
Downloads 2 (744,216)

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pollution cost-sharing problems, alpha-Local Responsibility Sharing method, axiomatization, cooperative games

15.

Balanced Externalities and the Proportional Allocation of Nonseparable Contributions

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2021-024/II
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 19 Mar 2021
Rene van den Brink, Youngsub Chun, Yukihiko Funaki and Zhengxing Zou
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, School of Business and Economics, Seoul National University - School of Economics, Waseda University, School of Political Science and Economics and Beijing Institute of Technology
Downloads 2 (744,216)

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Cooperative game, balanced externalities, proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions, consistency