34 Voie du Roman Pays
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, b-1348
Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
School choice, Dominant strategy, Undominated strategy, Manipulability, Stability, Tie-breaking, Boston mechanism, Deferred acceptance mechanism.
Multiple solutions, School choice, Stability, Boston mechanism, Deferred acceptance mechanism, Nash equilibrium, Undominated strategy
School choice, Constraints, Undominated strategy, Maximin strategies, Boston mechanism, Deferred acceptance mechanism
COVID-19, welfare, poverty, mortality
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Composite Indices, Deprivation Measurement, Premature Mortality
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