Austin, TX 78712
University of Texas at Austin
marriage, qualifications, assortative mating, latent ability
assortative mating, qualifications, marriage, latent ability
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Assortative mating, Latent ability, Marriage, Qualifications
principal-agency, moral hazard, differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives
differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives., moral hazard, principal-agency
Higher-order beliefs, Mis-specified models, Non-common priors, overconfidence, Policy persistence
consumer privacy, dynamic demand, endogenous screening, Nonlinear Pricing
Private monitoring, Relational Contracts, repeated games
human capital development, Human capital investment, Imperfect commitment, Premarital investment, Public Goods, Sex-ratio imbalances
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