Venkataraman Bhaskar

University of Texas at Austin

2317 Speedway

Austin, TX 78712

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

6

DOWNLOADS

86

SSRN CITATIONS

8

CROSSREF CITATIONS

2

Scholarly Papers (6)

Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability

CESifo Working Paper No. 7570
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 05 Apr 2019
Dan Anderberg, Jesper Bagger, Venkataraman Bhaskar and Tanya Wilson
University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics, University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin and affiliation not provided to SSRN
Downloads 25 (761,102)

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marriage, qualifications, assortative mating, latent ability

Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability

IZA Discussion Paper No. 12210
Number of pages: 58 Posted: 21 May 2019
Dan Anderberg, Jesper Bagger, Venkataraman Bhaskar and Tanya Wilson
University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics, University of London - Royal Holloway College, University of Texas at Austin and University of London - Royal Holloway College
Downloads 24 (761,102)

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assortative mating, qualifications, marriage, latent ability

Marriage Market Equilibrium, Qualifications, and Ability

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13590
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 18 Mar 2019
Dan Anderberg, Jesper Bagger, Venkataraman Bhaskar and Tanya Wilson
University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics, University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics, University of Texas at Austin and affiliation not provided to SSRN
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Assortative mating, Latent ability, Marriage, Qualifications

2.
Downloads 34 (665,120)
Citation 5

The Curse of Long Horizons

PIER Working Paper No. 18-029
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 04 Dec 2018
Venkataraman Bhaskar and George J. Mailath
University of Texas at Austin and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 34 (682,872)
Citation 5

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principal-agency, moral hazard, differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives

The Curse of Long Horizons

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11431
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 16 Aug 2016
Venkataraman Bhaskar and George J. Mailath
University of Texas at Austin and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
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differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives., moral hazard, principal-agency

3.

The Culture of Overconfidence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12740
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 26 Feb 2018
Venkataraman Bhaskar and Caroline Thomas
University of Texas at Austin and University of Texas at Austin
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Higher-order beliefs, Mis-specified models, Non-common priors, overconfidence, Policy persistence

4.

Consumer Privacy and Serial Monopoly

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13686
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 24 Apr 2019
Venkataraman Bhaskar and Nikita Roketskiy
University of Texas at Austin and University College London - Department of Economics
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consumer privacy, dynamic demand, endogenous screening, Nonlinear Pricing

5.

Robust Relational Contracts with Subjective Performance Evaluation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP17312
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 27 May 2022
Venkataraman Bhaskar, Wojciech Olszewski and Thomas Wiseman
University of Texas at Austin, Northwestern University - Department of Economics and The University of Texas at Austin
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Private monitoring, Relational Contracts, repeated games

6.

Multidimensional Pre-Marital Investments with Imperfect Commitment

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16864
Number of pages: 68 Posted: 04 Feb 2022
Venkataraman Bhaskar, Wenchao Li and Junjian Yi
University of Texas at Austin, Tongji University and Peking University
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human capital development, Human capital investment, Imperfect commitment, Premarital investment, Public Goods, Sex-ratio imbalances