Austin, TX 78712
University of Texas at Austin
principal-agency, moral hazard, differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $8.00 for this paper.
If you wish to purchase the right to make copies of this paper for distribution to others, please select the quantity.
differences in beliefs, high-powered incentives., moral hazard, principal-agency
assortative mating, qualifications, marriage, latent ability
marriage, qualifications, assortative mating, latent ability
Assortative mating, Latent ability, Marriage, Qualifications
Higher-order beliefs, Mis-specified models, Non-common priors, overconfidence, Policy persistence
consumer privacy, dynamic demand, endogenous screening, Nonlinear Pricing
This page was processed by aws-apollo4 in 0.300 seconds