Artur Gorokh

Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics

Graduate Student

657 Rhodes Hall

Ithaca, NY 14853-3801

United States

  • Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

4

DOWNLOADS

1,394

TOTAL CITATIONS

27

Scholarly Papers (4)

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1.

From Monetary to Non-Monetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 08 May 2017 Last Revised: 22 Feb 2019
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 603 (94,777)
Citation 19

Abstract:

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artificial currency, mechanism design, welfare, repeated allocation

2.

The Remarkable Robustness of the Repeated Fisher Market

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 30 Jun 2019 Last Revised: 03 Jun 2021
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 281 (227,971)

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Non-monetary mechanism, artificial currency, repeated auction, price of anarchy, robust mechanism design

3.

Near-Efficient Allocation Using Artificial Currency in Repeated Settings

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 17 Oct 2016
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 273 (234,690)
Citation 7

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artificial currency, welfare, incentive compatibility, repeated all-pay auctions

4.

When Bribes are Harmless: The Power and Limits of Collusion-Resilient Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 27 Feb 2018 Last Revised: 10 May 2019
Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee and Krishnamurthy Iyer
Cornell University - Center for Applied Mathematics, Cornell University - School of Operations Research and Information Engineering and University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering
Downloads 237 (270,354)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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mechanism design, collusion, efficient allocation, impossibility results, surplus submodularity