Song Zuo

Google Research

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

10

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Top 27,205

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3,294

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 47,530

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 47,530

in Total Papers Citations

11

CROSSREF CITATIONS

5

Scholarly Papers (10)

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1.

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

Econometrica, Vol. 88, No. 5
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 23 Nov 2016 Last Revised: 05 Oct 2020
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang and Song Zuo
Google Research, Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Research
Downloads 1,019 (38,777)
Citation 3

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Dynamic mechanism design, revenue optimization, non-clairvoyance.

2.

The Landscape of Auto-Bidding Auctions: Value Versus Utility Maximization

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 18 Feb 2021
Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Research, Google Research and Google Research
Downloads 637 (73,040)
Citation 2

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Autobidding, Mechanism Design, Revenue Maximization

3.

Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 4081457
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 27 Apr 2022
Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Research, Google Research and Google Research
Downloads 474 (105,915)

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internet advertising, autobidding, mechanism design, value maximization, budget constraints, return-on-spend constraints

4.

Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-64
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 03 Aug 2018 Last Revised: 18 May 2021
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Inc. and Google Research
Downloads 315 (166,471)
Citation 1

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double auctions, two-sided markets, dynamic mechanism design, revenue management

5.

Dynamic Mechanism Design in the Field

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 24 Apr 2017 Last Revised: 21 Feb 2018
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Rita Ren and Song Zuo
Google Research, Google Inc., Google Inc., New York and Google Research
Downloads 193 (268,744)
Citation 2

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Dynamic Auctions, Dynamic Second Price Auction, Bank Account Mechanisms, Internet Advertising

6.

Dynamic Revenue Sharing

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 25 Apr 2017
Santiago Balseiro, Max Lin, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Research, Google Inc. and Google Research
Downloads 178 (288,676)
Citation 5

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Dynamic Revenue Sharing, Internet Advertising, Revenue Sharing, Ad Exchanges, Two-sided Markets

7.

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 10 Jun 2019 Last Revised: 01 Jun 2021
Yuan Deng, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Duke University, Google Research and Google Research
Downloads 174 (297,475)
Citation 5

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dynamic mechanism design, general constraints, public correlation, repeated auctions, budget, non-clairvoyance, bank account mechanisms

8.

Non-Excludable Dynamic Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 17 Dec 2020
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Inc. and Google Research
Downloads 170 (300,392)

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dynamic mechanism design, non-excludability, geometric method

9.

Optimal Dynamic Auctions Are Virtual Welfare Maximizers

Number of pages: 19 Posted: 05 Dec 2018
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang and Song Zuo
Google Research, Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Research
Downloads 84 (504,888)

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Dynamic Auctions; Bank Account Mechanisms; Revenue Maximization; Virtual Values; Ironing; Virtual Welfare Maximizers

10.

Optimal Mechanisms for a Value Maximizer: The Futility of Screening Targets

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 10 Feb 2023
Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Research, Google Research and Google Research
Downloads 50 (660,110)

Abstract:

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internet advertising, autobidding, mechanism design, value maximization, return-on-spend constraints, two-part tariff