Song Zuo

Google Research

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

10

DOWNLOADS
Rank 26,987

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 26,987

in Total Papers Downloads

4,084

TOTAL CITATIONS
Rank 48,837

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 48,837

in Total Papers Citations

19

Scholarly Papers (10)

Actions:
Email selected abstracts
1.

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

Econometrica, Vol. 88, No. 5
Number of pages: 65 Posted: 23 Nov 2016 Last Revised: 05 Oct 2020
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang and Song Zuo
Google Research, Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Research
Downloads 1,099 (43,425)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Dynamic mechanism design, revenue optimization, non-clairvoyance.

2.

The Landscape of Auto-Bidding Auctions: Value Versus Utility Maximization

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 18 Feb 2021
Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Research, Google Research and Google Research
Downloads 827 (64,447)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Autobidding, Mechanism Design, Revenue Maximization

3.

Optimal Mechanisms for Value Maximizers with Budget Constraints via Target Clipping

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 4081457
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 27 Apr 2022
Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Research, Google Research and Google Research
Downloads 688 (81,951)

Abstract:

Loading...

internet advertising, autobidding, mechanism design, value maximization, budget constraints, return-on-spend constraints

4.

Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-64
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 03 Aug 2018 Last Revised: 18 May 2021
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Inc. and Google Research
Downloads 358 (180,369)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

double auctions, two-sided markets, dynamic mechanism design, revenue management

5.

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 10 Jun 2019 Last Revised: 01 Jun 2021
Yuan Deng, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Duke University, Google Research and Google Research
Downloads 211 (310,425)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Loading...

dynamic mechanism design, general constraints, public correlation, repeated auctions, budget, non-clairvoyance, bank account mechanisms

6.

Dynamic Revenue Sharing

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 25 Apr 2017
Santiago Balseiro, Max Lin, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Research, Google Inc. and Google Research
Downloads 206 (317,484)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

Dynamic Revenue Sharing, Internet Advertising, Revenue Sharing, Ad Exchanges, Two-sided Markets

7.

Dynamic Mechanism Design in the Field

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 24 Apr 2017 Last Revised: 21 Feb 2018
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Rita Ren and Song Zuo
Google Research, Google Inc., Google Inc., New York and Google Research
Downloads 203 (321,941)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Dynamic Mechanism Design, Dynamic Auctions, Dynamic Second Price Auction, Bank Account Mechanisms, Internet Advertising

8.

Non-Excludable Dynamic Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 17 Dec 2020
Santiago Balseiro, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Inc. and Google Research
Downloads 201 (324,821)

Abstract:

Loading...

dynamic mechanism design, non-excludability, geometric method

9.

Optimal Mechanisms for a Value Maximizer: The Futility of Screening Targets

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 4351927
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 10 Feb 2023
Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Decision Risk and Operations, Google Research, Google Research, Google Research and Google Research
Downloads 199 (327,869)

Abstract:

Loading...

internet advertising, autobidding, mechanism design, value maximization, return-on-spend constraints, two-part tariff

10.

Optimal Dynamic Auctions Are Virtual Welfare Maximizers

Number of pages: 19 Posted: 05 Dec 2018
Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme, Pingzhong Tang and Song Zuo
Google Research, Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Research
Downloads 92 (607,071)

Abstract:

Loading...

Dynamic Auctions; Bank Account Mechanisms; Revenue Maximization; Virtual Values; Ironing; Virtual Welfare Maximizers