Song Zuo

Google Inc., New York

Software Engineer

111 8th Ave

New York, NY 10011

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

6

DOWNLOADS
Rank 38,299

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 38,299

in Total Papers Downloads

1,185

SSRN CITATIONS

2

CROSSREF CITATIONS

5

Scholarly Papers (6)

1.

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 62 Posted: 23 Nov 2016 Last Revised: 17 Dec 2019
Google Inc., Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 732 (35,120)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Bank Account Mechanisms, Non-Clairvoyance, Dynamic Auctions, Approximations, Internet Advertising

2.

Dynamic Double Auctions: Toward First Best

Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 18-64
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 03 Aug 2018 Last Revised: 21 Jul 2019
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Inc. and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 148 (205,552)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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double auctions, two-sided markets, dynamic mechanism design, revenue management

3.

Dynamic Mechanism Design in the Field

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 24 Apr 2017 Last Revised: 21 Feb 2018
Google Inc., Google Inc., Google Inc., New York and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 144 (210,257)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Dynamic Auctions, Dynamic Second Price Auction, Bank Account Mechanisms, Internet Advertising

4.

Dynamic Revenue Sharing

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 25 Apr 2017
Columbia Business School - Decision Risk and Operations, Google Inc., Google Inc., Google Inc. and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 89 (296,814)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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Dynamic Revenue Sharing, Internet Advertising, Revenue Sharing, Ad Exchanges, Two-sided Markets

5.

Optimal Dynamic Auctions Are Virtual Welfare Maximizers

Number of pages: 19 Posted: 05 Dec 2018
Google Inc., Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 40 (440,808)

Abstract:

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Dynamic Auctions; Bank Account Mechanisms; Revenue Maximization; Virtual Values; Ironing; Virtual Welfare Maximizers

6.

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints and Beyond

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 10 Jun 2019 Last Revised: 12 Jul 2019
Yuan Deng, Vahab Mirrokni and Song Zuo
Duke University, Google Inc. and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 32 (475,604)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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dynamic mechanism design, general constraints, public correlation, repeated auctions, budget, non-clairvoyance, bank account mechanisms