Pingzhong Tang

Tsinghua University

Beijing, 100084

China

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

2

DOWNLOADS

749

SSRN CITATIONS

0

CROSSREF CITATIONS

1

Scholarly Papers (2)

1.

Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism Design

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 23 Nov 2016 Last Revised: 02 Nov 2018
Google Inc., Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 711 (35,570)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Dynamic Mechanism Design, Bank Account Mechanisms, Non-Clairvoyance, Dynamic Auctions, Approximations, Internet Advertising

2.

Optimal Dynamic Auctions Are Virtual Welfare Maximizers

Number of pages: 19 Posted: 05 Dec 2018
Google Inc., Google Inc., Tsinghua University and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 38 (439,601)

Abstract:

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Dynamic Auctions; Bank Account Mechanisms; Revenue Maximization; Virtual Values; Ironing; Virtual Welfare Maximizers