Alexander W. Bloedel

Stanford University - Department of Economics

Landau Economics Building

579 Serra Mall

STANFORD, CA 94305-6072

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

2

DOWNLOADS

375

CITATIONS

5

Scholarly Papers (2)

1.

Persuasion with Rational Inattention

Number of pages: 71 Posted: 17 Apr 2018 Last Revised: 22 Jun 2018
Alexander W. Bloedel and Ilya R. Segal
Stanford University - Department of Economics and Stanford University
Downloads 339 (87,510)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Bayesian Persuasion, Rational Inattention, Costly Communication, Information Acquisition, Information Design, Monotone Partition, Cheap Talk

Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information

Number of pages: 100 Posted: 27 Dec 2017 Last Revised: 21 Sep 2018
Alexander W. Bloedel, R. Vijay Krishna and Oksana Leukhina
Stanford University - Department of Economics, Florida State University - Department of Economics and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis
Downloads 32 (466,559)

Abstract:

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Absolute immiseration, relative immiseration, dynamic contracting, recursive contracts, principal-agent problem, persistent private information

Insurance and Inequality with Persistent Private Information

FRB St. Louis Working Paper No. 2018-20
Number of pages: 101 Posted: 02 Oct 2018 Last Revised: 21 Feb 2019
Alexander W. Bloedel, R. Krishna and Oksana Leukhina
Stanford University - Department of Economics, Florida State University and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis
Downloads 4 (645,792)

Abstract:

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Absolute immiseration, relative immiseration, dynamic contracting, recursive contracts, principal-agent problem, persistent private information.