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Michal Barzuza

University of Virginia School of Law

580 Massie Road

Charlottesville, VA 22903

United States

  • University of Virginia School of Law

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

17

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CITATIONS
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Top 12,001

in Total Papers Citations

33

Scholarly Papers (17)

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1.

The Market for Corporate Law

Downloads 2,643 ( 3,837)
Citation 22

The Market for Corporate Law

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 162, pp. 134-172, 2006, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 377
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 28 Jun 2001 Last Revised: 17 Aug 2009
Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza and Lucian A. Bebchuk
Harvard Law School, University of Virginia School of Law and Harvard Law School
Downloads 2,567 (3,941)
Citation 22

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corporate law, managers, shareholders, regulatory competition, Delaware, private benefits of control, network externalities

The Market for Corporate Law

NBER Working Paper No. w9156
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 23 Oct 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Oren Bar-Gill and Michal Barzuza
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and University of Virginia School of Law
Downloads 48 (362,064)
Citation 22

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The Market for Corporate Law

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3553
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 04 Nov 2002
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Oren Bar-Gill and Michal Barzuza
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School and University of Virginia School of Law
Downloads 28 (442,590)
Citation 22
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Network externalities, private benefits of control, Delaware, regulatory competition, shareholders, corporate law

2.

Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction

98 Va. Law Rev. 935 (2012), Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2011-07
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 31 Aug 2011 Last Revised: 05 Mar 2013
Michal Barzuza
University of Virginia School of Law
Downloads 758 (19,201)
Citation 1

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Corporate Law, Nevada, State Competition, Duty of Loyalty, Duty of Good Faith, Race to the Top, Race to the Bottom, Delaware, Market Segmentation

3.

What Happens in Nevada? Self-Selecting into Lax Law

Review of Financial Studies 2014 doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhu058, Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2011-08
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 18 Jul 2010 Last Revised: 22 Feb 2016
Michal Barzuza and David C. Smith
University of Virginia School of Law and University of Virginia - McIntire School of Commerce
Downloads 662 (27,238)
Citation 1

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corporate law, Nevada, accounting restatements, agency costs

4.

The State of State Antitakeover Law

Virginia Law Review, Vol. 95, pp. 1973-2052, 2009, Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2010-07
Number of pages: 81 Posted: 13 Jan 2010 Last Revised: 19 Apr 2010
Michal Barzuza
University of Virginia School of Law
Downloads 606 (25,604)
Citation 3

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5.

Price Considerations in the Market for Corporate Law

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 486
Number of pages: 88 Posted: 05 Sep 2004
Michal Barzuza
University of Virginia School of Law
Downloads 458 (51,992)
Citation 3

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Delaware, Incorporation, Corporate Charters, Price, Regulatory Competition, Managers, Shareholders, Takeovers, Federalism

6.

Lemon Signaling in Cross-Listing

Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2012-03
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 18 Oct 2007 Last Revised: 14 Mar 2012
Michal Barzuza
University of Virginia School of Law
Downloads 425 (55,688)
Citation 3

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Controlling Shareholders, Control Premium, Cross-Listing, Private Benefits, Signaling

7.

Board Interlocks and Outside Directors’ Protection

Journal of Legal Studies, 2017, Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2013-11
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 21 Jun 2013 Last Revised: 10 Feb 2018
Michal Barzuza and Quinn Curtis
University of Virginia School of Law and University of Virginia School of Law
Downloads 256 (51,858)

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Outside Directors, Interlock, Indemnification, Advancement

8.

Delaware's Compensation

Virginia Law Review, Vol. 94, No. 3, p. 521, May 2008
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 26 Jun 2008
Michal Barzuza
University of Virginia School of Law
Downloads 116 (199,982)

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Delaware, Corporate law, Franchise tax, Regulatory competition

9.

Board Interlocks and Corporate Governance

Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (DJCL), Vol. 39, No. 3, 2014, Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2014-16
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 12 Nov 2014 Last Revised: 07 Aug 2017
Michal Barzuza and Quinn Curtis
University of Virginia School of Law and University of Virginia School of Law
Downloads 115 (136,503)

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Corporate law; Corporate Governance; Boards of Directors; Interlocks

10.

Noise Adopters in Corporate Governance

Columbia Business Law Review, Vol. 3, No. 627, 2013, Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2014-05
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 17 Jan 2014 Last Revised: 12 Feb 2014
Michal Barzuza
University of Virginia School of Law
Downloads 70 (268,191)

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Corporate Governance, Signaling, Noise, Staggered Board

11.

Does the Structure of the Franchise Tax Matter?

Virginia Law Review In Brief, Vol. 6, p. 27, May 2010
Number of pages: 7 Posted: 20 Jan 2014
Michal Barzuza
University of Virginia School of Law
Downloads 25 (417,603)

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Delaware, Franchise Tax, Corporate Law

12.

Supreme Court Amicus Brief of 22 Corporate Law Professors, Mark Janus v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 31, et aL, No. 16-1466

Number of pages: 56 Posted: 02 Jan 2018
John C. Coates, IV, Lucian A. Bebchuk, John C. Coffee, Bernard S. Black, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, James D. Cox, Marcel Kahan, Reinier Kraakman, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ronald J. Gilson, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Henry Hansmann, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian JM Quinn, Michal Barzuza, Mira Ganor, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott, Holger Spamann and Randall S. Thomas
Harvard Law School, Harvard Law School, Columbia Law School, Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law, Widener University Delaware Law School, Duke University School of Law, New York University School of Law, Harvard Law School, Columbia Law School, Stanford Law School, University of Michigan Law School, Stanford Law School, Yale University - Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, BC Law School, University of Virginia School of Law, University of Texas at Austin - School of Law, New York University School of Law, Harvard Law School, New York University (NYU), Harvard Law School and Vanderbilt University - Law School
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corporate politics, union politics, First Amendment, shareholder rights, corporate speech

13.

Unbundling the Dynamics of MV Implementation: Voluntary Versus Reluctant Adoption of MV as a Source of an Omitted-Variable Bias: A Response to Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan, And Edward B. Rock, Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability? 83 U Chi L Rev 1119 (2016)

85 University of Chicago Law Review Online 242, 2017
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 02 Nov 2017 Last Revised: 18 Mar 2018
Michal Barzuza
University of Virginia School of Law
Downloads 0 (487,936)

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corporate governance, board, directors elections, shareholder proposals, majority voting rule, MVR, plurality voting rule, PVR, shareholder activism, stock exchanges, Institutional Shareholder Services Inc., ISS, SEC, no-action letters

14.

The Private Ordering Paradox in Corporate Law

Harvard Business Law Review, 2018, Forthcoming, Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2017-05
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 13 Mar 2017 Last Revised: 03 May 2017
Michal Barzuza
University of Virginia School of Law
Downloads 0 (157,798)

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Private Ordering, Corporate Law, Proxy Access, Majority Voting, Independent Directors, Proxy Advisors, Cross-LIsting, State Competition, Controlling Shareholders

15.

Short-Termism and Long-Termism

Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2, UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2731814, Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 14-503, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 526
Number of pages: 66 Posted: 14 Feb 2016 Last Revised: 18 Mar 2016
Michal Barzuza and Eric L. Talley
University of Virginia School of Law and Columbia University - School of Law
Downloads 0 (45,377)

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Shareholder Activism, Hedge Funds, Managerial Overconfidence, Present Bias, Limits to Arbitrage

16.

Self-Selection in the Market for Corporate Law

Posted: 22 Oct 2011 Last Revised: 07 Dec 2011
Michal Barzuza
University of Virginia School of Law

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Delaware, Agency Costs, Self-Selection, Nevada, Race to the Bottom, Race to the Top

17.

Signaling a Lemon: The Decision Not to Cross-List and High Private Benefits of Control

Posted: 20 Jan 2007
Michal Barzuza, David C. Smith and Elio Valladares
University of Virginia School of Law, University of Virginia - McIntire School of Commerce and University of Virginia - Department of Economics

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private benefits of control, signaling, cross-listing