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University of Virginia School of Law
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corporate law, managers, shareholders, regulatory competition, Delaware, private benefits of control, network externalities
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Network externalities, private benefits of control, Delaware, regulatory competition, shareholders, corporate law
Corporate Law, Nevada, State Competition, Duty of Loyalty, Duty of Good Faith, Race to the Top, Race to the Bottom, Delaware, Market Segmentation
corporate law, Nevada, accounting restatements, agency costs
Shareholder Activism, Hedge Funds, Managerial Overconfidence, Present Bias, Limits to Arbitrage
Outside Directors, Interlock, Indemnification, Advancement
Delaware, Incorporation, Corporate Charters, Price, Regulatory Competition, Managers, Shareholders, Takeovers, Federalism
Controlling Shareholders, Control Premium, Cross-Listing, Private Benefits, Signaling
Corporate law; Corporate Governance; Boards of Directors; Interlocks
Private Ordering, Corporate Law, Proxy Access, Majority Voting, Independent Directors, Proxy Advisors, Cross-LIsting, State Competition, Controlling Shareholders
Delaware, Corporate law, Franchise tax, Regulatory competition
corporate politics, union politics, First Amendment, shareholder rights, corporate speech
Corporate Governance, Signaling, Noise, Staggered Board
Delaware, Franchise Tax, Corporate Law
corporate governance, board, directors elections, shareholder proposals, majority voting rule, MVR, plurality voting rule, PVR, shareholder activism, stock exchanges, Institutional Shareholder Services Inc., ISS, SEC, no-action letters
Delaware, Agency Costs, Self-Selection, Nevada, Race to the Bottom, Race to the Top
private benefits of control, signaling, cross-listing
