Lucy White

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Fellow

London

United Kingdom

Boston University - Department of Finance & Economics

595 Commonwealth Avenue

Boston, MA 02215

United States

  • Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

  • Boston University - Department of Finance & Economics

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

22

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4,975

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Top 2,883

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209

CROSSREF CITATIONS

373

Scholarly Papers (22)

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1.

Is Deposit Insurance a Good Thing, and If so, Who Should Pay for it?

Downloads 967 (41,777)
Citation 6

Is Deposit Insurance a Good Thing, and If so, Who Should Pay for it?

Oxford Financial Research Centre Working Paper No. 2004-FE-08, EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 30 Mar 2004
Alan D. Morrison and Lucy White
University of Oxford - Said Business School and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 944 (42,626)
Citation 9

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deposit insurance, bank regulation, adverse selection, moral hazard

Is Deposit Insurance a Good Thing, and If so, Who Should Pay for it?

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 06 Jul 2004
Alan D. Morrison and Lucy White
University of Oxford - Said Business School and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 23 (884,011)
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Deposit insurance, adverse selection, moral hazard, banking systems

2.

The Role of Capital Adequacy Requirements in Sound Banking Systems

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 02 Jun 2001
Alan D. Morrison and Lucy White
University of Oxford - Said Business School and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 915 (45,141)
Citation 6

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Capital adequacy, bank regulation, deposit insurance, moral hazard, screening, signalling, adverse selection.

3.

Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

Downloads 744 (59,782)
Citation 56

Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

Number of pages: 45 Posted: 24 Mar 2005
Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 444 (112,484)
Citation 2

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vertical merger, collusion, vertical restraint, vertical integration, repeated

Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 25 Nov 2003
Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 278 (188,712)
Citation 6

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Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

Number of pages: 42 Posted: 30 Jan 2004
Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 22 (893,738)
Citation 8
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Vertical mergers, collusion

4.

Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking

Downloads 543 (89,125)
Citation 80

Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking

Oxford Financial Research Center Working Paper No. 2002-FE-05
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 07 Jun 2002
Alan D. Morrison and Lucy White
University of Oxford - Said Business School and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 518 (93,514)
Citation 17

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Capital adequacy, bank regulation, deposit insurance, moral hazard, screening, signalling, adverse selection

Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 26 May 2004
Alan D. Morrison and Lucy White
University of Oxford - Said Business School and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 25 (865,209)
Citation 8
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Capital requirements, banking crises

Crises and Capital Requirements in Banking

Posted: 14 Apr 2005
Alan D. Morrison and Lucy White
University of Oxford - Said Business School and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Capital requirements, banking crises

5.

Providing Incentives with Private Contracts

Number of pages: 65 Posted: 28 Jun 2019 Last Revised: 16 Mar 2022
Andrea M Buffa, Qing Liu and Lucy White
University of Colorado at Boulder - Leeds School of Business, City University of Hong Kong (CityU) and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 420 (273,025)
Citation 1

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privacy, private contracting, team, delegation, moral hazard, complementarities, pay transparency, bank syndicates, venture capital, organizational design, outsourcing

6.

Financial Liberalisation and Capital Regulation in Open Economies

Oxford Financial Research Centre Working Paper No. 2004-FE-10
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 05 May 2004
Alan D. Morrison and Lucy White
University of Oxford - Said Business School and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 337 (155,036)
Citation 10

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Bank regulation, capital, multinational banks, exchange controls, international financial regulation, level playing field

7.

The Good Cop and the Bad Cop: Complementarities between Debt and Equity in Disciplining Management

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 04 Mar 2002
Alexander Guembel and Lucy White
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 317 (165,493)
Citation 1

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Debt, equity, hard budget constraint, information production

8.

When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

Downloads 200 (260,568)
Citation 4

When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5225
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 10 Mar 2015
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 125 (386,414)
Citation 4

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simple penal code, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated extensive game, optimal punishment

When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime

PIER Working Paper No. 15-008
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 18 Feb 2015
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 75 (546,860)

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Simple Penal Code, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Repeated Extensive Game, Optimal Punishment.

9.

Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance

Downloads 187 (276,715)
Citation 53

Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance

ECB Working Paper No. 1196
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 25 May 2010
Lucy White and Alan D. Morrison
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and University of Oxford - Said Business School
Downloads 185 (278,981)
Citation 6

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Contagion, Reputation, Bank Regulation

Reputational Contagion and Optimal Regulatory Forbearance

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP9508
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 21 Jun 2013
Alan D. Morrison and Lucy White
University of Oxford - Said Business School and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 2 (1,087,088)
Citation 11
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bank regulation, contagion, reputation

10.

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games

Downloads 145 (343,334)
Citation 3

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games

Number of pages: 14 Posted: 15 Oct 2004
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 132 (370,434)
Citation 4

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Simple Penal Code, Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Repeated Extensive Game, Optimal Punishment

When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 30 Mar 2005
George J. Mailath, Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics, University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 13 (986,988)
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Simple penal code, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated extensive game, optimal punishment

11.

Asymmetric Cartels: Who Gains, Who Defects, and Some Unintended Consequences of Anti-Trust Policies

WBS Finance Group Research Paper Forthcoming
Number of pages: 51 Posted: 19 Mar 2022
Kebin Ma and Lucy White
University of Warwick - Finance Group and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 64 (588,044)

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Collusion; Cost asymmetry; Nash bargaining; Anti-trust, Leniency program

12.

Prudence in Bargaining: The Effect of Uncertainty on Bargaining Outcomes

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5822
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 24 Oct 2006
Lucy White
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 24 (847,867)
Citation 4
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Nash bargaining, Rubinstein bargaining, risk aversion, prudence

13.

Level Playing Fields in International Financial Regulation

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5247
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 27 Oct 2005
Alan D. Morrison and Lucy White
University of Oxford - Said Business School and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 24 (847,867)
Citation 2
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Bank regulation, capital, multinational banks, international financial regulation, level playing field

14.

Bargaining with Imperfect Enforcement

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5495
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 19 May 2006
Lucy White and Mark Williams
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and Marsh & McLennan Companies - London Office
Downloads 23 (856,699)
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Non-cooperative bargaining, enforcement, strength in weakness, incomplete contracts

15.

Foreclosure with Incomplete Information

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 13 Aug 2003
Lucy White
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 22 (865,836)
Citation 1
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Foreclosure, vertical integration, asymmetric information

16.

Precautionary Bidding in Auctions

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 03 Sep 2003
Peter Eso and Lucy White
Kellogg Graduate School of Management - MEDS and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 19 (894,143)
Citation 2
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Risk, risk-aversion, prudence, first-price auctions, second-price auctions, English auctions, winner's curse

17.

Anti-Competitive Financial Contracting: The Design of Financial Claims

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 19 Feb 2002
Giacinta Cestone and Lucy White
Bayes Business School, City University London and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 19 (894,143)
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Coase problem, equity, over-funding, venture capital

18.

Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7722
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 17 Mar 2010
Volker Nocke and Lucy White
University of Mannheim and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 4 (1,030,614)
Citation 2
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antitrust, collusion, merger guidelines, vertical integration, vertical merger

19.

Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14048
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 17 Oct 2019
Ansgar Walther and Lucy White
Imperial College London and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
Downloads 1 (1,051,885)
Citation 13
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bail-in, bail-out, bank resolution, bank runs, financial crises

20.

The TELUS Share Conversion Proposal

HBS Case No. 214-001
Posted: 17 Apr 2014 Last Revised: 04 Dec 2015
Benjamin Esty and Lucy White
Harvard Business School and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Empty voting, hedge funds, dual class shares, activist shareholders, Canada, corporate governance, proxy contests, short selling, telecommunications

21.

British Land

HBS Case No.: 208-064
Posted: 18 Sep 2008
Lucy White
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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22.

Anticompetitive Financial Contracting: The Design of Financial Claims

Posted: 09 Oct 2003
Giacinta Cestone and Lucy White
Bayes Business School, City University London and Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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