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Sergio Currarini

University of Leicester - Department of Economics

Professor

Department of Economics

Leicester LE1 7RH, Leicestershire LE1 7RH

United Kingdom

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia

Cannaregio 873

Venice, 30121

Italy

  • University of Leicester - Department of Economics

  • Ca Foscari University of Venice - Dipartimento di Economia

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

26

DOWNLOADS
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Top 15,356

in Total Papers Downloads

2,502

CITATIONS
Rank 7,153

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 7,153

in Total Papers Citations

67

Scholarly Papers (26)

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1.

Homophily and Long-Run Integration in Social Networks

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 23 Jan 2012 Last Revised: 01 May 2012
Yann Bramoulle, Sergio Currarini, Matthew O. Jackson, Paolo Pin and Brian W. Rogers
Laval University - Département d'Économique, University of Leicester - Department of Economics, Stanford University - Department of Economics, Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università degli Studi di Siena and Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management
Downloads 481 (36,703)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Networks, Social Networks, Network Formation, Homophily, Segregation, Integration, Citations

2.

Long-Run Integration in Social Networks

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 13 Jan 2011
Sergio Currarini, Matthew O. Jackson and Paolo Pin
University of Leicester - Department of Economics, Stanford University - Department of Economics and Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Università degli Studi di Siena
Downloads 240 (98,982)
Citation 2

Abstract:

social networks, homophily, integration, segregation, network formation, citation networks, networks

3.

An Economic Model of Friendship: Homophily, Minorities and Segregation

University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper No. 20/07
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 16 Oct 2007
Sergio Currarini, Matthew O. Jackson and Paolo Pin
University of Leicester - Department of Economics, Stanford University - Department of Economics and Dipartimento di Economia Politica
Downloads 202 (108,805)
Citation 43

Abstract:

Networks, Homophily, Segregation, Friendships, Social Networks, Integration, Diversity, Minorities

4.

Stable Organizations with Externalities

FEEM Working Paper No. 51.2002
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 29 Jul 2002
Sergio Currarini
University of Leicester - Department of Economics
Downloads 155 (143,230)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Organizations, Graphs, Networks, Cooperation, Coalitions, Externalities

5.

A Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function and the Core in Games with Externalities

FEEM Working Paper No. 11.2001, Springer Verlag, ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC DESIGN, S. Koray, M.R. Sertel, eds., pp. 233-250, Berlin & London, 2003
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 07 Jul 2001
Sergio Currarini and Marco A. Marini
University of Leicester - Department of Economics and University of Rome La Sapienza
Downloads 115 (192,799)
Citation 4

Abstract:

core, cooperative games, externalities

6.

Inflation and Welfare in an OLG Economy with a Privately Provided Public Good

FEEM Working Paper No. 12.2001
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 07 Jul 2001
Sergio Currarini, Gaetano Bloise and Nicholas Kikidis
University of Leicester - Department of Economics, Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) and Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) - Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)
Downloads 99 (211,224)

Abstract:

Optimal inflation, public goods, voluntary contributions

7.

Identity, Homophily and In-Group Bias

FEEM Working Paper No. 37.2012
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 21 Jun 2012 Last Revised: 14 Feb 2013
Sergio Currarini and Friederike Mengel
University of Leicester - Department of Economics and Maastricht University
Downloads 83 (189,168)
Citation 1

Abstract:

in-group bias, homophily, endogenous matching, experiments, game theory

8.

A Simple Model of Homophily in Social Networks

University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 24
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 25 Oct 2010 Last Revised: 04 May 2013
Sergio Currarini and Fernando Vega-Redondo
University of Leicester - Department of Economics and Universidad de Alicante - Department of Economic Analysis
Downloads 81 (187,981)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Homophily, search, social networks, segregation

9.

Bilateral Information Sharing in Oligopoly

University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper No. 21/07
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 16 Oct 2007
Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri
University of Leicester - Department of Economics and University of London
Downloads 76 (248,289)

Abstract:

Information sharing, oligopoly, networks, Bayesian equilibrium

10.

Coalition Formation in Games without Synergies

FEEM Working Paper No. 43.04, International Game Theory Review (IGTR), Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 111-126, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2006
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 24 Apr 2004
Sergio Currarini and Marco A. Marini
University of Leicester - Department of Economics and University of Rome La Sapienza
Downloads 71 (259,684)
Citation 3

Abstract:

coalition formation, synergies, strong nash equilibrium

11.

Network Economics and the Environment: Insights and Perspectives

Downloads 70 (274,377)

Network Economics and the Environment: Insights and Perspectives

FEEM Working Paper No. 6.2014
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 07 Feb 2014 Last Revised: 17 Feb 2014
Sergio Currarini, Carmen Marchiori and Alessandro Tavoni
University of Leicester - Department of Economics, London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)
Downloads 60 (301,353)

Abstract:

Networks, Environmental Externalities, Technological Diffusion, Gas Pipelines Common-pool Resources, Multi-level Governance, Coalitions

Network Economics and the Environment: Insights and Perspectives

CMCC Research Paper No. 201
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 30 Jul 2015
Sergio Currarini, Carmen Marchiori and Alessandro Tavoni
University of Leicester - Department of Economics, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) and London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)
Downloads 10 (513,503)

Abstract:

Networks, Environmental Externalities, Technological Diffusion, Gas Pipelines, Common-pool Resources, Multi-level Governance, Coalitions

12.

Delegation Versus Centralization: The Role of Externalities

University Ca' Foscari of Venice Economics Research Paper No. 15/06
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 28 Nov 2006
Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri
University of Leicester - Department of Economics and University of London
Downloads 60 (290,255)

Abstract:

Contracts, Externalities, Centralization, Delegation

13.

On the Stability of Hierarchies in Games with Externalities

FEEM Working Paper No. 19.2003
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 16 Apr 2003
Sergio Currarini
University of Leicester - Department of Economics
Downloads 53 (305,092)

Abstract:

14.

A Conjectural Cooperative Equilibrium in Strategic Form Games

GAME PRACTISE AND THE ENVIRONMENT, C. Carraro, V. Fragnelli, eds., Edward Elgar, 2004
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 21 Feb 2003 Last Revised: 01 May 2012
Marco A. Marini and Sergio Currarini
University of Rome La Sapienza and University of Leicester - Department of Economics
Downloads 51 (321,590)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Cooperative Equilibrium, Coalitions

15.

Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games

Downloads 50 (324,523)

Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games

Number of pages: 20 Posted: 22 Nov 2011 Last Revised: 17 Jan 2014
Sergio Currarini and Marco A. Marini
University of Leicester - Department of Economics and University of Rome La Sapienza
Downloads 49 (332,939)

Abstract:

cooperative games, coalitions, mergers, cartels, core, games with externalities, endogenous coalition formation

Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games

The Manchester School, Vol. 83, Issue 3, pp. 253-287, 2015
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 07 Apr 2015
Sergio Currarini and Marco A. Marini
University of Leicester - Department of Economics and University of Rome La Sapienza
Downloads 1 (567,857)

Abstract:

16.

Information Sharing Networks in Oligopoly

University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 16_08
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 04 Jul 2008
Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri
University of Leicester - Department of Economics and University of London
Downloads 41 (327,476)

Abstract:

Information sharing, oligopoly, networks, Bayesian equilibrium

17.

Network Design in Games with Spillovers

University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 16/06
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 28 Nov 2006
Sergio Currarini
University of Leicester - Department of Economics
Downloads 40 (345,765)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Organizational design, networks, group stability, spillovers

18.

Smoking and Social Interaction

Review of Environment, Energy and Economics (Re3), Forthcoming
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 03 May 2013
Sergio Currarini, Elena Fumagalli and Fabrizio Panebianco
University of Leicester - Department of Economics, University Ca' Foscari of Venice and University of East Anglia and Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS)
Downloads 37 (307,690)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Smoking, Social Interaction, Network Effects

19.

Group Stability of Hierarchies in Games With Spillovers

University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 14/06
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 24 Nov 2006
Sergio Currarini
University of Leicester - Department of Economics
Downloads 35 (355,535)

Abstract:

Hierarchies, Coalitions, Stability, Spillovers, Cooperative Games, Networks

20.

Information Sharing Networks in Linear Quadratic Games

FEEM Working Paper No. 47.2013, CMCC Research Paper No. 0172
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 06 Jun 2013
Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri
University of Leicester - Department of Economics and University of London
Downloads 23 (365,907)

Abstract:

Information Sharing, Networks, Bayesian Equilibrium, Beauty Contest, Oligopoly

21.

Cheap Talk with Correlated Signals

FEEM Working Paper No. 77.2013, CMCC Research Paper No. 0177
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 02 Oct 2013
A.K.S. Chand, Sergio Currarini and Giovanni Ursino
Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, University of Leicester - Department of Economics and Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Downloads 22 (373,016)

Abstract:

Cheap Talk, Multiple Senders, Correlation

22.

The Kinked Demand Model and the Stability of Cooperation

WP-EMS # 2009/05
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 24 Sep 2009
Marco A. Marini and Sergio Currarini
University of Rome La Sapienza and University of Leicester - Department of Economics
Downloads 18 (440,947)

Abstract:

kinked demand, symmetric games, norms of behaviour

23.

Games on Networks: Direct Complements and Indirect Substitutes

FEEM Working Paper No. 4.2013
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 06 Feb 2013
Sergio Currarini, Elena Fumagalli and Fabrizio Panebianco
University of Leicester - Department of Economics, University Ca' Foscari of Venice and University of East Anglia and Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology & Social Sciences (CISEPS)
Downloads 16 (420,365)

Abstract:

networks, peer effects, key-player, centrality, substitutes, altruism

24.

Majority Rules and Coalitional Stability

Number of pages: 9 Posted: 30 Aug 2012 Last Revised: 15 Mar 2013
Sergio Currarini and Marco A. Marini
University of Leicester - Department of Economics and University of Rome La Sapienza
Downloads 14 (440,947)

Abstract:

Majority Rule, Supermajority, Externalities, Core

25.

International Integration and Political Preferences: New Insights from the Recent History of EMU

Review of Environment, Energy and Economics (Re3), Forthcoming
Number of pages: 6 Posted: 24 Jul 2012
Sergio Currarini
University of Leicester - Department of Economics
Downloads 10 (487,310)

Abstract:

European Monetary Union, International Integration, Political Preferences

26.

Cheap Talk with Correlated Information

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 01 Jul 2016
A.K.S. Chand, Sergio Currarini and Giovanni Ursino
Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, University of Leicester - Department of Economics and Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore
Downloads 0 (501,996)

Abstract:

Cheap Talk, Multiple Players, Correlation across Signals

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