Hoboken, NJ 07030
United States
http://rodivilov.weebly.com/
Stevens Institute of Technology - School of Business
Dynamic mechanism design, dynamic incentive compatibility, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, budget balance.
Slot allocation, Mechanism design, Trading cycles
Supply Elasticity, Demand Elasticity, Income Elasticity, Income-Emission Relationship, Engel Curve
Information Gathering, Optimal Contracts, Strategic Experimentation
Strategic Experimentation, Moral hazard, Adverse selection, Outsourcing, Integration and Separation.
Career Concern, Obsession, Overachievement, Signaling
Adverse Selection, Incomplete Contracts, Information Acquisition, Moral Hazard, Pricing, Principal-Agent.
Slot allocation, Mechanism design, Multiple-runway
Equilibrium concept, collusion-proofness, full implementation
Information Sharing, Moral Hazard, Common Agency
Agency, Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, Excessive Effort, Shirking
Platforms, Real Options, Dynamic Pricing, Uncertainty, Coordination Games