Michael Finus

University of Stirling

Department of Economics

Stirling, Scotland FK9 4LA

United Kingdom

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

19

DOWNLOADS
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SSRN RANKINGS

Top 32,101

in Total Papers Downloads

3,246

TOTAL CITATIONS
Rank 10,500

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 10,500

in Total Papers Citations

159

Scholarly Papers (19)

1.

International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 24 Apr 2004
Michael Finus
University of Stirling
Downloads 387 (156,528)
Citation 3

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International pollution, International environmental agreements, Treaty design, Coalition theory

2.

Endogenous Coalition Formation in Global Pollution Control

Number of pages: 57 Posted: 04 Aug 2001
Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 364 (167,645)
Citation 10

Abstract:

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International environmental agreements, coalition formation games, global pollution

3.

An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 14 Jan 2005
Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and University of Stirling
Downloads 283 (219,366)
Citation 33

Abstract:

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Coalition games, Partition function, Externalities, Sharing schemes

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

FEEM Working Paper No. 50.05, University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 44/06
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 12 Apr 2005
Carlo Carraro, Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus
Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and University of Stirling
Downloads 193 (317,026)
Citation 5

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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements, Climate policy, Transfers

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5046
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 15 Sep 2005
Carlo Carraro, Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus
Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and University of Stirling
Downloads 16 (1,132,179)
Citation 2
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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements, climate policy, transfers, international environmental agreements

5.

New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming

Number of pages: 44 Posted: 22 Nov 2003
Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and University of Stirling
Downloads 205 (300,683)
Citation 2

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Design of climate treaty protocol, Coalition formation, Non-cooperative game theory

6.

Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 09 Oct 2003
University of Stirling, Wageningen University and Research (WUR) - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group and Wageningen University and Research (WUR) - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources GroupOrganization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)
Downloads 177 (343,786)
Citation 13

Abstract:

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International environmental agreements,

7.

How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 20 Sep 2003
Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 177 (343,786)
Citation 11

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Non-cooperative game theory, Rules of coalition formation, Stability

8.

Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2003/88
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 23 Apr 2007
Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and University of Stirling
Downloads 173 (350,777)
Citation 15

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design of climate treaty protocol, coalition formation, non-cooperative game theory

9.

Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria

Number of pages: 13 Posted: 02 Mar 2005
University of Stirling, Wageningen University and University of Hagen
Downloads 161 (373,063)
Citation 3

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Existence and uniqueness of coalitional equilibrium, Game in strategic form

10.

A Non-Cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality Ntu-Coalition Games

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 13 May 2003
Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 145 (406,950)
Citation 4

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Core-stability, Non-cooperative Game Theory, Positive Externality Games

11.

Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

FEEM Working Paper No. 20.2008
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 16 Apr 2008 Last Revised: 27 Oct 2008
University of Algarve, University of Stirling, University of Helsinki and University of British Columbia
Downloads 142 (413,842)
Citation 5

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Straddling Fish Stock, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, Unregulated Fishing, Bioeconomic Model, Coalition Formation Model, Free-Riding

12.

Coalition Formation Under Uncertainty: The Stability Likelihood of an International Climate Agreement

FEEM Working Paper No. 98.2005
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 08 Sep 2005
Rob Dellink, Rob Dellink, Michael Finus and Niels Olieman
Wageningen University and Research (WUR) - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources GroupOrganization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), University of Stirling and Operations Research and Logistics Group - Wageningen University
Downloads 136 (428,083)
Citation 1

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Climate change, Coalition formation, International environmental agreements, Uncertainty

13.

International Environmental Agreements with Uncertainty, Learning and Risk Aversion

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4589
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 11 Feb 2014
Michael Finus, Pedro Pintassilgo and Alistair Ulph
University of Stirling, University of Algarve and The University of Manchester - Faculty of Humanities
Downloads 133 (435,732)

Abstract:

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international environmental agreements, uncertainty, learning and risk aversion, game theory

14.

Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation

Number of pages: 2 Posted: 12 Apr 2005
Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 129 (446,251)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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International environmental agreements, Timing of participation decision

15.

Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy

FEEM Working Paper No. 62.2008
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 02 Sep 2008
Michael Finus and Dirk T. G. Rübbelke
University of Stirling and Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg
Downloads 120 (471,829)
Citation 38

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Ancillary Benefits, Climate Policy, Coalition Formation, Game Theory, Impure Public Goods

The Impact of Surplus Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Agreements

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 10 Sep 2004
Wageningen University and Research (WUR) - School of Social Sciences, University of Stirling and Wageningen University - Social Sciences, Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group
Downloads 117 (483,579)
Citation 7

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International environmental agreements, Sharing rules, Stability of coalitions

The Impact of Surplus Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Agreements

Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 209-232, 2006
Posted: 29 Feb 2008
Wageningen University and Research (WUR) - School of Social Sciences, University of Stirling and Wageningen University - Social Sciences, Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group

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17.

Modesty Pays: Sometimes!

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 11 Jun 2004
Michael Finus
University of Stirling
Downloads 110 (503,614)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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International environmental agreements, Internal&external stability, Modest emission reduction

18.

Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, But Second Served?

FEEM Working Paper No. 109.2009
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 04 Feb 2010
Johan Eyckmans, Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies, University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 78 (627,258)

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International Climate Agreements, Sequential Coalition Formation, Coordination through Moderator, Integrated Assessment Model, Alogorithm for Computations

19.

Permit Trading and Stability of International Climate Agreements

Journal of Applied Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1, May 2006
Posted: 14 Jun 2006
Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera and Michael Finus
Wageningen University - Social Sciences, Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group and University of Stirling

Abstract:

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climate agreements, tradable emission permits, coalition formation, self-enforcing agreements