Michael Finus

University of Stirling

Department of Economics

Stirling, Scotland FK9 4LA

United Kingdom

  • University of Stirling

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

20

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SSRN CITATIONS
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28

CROSSREF CITATIONS

127

Scholarly Papers (20)

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1.

International Cooperation to Resolve International Pollution Problems

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 24 Apr 2004
Michael Finus
University of Stirling
Downloads 355 (106,789)
Citation 3

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International pollution, International environmental agreements, Treaty design, Coalition theory

2.

Endogenous Coalition Formation in Global Pollution Control

Number of pages: 57 Posted: 04 Aug 2001
Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 302 (127,375)
Citation 10

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International environmental agreements, coalition formation games, global pollution

3.

An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 14 Jan 2005
Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and University of Stirling
Downloads 247 (156,434)
Citation 33

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Coalition games, Partition function, Externalities, Sharing schemes

4.

New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming

Number of pages: 44 Posted: 22 Nov 2003
Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and University of Stirling
Downloads 180 (209,848)
Citation 2

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Design of climate treaty protocol, Coalition formation, Non-cooperative game theory

5.

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

Downloads 162 (229,567)
Citation 26

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

FEEM Working Paper No. 50.05, University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 44/06
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 12 Apr 2005
Carlo Carraro, Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus
Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and University of Stirling
Downloads 146 (250,901)
Citation 5

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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements, Climate policy, Transfers

Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5046
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 15 Sep 2005
Carlo Carraro, Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus
Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and University of Stirling
Downloads 16 (695,160)
Citation 2
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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements, climate policy, transfers, international environmental agreements

6.

Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game

Number of pages: 36 Posted: 09 Oct 2003
Michael Finus, Ekko van Ierland, Rob Dellink and Rob Dellink
University of Stirling, Wageningen UR - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group and Wageningen UR - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources GroupOrganization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)
Downloads 158 (234,546)
Citation 13

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International environmental agreements,

7.

Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2003/88
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 23 Apr 2007
Johan Eyckmans and Michael Finus
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies and University of Stirling
Downloads 149 (246,094)
Citation 14

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design of climate treaty protocol, coalition formation, non-cooperative game theory

8.

How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements

Number of pages: 26 Posted: 20 Sep 2003
Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 142 (255,833)
Citation 11

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Non-cooperative game theory, Rules of coalition formation, Stability

9.

A Non-Cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality Ntu-Coalition Games

Number of pages: 21 Posted: 13 May 2003
Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 123 (285,454)
Citation 4

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Core-stability, Non-cooperative Game Theory, Positive Externality Games

10.

Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

FEEM Working Paper No. 20.2008
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 16 Apr 2008 Last Revised: 27 Oct 2008
Pedro Pintassilgo, Michael Finus, Marko Lindroos and Gordon Munro
University of Algarve, University of Stirling, University of Helsinki and University of British Columbia
Downloads 112 (305,101)
Citation 5

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Straddling Fish Stock, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, Unregulated Fishing, Bioeconomic Model, Coalition Formation Model, Free-Riding

11.

Coalition Formation Under Uncertainty: The Stability Likelihood of an International Climate Agreement

FEEM Working Paper No. 98.2005
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 08 Sep 2005
Rob Dellink, Rob Dellink, Michael Finus and Niels Olieman
Wageningen UR - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources GroupOrganization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), University of Stirling and Operations Research and Logistics Group - Wageningen University
Downloads 106 (316,929)
Citation 1

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Climate change, Coalition formation, International environmental agreements, Uncertainty

12.

Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation

Number of pages: 2 Posted: 12 Apr 2005
Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 103 (323,137)
Citation 2

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International environmental agreements, Timing of participation decision

13.

Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy

FEEM Working Paper No. 62.2008
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 02 Sep 2008
Michael Finus and Dirk T. G. Rübbelke
University of Stirling and Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg
Downloads 90 (352,291)
Citation 38

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Ancillary Benefits, Climate Policy, Coalition Formation, Game Theory, Impure Public Goods

14.

The Impact of Surplus Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Agreements

Downloads 90 (352,291)

The Impact of Surplus Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Agreements

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 10 Sep 2004
Hans-Peter Weikard, Michael Finus and Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera
Wageningen UR - School of Social Sciences, University of Stirling and Wageningen University - Social Sciences, Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group
Downloads 90 (355,223)
Citation 7

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International environmental agreements, Sharing rules, Stability of coalitions

The Impact of Surplus Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Agreements

Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 58, No. 2, pp. 209-232, 2006
Posted: 29 Feb 2008
Hans-Peter Weikard, Michael Finus and Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera
Wageningen UR - School of Social Sciences, University of Stirling and Wageningen University - Social Sciences, Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group

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15.

International Environmental Agreements with Uncertainty, Learning and Risk Aversion

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4589
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 11 Feb 2014
Michael Finus, Pedro Pintassilgo and Alistair Ulph
University of Stirling, University of Algarve and University of Manchester - Faculty of Humanities
Downloads 84 (367,541)

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international environmental agreements, uncertainty, learning and risk aversion, game theory

16.

Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria

Number of pages: 13 Posted: 02 Mar 2005
Michael Finus, Pierre van Mouche and Bianca Rundshagen
University of Stirling, Wageningen University and University of Hagen
Downloads 82 (372,858)
Citation 3

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Existence and uniqueness of coalitional equilibrium, Game in strategic form

17.

Modesty Pays: Sometimes!

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 11 Jun 2004
Michael Finus
University of Stirling
Downloads 78 (383,853)
Citation 4

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International environmental agreements, Internal&external stability, Modest emission reduction

18.

Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, But Second Served?

FEEM Working Paper No. 109.2009
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 04 Feb 2010
Johan Eyckmans, Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies, University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 40 (523,868)

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International Climate Agreements, Sequential Coalition Formation, Coordination through Moderator, Integrated Assessment Model, Alogorithm for Computations

19.

Do Abatement Quotas Lead to More Successful Climate Coalitions?*

Manchester School, Vol. 76, Issue 1, pp. 104-129, January 2008
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 23 Dec 2007
Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera, Michael Finus, Rob Dellink and Rob Dellink
Wageningen University - Social Sciences, Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, University of Stirling and Wageningen UR - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources GroupOrganization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)
Downloads 18 (656,813)
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20.

Permit Trading and Stability of International Climate Agreements

Journal of Applied Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1, May 2006
Posted: 14 Jun 2006
Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera and Michael Finus
Wageningen University - Social Sciences, Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group and University of Stirling

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climate agreements, tradable emission permits, coalition formation, self-enforcing agreements