Bianca Rundshagen

University of Hagen

Profilstr. 8

Hagen, D-58084

Germany

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

6

DOWNLOADS

748

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 36,367

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 36,367

in Total Papers Citations

3

CROSSREF CITATIONS

13

Scholarly Papers (6)

1.

Endogenous Coalition Formation in Global Pollution Control

FEEM Working Paper No. 43.2001
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 04 Aug 2001
Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 282 (109,581)
Citation 10

Abstract:

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International environmental agreements, coalition formation games, global pollution

2.

How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements

FEEM Working Paper No. 62.2003
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 20 Sep 2003
Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 130 (223,022)
Citation 8

Abstract:

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Non-cooperative game theory, Rules of coalition formation, Stability

3.

A Non-Cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality Ntu-Coalition Games

FEEM Working Paper No. 31.2003
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 13 May 2003
Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 121 (235,448)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Core-stability, Non-cooperative Game Theory, Positive Externality Games

4.

Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation

FEEM Working Paper No. 45.05
Number of pages: 2 Posted: 12 Apr 2005
Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 98 (273,154)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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International environmental agreements, Timing of participation decision

5.

Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria

FEEM Working Paper No. 23.05
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 02 Mar 2005
Michael Finus, Pierre van Mouche and Bianca Rundshagen
University of Stirling, Wageningen University and University of Hagen
Downloads 80 (310,210)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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Existence and uniqueness of coalitional equilibrium, Game in strategic form

6.

Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, But Second Served?

FEEM Working Paper No. 109.2009
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 04 Feb 2010
Johan Eyckmans, Michael Finus and Bianca Rundshagen
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Center for Economic Studies, University of Stirling and University of Hagen
Downloads 37 (443,964)

Abstract:

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International Climate Agreements, Sequential Coalition Formation, Coordination through Moderator, Integrated Assessment Model, Alogorithm for Computations