Sascha Hahn

WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

Doctoral Student

Burgplatz 2

Vallendar, 56179

Germany

  • WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management

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    • Tel: +4915153725333
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Scholarly Papers (1)

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The Economics of Banking Regulation in Europe: Does the Post-GFC Bail-In Regime Effectively Eliminate Implicit Government Guarantees?

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The Economics of Banking Regulation in Europe: Does the Post-GFC Bail-In Regime Effectively Eliminate Implicit Government Guarantees?

Number of pages: 75 Posted: 15 Feb 2022
Sascha Hahn, Paul P. Momtaz and Axel Wieandt
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management and WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
Downloads 76 (433,412)

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Bail-In, Implicit Government Guarantee, European Banking Regulation, Too-Big-to- Fail, Global System

Implementing a European Bail-In Regime: Do BRRD & SRM-R Effectively Eliminate Implicit Government Guarantees in the European Banking Sector? An Empirical Analysis

Number of pages: 64 Posted: 12 Aug 2020 Last Revised: 29 Oct 2020
Sascha Hahn, Paul P. Momtaz and Axel Wieandt
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Anderson School of Management and WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
Downloads 174 (239,493)

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Bail-In, Implicit Government Guarantee, European Banking Regulation, Too-Big-to- Fail, Global Systemically Important Bank (G-SIB), Bank Recovery & Resolution Directive (BRRD), Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)