Sergei Izmalkov

New Economic School

Associate Professor

100A Novaya Street

Moscow, Skolkovo 143026

Russia

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

6

DOWNLOADS

827

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 35,353

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 35,353

in Total Papers Citations

1

CROSSREF CITATIONS

22

Scholarly Papers (6)

1.

Informed Seller in a Hotelling Market

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 20 Feb 2014 Last Revised: 02 Feb 2016
Filippo Balestrieri and Sergei Izmalkov
Analysis Group, Inc. and New Economic School
Downloads 192 (197,372)
Citation 15

Abstract:

Loading...

informed principal, information discrimination, horizontal differentiation, lotteries, optimal mechanism

2.

On Efficiency of the English Auction

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 29 Nov 2003
Oleksii Birulin and Sergei Izmalkov
The University of Sydney and New Economic School
Downloads 166 (222,849)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Loading...

English auction, efficient auction, ex post equilibrium, single-crossing, interdependent values

3.

English Auctions with Reentry

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 03 Sep 2001
Sergei Izmalkov
New Economic School
Downloads 161 (228,715)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

Auction, English auction, Efficient auction, English auction with reentry.

4.

Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Tort Reform under Self-Serving Bias

Forthcoming in Thomas Miceli and Mathew Baker (eds.), The Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 22 Oct 2012
Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin and Sergei Izmalkov
University of Alberta - Department of Economics, Higher School of Economics and New Economic School
Downloads 139 (257,967)

Abstract:

Loading...

Settlement, Litigation, Incentives for Care, Self-Serving Bias, Tort Reform, Damage Caps, Asymmetric Information, Apparent Opponents, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Motivated Reasoning, Divergent Beliefs, Universal Divinity Refinement, Motivated Anchoring, Non-Cooperative Games, Disputes

5.

The Market for Surprises: Selling Substitute Goods Through Lotteries

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 15 Nov 2015
Filippo Balestrieri, Sergei Izmalkov and Joao Leao
Analysis Group, Inc., New Economic School and University of Lisbon
Downloads 95 (337,648)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Loading...

price discrimination, optimal selling strategies, lotteries

6.

Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 10 Aug 2004
Sergei Izmalkov
New Economic School
Downloads 74 (392,120)

Abstract:

Loading...

Multiple units, Interdependent values, Sequential auctions, Ascending price auction