Je-ok Choi

Stanford University - Institute for Computational and Mathematical Engineering

Huang Building, 475 Via Ortega

Suite 060 (Bottom level)

Stanford, CA 94305-4042

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

1

DOWNLOADS

78

SSRN CITATIONS

0

CROSSREF CITATIONS

0

Scholarly Papers (1)

1.

The Design of Optimal Pay-as-Bid Procurement Mechanisms

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 02 Jun 2022 Last Revised: 03 Jun 2022
Stanford University - Institute for Computational and Mathematical Engineering, Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford University
Downloads 78 (429,015)

Abstract:

Loading...

mechanism design, pay-as-bid, market design, procurement, auctions, assortments