Achim Wambach

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

P.O. Box 10 34 43

L 7,1

D-68034 Mannheim, 68034

Germany

  • ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

4

DOWNLOADS

377

SSRN CITATIONS

4

CROSSREF CITATIONS

6

Scholarly Papers (4)

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1.

The Fall and Rise of Market Power in Europe

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 18-03
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 27 Jan 2018
John P. Weche and Achim Wambach
Monopolies Commission and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 259 (216,463)
Citation 16

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Market Power, Markups, Europe, Crisis

2.

Imitation Perfection – A Simple Rule to Prevent Discrimination in Procurement

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 17-58
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 29 Nov 2017
Helene Mass, Nicolas Fugger, Vitali Gretschko and Achim Wambach
University of Bonn, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 42 (757,328)
Citation 2

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Discrimination, symmetric auctions, procurement regulation

3.

Contract (Re-)Negotiation with Private and Common Values

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 17-056
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 29 Nov 2017
Vitali Gretschko and Achim Wambach
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 42 (757,328)
Citation 1

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Principal-Agent models, renegotiation, Coase-conjecture

4.

Contract Design with Limited Commitment

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 18-054
Number of pages: 48 Posted: 02 Jan 2019 Last Revised: 18 Jan 2019
Achim Wambach and Vitali Gretschko
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research and ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research
Downloads 34 (816,807)

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Principal-Agent models, renegotiation, commitment, Coase-conjecture