Balasubramanian Sivan

Google Inc., New York

111 8th Ave

New York, NY 10011

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

4

DOWNLOADS

601

SSRN CITATIONS

2

CROSSREF CITATIONS

0

Scholarly Papers (4)

1.

Best of Both Worlds Ad Contracts: Guaranteed Allocation and Price with Programmatic Efficiency

Management Science, Forthcoming, Management Science, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 18 Dec 2017 Last Revised: 16 Aug 2022
Maxime C. Cohen, Antoine Désir, Nitish Korula and Balasubramanian Sivan
Desautels Faculty of Management, McGill University, INSEAD, Google Inc. and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 273 (199,949)

Abstract:

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Online ads, guaranteed contracts, risk aversion, auctions, revenue management

2.

Welfare-maximizing Guaranteed Dashboard Mechanisms

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 03 Jun 2021
Yuan Deng, Jason Hartline, Jieming Mao and Balasubramanian Sivan
Google Research, affiliation not provided to SSRN, Google Research and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 178 (299,098)

Abstract:

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Dynamic mechanism design; Online advertising; Welfare maximization;

3.

Online Bipartite Matching with Reusable Resources

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 31 Oct 2022
Google Inc., Carnegie Mellon University - School of Computer Science, University of Chicago - Booth School of Business, Google Inc., New York and UC Berkeley
Downloads 108 (444,384)

Abstract:

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Online resource allocation, matching, reusable resources, revenue management

4.

Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 12 Aug 2020
Cornell University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Google Inc., Google and Google Inc., New York
Downloads 42 (734,199)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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posted-price mechanisms, eager second-price auctions, multi-unit, position auctions, online advertising