140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467
United States
http://www2.bc.edu/~unver
Boston College, Department of Economics
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Dynamic exchange, barter exchange, kidney exchange, matching, market design, dynamic optimization, Markov process
Individual strategy-proofness, group strategy-proofness, Pareto efficiency, Arrovian preference aggregation, matching, no-transfer allocation and exchange, single-unit demand, Lorenz dominance
House allocation, matching, strategy-proofness, consistency, individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, neutrality
Law clerks, Market design, Experiments
Many-to-many matching, pairwise stability, stability, random paths
Course Allocation, Matching, Market Design, Deferred Acceptance
Market Design, Matching Theory, Tuition Exchange, Worker Exchange, Balanced Exchange, Two–sided Matching, Two–sided Top Trading Cycles
auctions, artificial agent simulations, genetic algorithm, finite automata
random mechanisms, ordinal mechanisms, total unimodularity, single-peaked preferences, voting, individual rationality, strategy-proofness, unanimity, anonymity, generalized median mechanisms
matching, unraveling, experiments, market design, labor demand and supply
Fairness, mechanism design, soccer, penalty shootouts, market design, axiomatic approach
Two-Sided Matching, Unraveling, Assortative Matching, Efficiency, College Football
Market design, organ allocation, kidney exchange, equity, efficiency, compatible pairs
matching, stability, unraveling, linear programming, genetic algorithms, market experiments
market design, matching, complementarities, lung exchange, dual-graft liver exchange, simultaneous liver-kidney exchange
Core, House Allocation, Housing Lottery, Indivisible Goods, Matching
Market design, matching, kidney exchange
Kidney Exchange, Market Design, Matching
market design, mechanism design, penalty shootouts, fairness in sequential contests, tiebreak mechanisms
