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Liquidity; Dynamic Price Feedback; Tradable Assets; Security Design; Multiple Equilibria; Self-fulfilling Prices; Financial Fragility; Haircut; Repo; Repo Runs; Credit Crunch; Asset-Backed Security; Collateral; Limited Commitment; Adverse Selection; Market Based Financial Intermediation
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financial fragility, liquidity, repo, security design
Complexity, categorization, employment relationship, agency, Pettis integral, behavior, behavioral foundation, decision making, uncertainty, bounded rationality, incomplete contracts, discretization, features, instances
Complexity, Categorization, Employment Relationship, Agency, Pettis Integral, Behavior, Behavioral Foundation, Decision Making, Uncertainty, Bounded Rationality, Incomplete Contracts, Discretization, Features, Instances
Feedback effects, coordination, strategic uncertainty, global games, Grossman-Stiglitz, asymmetric information, heterogenous information, multiple equilibria
Coordination, Asset price, Feedback, Excess Volatility
willpower, self-control, hotelling
Adverse Selection; Collateral; Convenience Yields; Financial Fragility; Narrow banking; QE; Quality-Sensitive Assets; Safe Assets; Safety Premium; Security Design; Shadow Banking.
Stopping game, experimentation, learning, preemption, multiarmed bandit problem
Recursive utility, subjective probability, uncertainty, risk, information
gender, menstrual cycle, contraceptive pills, auction, experiment
Matching, Nonlinear Pricing
sealed bid auctions, ambiguity, experiment
Decentralized Finance; DeFi, Smart Contracts; Dynamic Price Feedback; Financial Fragility; Adverse Selection; DeFi trilemma, Stability, Efficiency, and Decentralization Tradeoff
Optimal Contract, Stock Market Tournament, Beauty Contest, Excess (Insufficient) Effort, Excessive (Insufficient) Systematic Risk-taking, Boom and Bust, Financial Crisis
Intermediation, market microstructure, matching, uncertainty, innovation, patent licensing
Coordination, Financial markets, Heterogenous Information, Learning, Liquidity
Coordination, Currency attacks, Feedback effects, Financial markets, Global games, Heterogenous information, Strategic complementarities
boom-bust effort exertion, contractual externalities, relative and absolute performance contracts, risk taking
Contractual Externalities, Excessive Risk-Taking, Insuffi cient Risk-Taking, Stock-Based Incentives