Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States
Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center
prior-free portfolios, non-stationary returns, time-varying risk premium
collusion, cartel enforcement, minimum prices, entry deterrence, procurement.
experiment design, robustness, ambiguity aversion, randomization, rerandomization
Randomized Controlled Trials, Selective Trials, Blind Trials, Incentivized Trials, Marginal Treatment Effects, Mechanism Design, Selection, Heterogeneous Beliefs, Compliance
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blind trials, compliance, heterogeneous beliefs, incentivized trials, marginal treatment e
corruption, monitoring, collusion, endogenous asymmetric information, random incentives, bargaining failure, prior-free policy evaluation, structural experiment design
Multi-armed bandit problems, regret bounds, batches, multi-phase allocation, grouped clinical trials, sample size determination, switching cost
corruption, whistleblowing, plausible deniability, inference, structural experiment design, prior-free policy design.
adverse selection, big data, capitation, observable but not interpretable, health-care regulation, detail-free mechanism design, model selection
informal contracts, incomplete contracts, social preferences, heuristics, arbitration, third party punishment
value of time, non-transitivity, labor rationing, loss aversion, self-serving bias
labor rationing, loss aversion, non-transitivity, Self-serving bias
Cooperation, fear of miscoordination, global games, dynamic games, exit games, local dominance solvability
