Leonard Treuren

University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE)

Roetersstraat 11

Amsterdam, North Holland 1018 WB

Netherlands

http://sites.google.com/view/leonardtreuren/home

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

3

DOWNLOADS

479

SSRN CITATIONS

2

CROSSREF CITATIONS

1

Scholarly Papers (3)

1.

Green Antitrust: Friendly Fire in the Fight against Climate Change

Forthcoming in: Holmes, S., D. Middelschulte and M. Snoep (eds.), Competition Law, Climate Change & Environmental Sustainability, Concurrences, 2021, Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2020-72, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2020-07
Number of pages: 25 Posted: 15 Dec 2020 Last Revised: 11 Feb 2021
Maarten Pieter Schinkel and Leonard Treuren
University of Amsterdam - Department of Economics and University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE)
Downloads 240 (149,565)

Abstract:

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sustainability, competition, cartel, corporate social responsibility, greenwashing, regulation

2.

Can Collusion Promote Sustainable Consumption and Production? Not Beneficially Beyond Duopoly

Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2018-02, Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2018-01
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 13 Mar 2018 Last Revised: 14 May 2018
Leonard Treuren and Maarten Pieter Schinkel
University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE) and University of Amsterdam - Department of Economics
Downloads 158 (217,626)
Citation 4

Abstract:

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Sustainability, cartel, partial collusion, fringe competition

3.

Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2019-009/VII
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 08 Feb 2019 Last Revised: 01 Jul 2020
Jeroen Hinloopen, Sander Onderstal and Leonard Treuren
CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Policy Analysis, University of Amsterdam and University of Amsterdam - Amsterdam School of Economics (ASE)
Downloads 81 (352,812)

Abstract:

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Cartel Stability, English Auction, First-Price Sealed-Bid Auction, Laboratory Experiments