Gerd Muehlheusser

University of Hamburg

Von Melle Park 5

Hamburg, 20146

Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240

Bonn, D-53072

Germany

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

18

DOWNLOADS
Rank 29,855

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Top 29,855

in Total Papers Downloads

3,596

TOTAL CITATIONS
Rank 13,843

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 13,843

in Total Papers Citations

44

Scholarly Papers (18)

1.

Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 08 Feb 2002
Gerd Muehlheusser and Eberhard Feess
University of Hamburg and Frankfurt School of Finance & Management
Downloads 514 (115,439)
Citation 6

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Labor Contracts, Bosman Judgement, Transfer Fees, Breach of Contract, Investment Incentives, General Skills, Externalities

2.

Legal Restrictions on Buyout Fees: Theory and Evidence from German Soccer

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 07 Jul 2004
Eberhard Feess, Bernd Frick and Gerd Muehlheusser
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, University of Witten/Herdecke - Institute of Economics and Business Administration and University of Hamburg
Downloads 499 (119,639)
Citation 6

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Labor contracts, Bosman judgement, empirical contract theory

The Impact of Managerial Change on Performance: The Role of Team Heterogeneity

IZA Discussion Paper No. 6884
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 07 Oct 2012
Sandra Hentschel, Gerd Muehlheusser and Dirk Sliwka
Bielefeld University, University of Hamburg and University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences
Downloads 229 (277,448)
Citation 1

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managerial succession, teams, heterogeneity, tournaments

The Impact of Managerial Change on Performance: The Role of Team Heterogeneity

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3950
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 04 Oct 2012
Sandra Hentschel, Gerd Muehlheusser and Dirk Sliwka
Bielefeld University, University of Hamburg and University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences
Downloads 127 (468,029)

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managerial succession, teams, heterogeneity, tournaments

Whistle-Blower Protection: Theory and Experimental Evidence

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6394
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 14 Apr 2017
University of Hamburg, University of Hamburg and IZA Institute of Labor EconomicsUniversity of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics
Downloads 213 (297,560)
Citation 1

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corporate fraud, corruption, whistle-blowing, business ethics, cheap-talk games, lab experiment

Whistle-Blower Protection: Theory and Experimental Evidence

IZA Discussion Paper No. 10607
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 26 Mar 2017 Last Revised: 18 Nov 2021
University of Hamburg, University of Hamburg and IZA Institute of Labor EconomicsUniversity of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics
Downloads 97 (574,010)

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business ethics, whistle-blowing, corruption, corporate fraud, cheap-talk games, lab experiment

Whistle-Blower Protection: Theory and Experimental Evidence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11898
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 16 Mar 2017
University of Hamburg, IZA Institute of Labor EconomicsUniversity of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics and University of Hamburg
Downloads 1 (1,357,805)
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Business Ethics, Cheap-Talk Games, Corporate Fraud, Corruption, Lab Experiment, Whistle-Blowing

5.

Environmental Liability Under Uncertain Causation

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 06 Sep 2007
Eberhard Feess, Gerd Muehlheusser and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, University of Hamburg and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 239 (267,613)
Citation 2

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environmental liability, uncertainty over causation, standard of proof, threshold probabilities

6.

The Contribution of Managers to Organizational Success: Evidence from German Soccer

IZA Discussion Paper No. 8560
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 25 Oct 2014
Sandra Hentschel, Gerd Muehlheusser and Dirk Sliwka
Bielefeld University, University of Hamburg and University of Cologne - Faculty of Management, Economics and Social Sciences
Downloads 228 (280,089)

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managerial skills, human capital, empirical, fixed effects, professional sports

7.

Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer

IZA Discussion Paper No. 3834
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 25 Nov 2008
Eberhard Feess, Michael Gerfin and Gerd Muehlheusser
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, University of Bern and University of Hamburg
Downloads 204 (311,434)
Citation 1

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strategic contracting, rent seeking, empirical contract theory, long-term contracts, breach of contract, sports economics

Gender Differences in Honesty: Groups Versus Individuals

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4970
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 07 Oct 2014
University of Hamburg, IZA Institute of Labor EconomicsUniversity of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics and University of Hamburg
Downloads 104 (546,267)

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unethical behavior, lying, group decisions, gender effects, experiment

Gender Differences in Honesty: Groups Versus Individuals

IZA Discussion Paper No. 8443
Number of pages: 13 Posted: 27 Sep 2014
University of Hamburg, IZA Institute of Labor EconomicsUniversity of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics and University of Hamburg
Downloads 73 (682,550)

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unethical behavior, lying, group decisions, gender effects, experiment

Gender Differences in Honesty: Groups Versus Individuals

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10317
Number of pages: 14 Posted: 23 Jan 2015
University of Hamburg, IZA Institute of Labor EconomicsUniversity of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics and University of Hamburg
Downloads 11 (1,261,260)
Citation 7
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experiment, gender effects, group decisions, lying, unethical behaviour

Repeated Selection with Heterogenous Individuals and Relative Age Effects

IZA Discussion Paper No. 6478
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 14 Apr 2012
Herbert Dawid and Gerd Muehlheusser
Bielefeld University - Department of Business Administration and Economics and University of Hamburg
Downloads 55 (791,199)
Citation 1

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skill formation, human capital, selection, heterogeneity, age effects, training, education

Repeated Selection with Heterogenous Individuals and Relative Age Effects

Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics and Management No. 02-2012
Number of pages: 41 Posted: 23 Nov 2012
Herbert Dawid and Gerd Muehlheusser
Bielefeld University - Department of Business Administration and Economics and University of Hamburg
Downloads 55 (791,199)
Citation 1

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Skill Formation, Human Capital, Selection, Heterogeneity, Age Effects, Training, Education

Repeated Selection with Heterogenous Individuals and Relative Age Effects

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3786
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 19 Apr 2012
Herbert Dawid and Gerd Muehlheusser
Bielefeld University - Department of Business Administration and Economics and University of Hamburg
Downloads 37 (940,938)
Citation 1

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skill formation, human capital, selection, heterogeneity, age effects, training, education

10.

When Bidding More is Not Enough: All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps

Bonn Econ. Discussion Paper No. 14/2002
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 21 Aug 2002
Markus Walzl, Eberhard Feess and Gerd Muehlheusser
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and University of Hamburg
Downloads 134 (446,913)

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All-pay auction, contest, asymmetric allocation rule, rent-seeking, asymmetric information

11.

Screening in Courts: On the Joint Use of Negligence and Causation Standards

Number of pages: 25 Posted: 13 Dec 2007 Last Revised: 02 Sep 2008
Eberhard Feess, Gerd Muehlheusser and Ansgar Wohlschlegel
Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, University of Hamburg and Portsmouth Business School
Downloads 129 (460,655)

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liability rules, uncertainty over causation, negligence, threshold probabilities, screening

12.

On the Optimal Design of Unfair Contests

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 30 Oct 2002
Markus Walzl, Eberhard Feess and Gerd Muehlheusser
RWTH Aachen University - Chair for Economics (Microeconomics), Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and University of Hamburg
Downloads 129 (460,655)
Citation 8

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Asymmetric contests, asymmetric information, contest design

How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents

Number of pages: 28 Posted: 13 Feb 2004
Andrea Ichino and Gerd Muehlheusser
University of Bologna and University of Hamburg
Downloads 106 (538,557)
Citation 2

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monitoring, probation, effort, asymmetric information

How Often Should You Open the Door? Optimal Monitoring to Screen Heterogeneous Agents

Number of pages: 27 Posted: 25 Mar 2004
Andrea Ichino and Gerd Muehlheusser
University of Bologna and University of Hamburg
Downloads 19 (1,150,752)
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Monitoring, probation, effort, asymmetric information

14.
Downloads 104 (541,781)
Citation 3

Black Sheep and Walls of Silence

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 06 Jul 2004
Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider and Andreas Roider
University of Hamburg and IZA Institute of Labor EconomicsUniversity of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics
Downloads 86 (620,242)
Citation 1

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teams, misbehavior, wall of silence, asymmetric information

Black Sheep and Walls of Silence

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5308
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 30 Dec 2005
Gerd Muehlheusser, Andreas Roider and Andreas Roider
University of Hamburg and IZA Institute of Labor EconomicsUniversity of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics
Downloads 18 (1,164,438)
Citation 2
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Teams, misbehaviour, wall of silence, asymmetric information

Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

IZA Discussion Paper No. 5027
Number of pages: 53 Posted: 06 Jul 2010
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics, University of Hamburg and IZA Institute of Labor EconomicsUniversity of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics
Downloads 82 (638,429)

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moral hazard, limited commitment, ex-post outside option, limited liability

Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7914
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 19 Jul 2010
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics, University of Hamburg and IZA Institute of Labor EconomicsUniversity of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics
Downloads 2 (1,348,985)
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ex-post outside option, limited commitment, limited liability, moral hazard

16.

Regulating Damage Clauses in (Labor) Contracts

Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No. 2367
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 27 Oct 2006
Gerd Muehlheusser
University of Hamburg
Downloads 79 (643,520)

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damage clauses, penalty doctrine, breach of contract, asymmetric information, labor contracts

17.

Black Sheep or Scapegoats? Implementable Monitoring Policies Under Unobservable Levels of Misbehavior

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4698
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 16 Apr 2014
Berno Buechel and Gerd Muehlheusser
Bielefeld University - Center for Mathematical Economics and University of Hamburg
Downloads 78 (648,079)
Citation 1

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monitoring, deterrence, unobservable misbehavior, victimless crime, doping, law & economics

18.

Optimal Law Enforcement with Sophisticated and Naive Offenders

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 7106
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 09 Aug 2018
Berno Buechel, Eberhard Feess and Gerd Muehlheusser
University of Fribourg - Faculty of Economics and Social Science, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management and University of Hamburg
Downloads 48 (824,314)
Citation 3

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optimal law enforcement, deterrence, behavioral law & economics, naïveté, shrouding

Other Papers (1)

Total Downloads: 30
1.

Optimal Incentive Contracts Under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 17 Jan 2012
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics, University of Hamburg and IZA Institute of Labor EconomicsUniversity of Regensburg - Department of Economics and Econometrics
Downloads 30

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moral hazard, limited commitment, ex-post outside option, limited liability