Somouaoga Bonkoungou

National Research University Higher School of Economics

Soyza Pechatnikov str., 15

St. Petersburg, 190068

Russia

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

3

DOWNLOADS

174

SSRN CITATIONS

3

CROSSREF CITATIONS

4

Scholarly Papers (3)

1.

Reforms Meet Fairness Concerns In School And College Admissions

Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 234/EC/2020
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 31 Jul 2020
Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov
National Research University Higher School of Economics and National Research University Higher School of Economics
Downloads 71 (433,969)
Citation 3

Abstract:

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market design,school choice,college admission,fairness,stability

2.

Incentives in Matching Markets: Counting and Comparing Manipulating Agents

Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 249/EC/2021
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 07 Jul 2021
Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov
National Research University Higher School of Economics and National Research University Higher School of Economics
Downloads 63 (461,592)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Vulnerability to manipulation is a threat to successful matching market design. However, some manipulation is often inevitable and the mechanism designer wants to compare manipulable mechanisms and pick the best. Real-life examples include reforms in the entry-level medical labor market in the US (1

3.

Comparing School Choice and College Admission Mechanisms By Their Immunity to Strategic Admissions

Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 222/EC/2020
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 28 Jan 2020
Somouaoga Bonkoungou and Alexander Nesterov
National Research University Higher School of Economics and National Research University Higher School of Economics
Downloads 40 (559,943)

Abstract:

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matching market design, school choice, college admission, manipulability