213 Fisher Hall
Princeton, NJ 08544
United States
London
United Kingdom
Princeton University - Department of Economics
SSRN RANKINGS
in Total Papers Citations
dynamic contracts, mechanism design, first-order approach
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $8.00 for this paper.
If you wish to purchase the right to make copies of this paper for distribution to others, please select the quantity.
cheap talk, communication, experiment
Behavioral Economics, Constitutional Design, Elections, Endogenous Institutions, Experiment
Peer effects, social interactions, clubs, self-control, willpower, addiction, time-inconsistency, memory, psychology
Contract theory, dynamic contracts, renegotiation, regulation
Lobbying, interest groups, activism, political economy, signalling games
Teams, moral hazard, incentives, theory of the firm
Committees, costly voting, information aggregation, sequential voting
Swing voter's curse, voting behaviour, information aggregation