Piotr Dworczak

Northwestern University - Department of Economics

Assistant Professor

2003 Sheridan Road

Evanston, IL 60208

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

10

DOWNLOADS
Rank 26,870

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 26,870

in Total Papers Downloads

1,698

CITATIONS
Rank 22,227

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 22,227

in Total Papers Citations

20

Scholarly Papers (10)

1.
Downloads 751 ( 32,006)
Citation 11

Benchmarks in Search Markets

Journal of Finance, Forthcoming, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 14-47
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 29 Oct 2014 Last Revised: 23 Nov 2016
Darrell Duffie, Piotr Dworczak and Haoxiang Zhu
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business, Northwestern University - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 683 (35,855)

Abstract:

Loading...

Benchmark, Search, Transparency, OTC markets, LIBOR

Benchmarks in Search Markets

NBER Working Paper No. w20620
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 27 Oct 2014
Darrell Duffie, Piotr Dworczak and Haoxiang Zhu
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business, Northwestern University - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 68 (334,139)
Citation 24

Abstract:

Loading...

2.

Redistribution through Markets

Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics Working Paper No. 2018-16
Number of pages: 67 Posted: 20 Mar 2018 Last Revised: 31 Mar 2019
Northwestern University - Department of Economics, Harvard University and Stanford University
Downloads 501 (54,638)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

optimal mechanism design, redistribution, inequality

3.

Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms

Number of pages: 59 Posted: 30 Oct 2016 Last Revised: 02 Jul 2019
Piotr Dworczak
Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 90 (280,143)
Citation 12

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism Design, Information Design, Disclosure, Auctions, OTC Markets

4.

Robust Benchmark Design

NBER Working Paper No. w20540
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 06 Oct 2014
Darrell Duffie and Piotr Dworczak
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 88 (284,186)

Abstract:

Loading...

5.

The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 29 May 2016 Last Revised: 30 Nov 2017
Piotr Dworczak and Giorgio Martini
Northwestern University - Department of Economics and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 75 (312,845)
Citation 11

Abstract:

Loading...

Bayesian Persuasion, Walrasian Equilibrium, Lagrangian, mean-preserving spreads

6.

Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 01 May 2015 Last Revised: 02 Jul 2019
Piotr Dworczak
Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 58 (357,968)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Loading...

Deferred Acceptance, Stability, Compensation Chain

7.

The Effects of Post-Auction Bargaining between Bidders

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 17 Jan 2015 Last Revised: 22 Jul 2015
Piotr Dworczak
Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 47 (393,473)

Abstract:

Loading...

Auctions, bargaining, information revelation, mechanism design

8.

Implementability, Walrasian Equilibria and Efficient Matchings

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 15-30
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 12 May 2015 Last Revised: 26 Oct 2016
Piotr Dworczak and Anthony Lee Zhang
Northwestern University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 46 (396,956)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Implementability, Walrasian Equilibrium, Multidimensional Screening

9.

Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: On the Impossibility of Pure Information Intermediation

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-3
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 03 Jan 2017
Piotr Dworczak
Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 21 (509,159)

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism Design, Information Design, Sequential Agency, Communication

10.

Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: Optimal Mechanisms Under Binary Actions

Research Paper
Number of pages: 63 Posted: 03 Jan 2017 Last Revised: 02 Jul 2019
Piotr Dworczak
Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 21 (509,159)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Loading...

Mechanism Design, Information Design, Auctions