Piotr Dworczak

Northwestern University - Department of Economics

Assistant Professor

2003 Sheridan Road

Evanston, IL 60208

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

16

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3,806

SSRN CITATIONS
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SSRN RANKINGS

Top 7,722

in Total Papers Citations

96

CROSSREF CITATIONS

72

Scholarly Papers (16)

1.

Redistribution through Markets

Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics Working Paper No. 2018-16
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 20 Mar 2018 Last Revised: 09 Jul 2020
Northwestern University - Department of Economics, Harvard University and Stanford University
Downloads 1,325 (20,752)
Citation 9

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optimal mechanism design, redistribution, inequality, welfare theorems

2.
Downloads 815 ( 41,590)
Citation 41

Benchmarks in Search Markets

Journal of Finance, Forthcoming, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 14-47
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 29 Oct 2014 Last Revised: 23 Nov 2016
Darrell Duffie, Piotr Dworczak and Haoxiang Zhu
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business, Northwestern University - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 736 (47,060)

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Benchmark, Search, Transparency, OTC markets, LIBOR

Benchmarks in Search Markets

NBER Working Paper No. w20620
Number of pages: 62 Posted: 27 Oct 2014 Last Revised: 07 May 2022
Darrell Duffie, Piotr Dworczak and Haoxiang Zhu
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business, Northwestern University - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management
Downloads 79 (413,480)
Citation 17

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3.

An Economic Framework for Vaccine Prioritization

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 17 May 2021 Last Revised: 24 Jan 2022
Stanford University, University of Chicago - Booth School of Business, Northwestern University - Department of Economics and Harvard University
Downloads 382 (107,080)

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COVID-19, vaccination, mechanism design, inequality

4.

Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms

Number of pages: 45 Posted: 18 Jun 2020 Last Revised: 09 Oct 2020
Stanford University, Northwestern University - Department of Economics and Harvard University
Downloads 308 (135,287)
Citation 6

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optimal mechanism design, redistribution, inequality, welfare

5.

Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms

Number of pages: 73 Posted: 30 Oct 2016 Last Revised: 28 Jan 2020
Piotr Dworczak
Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 173 (234,490)
Citation 23

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Mechanism Design, Information Design, Disclosure, Auctions

6.

The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 29 May 2016 Last Revised: 30 Nov 2017
Piotr Dworczak and Giorgio Martini
Northwestern University - Department of Economics and Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 136 (288,329)
Citation 42

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Bayesian Persuasion, Walrasian Equilibrium, Lagrangian, mean-preserving spreads

7.

Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal when Agents are Unsophisticated?

Number of pages: 53 Posted: 15 Jul 2020 Last Revised: 08 Sep 2020
Jiangtao Li and Piotr Dworczak
Singapore Management University and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 123 (307,238)
Citation 2

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Simple mechanisms, complex mechanisms, robust mechanism design, dominant-strategy mechanisms, obviously strategy-proof mechanisms, strongly obviously strategy-proof mechanisms

8.

Robust Benchmark Design

NBER Working Paper No. w20540
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 06 Oct 2014 Last Revised: 14 Feb 2022
Darrell Duffie and Piotr Dworczak
Stanford University - Graduate School of Business and Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 121 (311,110)
Citation 1

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9.

Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion

Number of pages: 69 Posted: 14 Feb 2020 Last Revised: 02 Nov 2020
Piotr Dworczak and Alessandro Pavan
Northwestern University - Department of Economics and Northwestern University
Downloads 107 (338,925)
Citation 2

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persuasion, information design, robustness, worst-case optimality

10.

Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains

Number of pages: 24 Posted: 01 May 2015 Last Revised: 11 Nov 2019
Piotr Dworczak
Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 89 (381,330)
Citation 1

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Deferred Acceptance, Stability, Compensation Chain

11.

The Effects of Post-Auction Bargaining between Bidders

Number of pages: 40 Posted: 17 Jan 2015 Last Revised: 22 Jul 2015
Piotr Dworczak
Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 57 (484,447)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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Auctions, bargaining, information revelation, mechanism design

12.

Implementability, Walrasian Equilibria and Efficient Matchings

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 15-30
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 12 May 2015 Last Revised: 26 Oct 2016
Piotr Dworczak and Anthony Lee Zhang
Northwestern University - Department of Economics and University of Chicago - Booth School of Business
Downloads 54 (496,447)
Citation 2

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Implementability, Walrasian Equilibrium, Multidimensional Screening

13.

The Persuasion Duality

Number of pages: 29 Posted: 01 Nov 2019
Piotr Dworczak and Anton Kolotilin
Northwestern University - Department of Economics and University of New South Wales (UNSW)
Downloads 52 (504,710)
Citation 1

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Bayesian Persuasion, Information Design, Duality

14.

Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: Optimal Mechanisms Under Binary Actions

Research Paper
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 03 Jan 2017 Last Revised: 08 Sep 2020
Piotr Dworczak
Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 38 (570,314)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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Mechanism Design, Information Design, Auctions

15.

Mechanism Design with Aftermarkets: On the Impossibility of Pure Information Intermediation

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-3
Number of pages: 12 Posted: 03 Jan 2017
Piotr Dworczak
Northwestern University - Department of Economics
Downloads 26 (641,399)

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Mechanism Design, Information Design, Sequential Agency, Communication

16.

Preparing for the Worst But Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15017
Number of pages: 64 Posted: 28 Jul 2020 Last Revised: 16 Aug 2020
Piotr Dworczak and Alessandro Pavan
Northwestern University - Department of Economics and Northwestern University
Downloads 0 (875,504)
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information design, Persuasion, robustness, worst-case optimality