Dino Gerardi

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Assistant Professor

Box 208281

New Haven, CT 06520-8281

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

14

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1,459

SSRN CITATIONS
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Top 7,813

in Total Papers Citations

30

CROSSREF CITATIONS

136

Scholarly Papers (14)

1.

Aggregation of Expert Opinions

Number of pages: 41 Posted: 05 Apr 2005
Yale University - Cowles Foundation, Rutgers University - Department of Economics and University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics
Downloads 375 (113,980)
Citation 12

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Information aggregation, Asymmetric information, Cheap talk, Experts

2.

Social Memory and Evidence from the Past

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1601
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 29 Jan 2007
Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi and Roger Lagunoff
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Georgetown University - Department of Economics
Downloads 175 (241,510)

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Social memory, Private communication, Dynastic games, Physical evidence

3.

Committee Design in the Presence of Communication

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 17 Mar 2003
Dino Gerardi and Leeat Yariv
Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Princeton University
Downloads 160 (260,429)

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Communication, Collective Choice, Mechanism Design, Strategic Voting, Information Acquisition

4.

Communication and Learning

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1639, Yale Economics Department Working Paper No. 37
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 10 Feb 2008 Last Revised: 20 Mar 2008
Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi and Roger Lagunoff
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Georgetown University - Department of Economics
Downloads 153 (269,992)

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Communication, Learning, Dynamic strategic information transmission

5.

Information Acquisition in Committees

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1411R
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 03 Sep 2007
Dino Gerardi and Leeat Yariv
Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Princeton University
Downloads 128 (310,365)
Citation 5

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D71, D72, D78

6.

Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information

Number of pages: 74 Posted: 13 Jun 2002
Dino Gerardi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation
Downloads 107 (352,329)
Citation 1

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Communication, Correlated Equilibrium, Communication Equilibrium, Sequential Equilibrium, Mechanism Design, Revelation Principle

7.

Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1542
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 05 Dec 2005
Dino Gerardi and Roger Myerson
Yale University - Cowles Foundation and University of Chicago - Department of Economics
Downloads 106 (354,598)
Citation 13

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Bayesian games, Communication, Communication equilibrium, Sequential communication equilibrium

8.
Downloads 100 (368,505)
Citation 2

The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1760
Number of pages: 77 Posted: 14 May 2010
Dino Gerardi, Johannes Horner and Lucas Maestri
Yale University - Cowles Foundation, Yale University - Cowles Foundation and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 63 (486,551)
Citation 1

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Bargaining, Mechanism Design, Market for Lemons

The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1760R
Number of pages: 83 Posted: 06 Oct 2013
Dino Gerardi, Johannes Horner and Lucas Maestri
Yale University - Cowles Foundation, Yale University - Cowles Foundation and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 37 (612,372)

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Bargaining, Mechanism design, Market for lemons

9.

A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1680
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 31 Oct 2008
Dino Gerardi and Lucas Maestri
Yale University - Cowles Foundation and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 82 (416,273)

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Dynamic mechanism design, Information acquisition, Sequential testing

10.

The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games

Number of pages: 78 Posted: 24 Nov 2004
Luca Anderlini, Dino Gerardi and Roger Lagunoff
Georgetown University - Department of Economics, Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Georgetown University - Department of Economics
Downloads 71 (451,136)

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Dynastic Repeated Games, Private Communication, Folk Theorem

11.

Get Out the (Costly) Vote: Institutional Design for Greater Participation

Economic Inquiry, Vol. 54, Issue 4, pp. 1963-1979, 2016
Number of pages: 17 Posted: 31 Aug 2016
Yale University - Cowles Foundation, Harvard University, University of Arizona - Eller College of Management and Princeton University
Downloads 2 (899,177)

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12.

The Perils of Friendly Oversight

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16100
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 14 May 2021
Dino Gerardi, Edoardo Grillo and Ignacio Monzón
Yale University - Cowles Foundation, University of Turin - Collegio Carlo Alberto and University of Turin - Collegio Carlo Alberto
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13.

Bargaining Over a Divisible Good in the Market for Lemons

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14920
Number of pages: 90 Posted: 29 Jun 2020
Dino Gerardi, Lucas Maestri and Ignacio Monzón
Yale University - Cowles Foundation, University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) and University of Turin - Collegio Carlo Alberto
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Bargaining, Coase conjecture, divisible objects, gradual sale, interdependent valuations, market for lemons

14.

Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12699
Number of pages: 77 Posted: 14 Feb 2018
Dino Gerardi
Yale University - Cowles Foundation
Downloads 0 (929,346)
Citation 4
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Dynamic Contracting, Limited Commitment, Ratchet Effect