Andrzej Skrzypacz

Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business

Professor

655 Knight Way

Stanford, CA 94305-5015

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

22

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Top 9,311

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4,855

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Top 7,952

in Total Papers Citations

58

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Scholarly Papers (22)

1.
Downloads 968 ( 22,216)

Selling Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1743
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 26 Dec 2009 Last Revised: 14 Aug 2010
Johannes Horner and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 398 (71,223)

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Value of information, Dynamic game

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Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1743R
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 01 Jun 2011 Last Revised: 20 Aug 2011
Johannes Horner and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 343 (84,836)

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Value of information, Dynamic game

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Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1743RR
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 28 Nov 2012
Johannes Horner and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 227 (131,882)

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Value of information, Dynamic game

2.

Persuading the Principal to Wait

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 16-20
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 20 Apr 2016 Last Revised: 27 Aug 2018
Dmitry Orlov, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Pavel Zryumov
University of Rochester - Simon Business School, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and University of Rochester - Simon Business School
Downloads 643 (39,210)

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strategic communication, bayesian persuasion, dynamic games, real options

3.

Dynamic Trading: Price Inertia and Front-Running

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-4
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 10 Dec 2016
Yuliy Sannikov and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Stanford GSB and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 571 (45,939)

Abstract:

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4.

Comments of 71 Concerned Economists: Using Procurement Auctions to Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 15 Apr 2009 Last Revised: 08 Jun 2014
New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies, Stanford University - Department of Economics, Stanford Graduate School of Business, American University - Washington College of Law, The Brattle Group, University of Maryland, Baltimore County - Department of Public Policy, Stanford University - Department of Economics, Stanford University, Columbia University, University of Maryland - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder - College of Engineering and Applied Science, University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Stanford Graduate School of Business, University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School, University of Michigan, Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Zurich, University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business, Harvard University - Technology & Operations Management Unit, University of Oxford, Smith School, Hoover Institution and Department of Economics, Stanford University, affiliation not provided to SSRN, affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group, University of North Texas, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics, Clemson University, University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics, affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration, Public Utility Research Center, Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics, National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) (Deceased), Independent, Penn State University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL), Technology Policy Institute, Stanford University - Department of Economics, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST), Georgetown University - Department of Strategy/Economics/Ethics/Public Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA), Stanford University, Stanford University - Department of Economics, Stanford University, California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Northwestern University - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Toulouse School of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics, Boston University - Department of Finance & Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Georgetown University, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business, Chapman University - Economic Science Institute, University of Maryland - Department of Economics, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management, Technology Policy Institute, Northwestern University - Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences (MEDS), University of Nevada, Las Vegas - College of Business - Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics, Charles River Associates (CRA) and Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
Downloads 329 (89,571)

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5.

Design of Macro-Prudential Stress Tests

Simon Business School Working Paper No. FR 17-14, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-41
Number of pages: 75 Posted: 01 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 18 May 2018
Dmitry Orlov, Pavel Zryumov and Andrzej Skrzypacz
University of Rochester - Simon Business School, University of Rochester - Simon Business School and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 302 (98,358)

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Stress Tests, Systemic Risk, Capital Requirements, Information Design, Dynamic Disclosure

6.

Standards Coalitions Formation and Market Structure in Network Industries

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 13 Mar 2003
Nicholas Economides and Andrzej Skrzypacz
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 251 (119,640)

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7.
Downloads 239 (125,673)

Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 14 Dec 2011 Last Revised: 09 Feb 2013
Maria Bigoni, Marco Casari, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Giancarlo Spagnolo
University of Bologna - Department of Economics, University of Bologna - Department of Economics, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 125 (223,051)

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folk theorem, prisoner's dilemma, backward induction, termination rule, infinite horizon

Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time

Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 796
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 17 Nov 2011
Maria Bigoni, Marco Casari, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Giancarlo Spagnolo
University of Bologna - Department of Economics, University of Bologna - Department of Economics, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 114 (239,149)

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folk theorem, prisoner's dilemma, backward induction, termination rule, innite horizon

8.
Downloads 214 (139,972)

Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design

14th Annual Utah Winter Finance Conference Paper
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 25 Aug 2004
Peter M. DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Independent and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 175 (168,561)

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Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design

NBER Working Paper No. w10891
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 22 Nov 2004
Peter M. DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Independent and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 39 (429,765)

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9.

Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure

American Economic Review, 2014, vol. 104, issue 8, pages 2400-2420
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 14 Jun 2012 Last Revised: 22 Aug 2014
Ilan Guttman, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University, University of Warwick and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 181 (163,460)

Abstract:

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corporate disclosure, valuation, asset pricing, markets

10.

Network Externalities and Long-Run Market Shares

Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1879
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 24 Jan 2005
Andrzej Skrzypacz and Matthew F. Mitchell
Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and Rotman School of Management
Downloads 158 (183,976)

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11.

Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 2133; Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 13-4
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 05 Sep 2013
William Fuchs and Andrzej Skrzypacz
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 147 (195,327)

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12.

Limited Records and Reputation

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 2030, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 54
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 16 Jul 2009
Qingmin Liu and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Columbia University and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 146 (196,422)

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reputation, repeated games

13.

Impossibility of Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production

Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1887
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 28 May 2005
Andrzej Skrzypacz and Yuliy Sannikov
Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 136 (207,974)

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Economic theory, microeconomics, dynamic games, collusion

Ratings, Certifications and Grades: Dynamic Signaling and Market Breakdown

Stanford GSB Working Paper No. 1814 (R)
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 09 Oct 2003
Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Independent and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 78 (307,400)

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Ratings, Certifications and Grades: Dynamic Signaling and Market Breakdown

Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1814 (R2)
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 29 Jun 2005
Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Independent and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 53 (377,765)

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bargaining, screening, dynamic signaling

15.

Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-9
Number of pages: 74 Posted: 25 Jan 2017 Last Revised: 26 May 2018
Felipe Varas, Ivan Marinovic and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Duke University - Fuqua School of Business - Finance Department, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 124 (223,560)

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Monitoring, Auditing, Dynamic Contracts, Dynamic Games, Reputation

16.

Collusion Under Monitoring of Sales

Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1885
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 14 Apr 2005
Andrzej Skrzypacz and Joseph E. Harrington
Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and Johns Hopkins University - Department of Economics
Downloads 95 (269,539)

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17.

Transparency and Distressed Sales Under Asymmetric Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1986, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 15-14
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 11 Feb 2015
William Fuchs, Aniko Oery and Andrzej Skrzypacz
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance, Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 87 (284,984)

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Adverse selection, Transparency, Distress, Market design, Volume

18.

Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality

Number of pages: 60 Posted: 25 Jan 2017
Ivan Marinovic, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Felipe Varas
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and Duke University - Fuqua School of Business - Finance Department
Downloads 72 (318,714)

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Dynamic Certification, Disclosure, Investment trap, Voluntary Disclosure, Certification, Dynamic Games, Optimal Stopping

19.

Rules with Discretion and Local Information

Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 2117R
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 04 Sep 2012 Last Revised: 25 Jan 2013
T. Renee Bowen, David M. Kreps and Andrzej Skrzypacz
University of California, San Diego, Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 55 (365,591)

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20.

Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

NBER Working Paper No. w20487
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 15 Sep 2014
Jonathan Levin and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Stanford University - Department of Economics and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 6 (595,678)

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21.

Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services

Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 406
Posted: 08 Feb 2011
Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory L. Rosston and Andrzej Skrzypacz
University of Maryland - Department of Economics, Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business

Abstract:

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auctions, spectrum auctions, market design

22.

Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories

Posted: 25 Jul 2008
Christopher Phelan and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business

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Private Monitoring, Repeated Games