Andrzej Skrzypacz

Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business

Professor

655 Knight Way

Stanford, CA 94305-5015

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

33

DOWNLOADS
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Top 9,571

in Total Papers Downloads

8,372

SSRN CITATIONS
Rank 3,272

SSRN RANKINGS

Top 3,272

in Total Papers Citations

303

CROSSREF CITATIONS

190

Scholarly Papers (33)

1.
Downloads 1,091 (33,867)
Citation 30

Selling Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1743
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 26 Dec 2009 Last Revised: 14 Aug 2010
Johannes Horner and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 423 (114,830)
Citation 5

Abstract:

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Value of information, Dynamic game

Selling Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1743R
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 01 Jun 2011 Last Revised: 20 Aug 2011
Johannes Horner and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 376 (131,763)
Citation 9

Abstract:

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Value of information, Dynamic game

Selling Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1743RR
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 28 Nov 2012
Johannes Horner and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 292 (173,176)
Citation 6

Abstract:

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Value of information, Dynamic game

2.

Persuading the Principal to Wait

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 16-20
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 20 Apr 2016 Last Revised: 28 Sep 2019
Dmitry Orlov, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Pavel Zryumov
University of Wisconsin School of Business, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and University of Rochester - Simon Business School
Downloads 932 (42,347)
Citation 19

Abstract:

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strategic communication, bayesian persuasion, dynamic games, real options

3.

Spoofing in Equilibrium

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 01 Feb 2021 Last Revised: 14 Jun 2021
Basil Williams and Andrzej Skrzypacz
New York University (NYU) and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 741 (57,874)
Citation 2

Abstract:

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market microstructure, manipulation, spoofing

4.

Design of Macro-Prudential Stress Tests

Simon Business School Working Paper No. FR 17-14, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-41
Number of pages: 220 Posted: 01 Jun 2017 Last Revised: 06 Nov 2021
Dmitry Orlov, Pavel Zryumov and Andrzej Skrzypacz
University of Wisconsin School of Business, University of Rochester - Simon Business School and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 685 (64,566)
Citation 22

Abstract:

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Stress Tests, Capital Requirements, Systemic Risk, Macro-Prudential Regulation, Mechanism Design, Dynamic mechanisms, Bayesian Persuasion.

5.

Dynamic Trading: Price Inertia and Front-Running

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-4
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 10 Dec 2016
Yuliy Sannikov and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Stanford GSB and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 616 (73,459)
Citation 29

Abstract:

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6.

Comments of 71 Concerned Economists: Using Procurement Auctions to Allocate Broadband Stimulus Grants

Number of pages: 16 Posted: 15 Apr 2009 Last Revised: 08 Jun 2014
New York University - Stern School of Business, Berkley Center for Entrepreneurial Studies, Stanford University - Department of Economics, Stanford Graduate School of Business, American University - Washington College of Law, The Brattle Group, University of Maryland, Baltimore County - Department of Public Policy, Stanford Graduate School of BusinessStanford University - Department of Economics, Stanford University, Columbia University, University of Maryland - Department of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - Department of Economics, University of Colorado at Boulder - College of Engineering and Applied Science, University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Stanford Graduate School of Business, University of Pennsylvania - Wharton School, University of Michigan, Georgetown University - Department of Economics, University of Zurich, University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)Harvard University - Technology & Operations Management Unit, Technology Policy Institute, Hoover Institution and Department of Economics, Stanford University, affiliation not provided to SSRN, affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group, University of North Texas, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics, Clemson University, University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics, affiliation not provided to SSRN, University of Florida - Warrington College of Business Administration, Public Utility Research Center, Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics, National Economic Research Associates Inc. (NERA) (Deceased), Independent, Penn State University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (CSAIL), Technology Policy Institute, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST), Georgetown University - McDonough School of Business, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Economics, Finance, Accounting (EFA), Stanford University, Stanford University - Department of Economics, Stanford University, California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Northwestern University - Department of Economics, University of Chicago - Department of Economics, Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Toulouse School of EconomicsColumbia University - Columbia Institute for Tele Information, University of Colorado at Boulder - Department of Economics, Boston University - Department of Finance & Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management, Georgetown University - Department of Economics, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business, Chapman University - Economic Science Institute, University of Maryland - Department of Economics, University of Minnesota - Twin Cities - Carlson School of Management, Technology Policy Institute, Northwestern University - Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences (MEDS), University of Nevada, Las Vegas - College of Business - Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics, Charles River Associates (CRA) and Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research
Downloads 478 (100,543)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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7.

Incentive Design for Talent Discovery

Number of pages: 82 Posted: 12 Feb 2021 Last Revised: 03 May 2022
Erik Madsen, Basil Williams and Andrzej Skrzypacz
New York University, New York University (NYU) and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 387 (128,536)

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Incentive pay, promotion policies, career concerns, risk-taking

8.

Persuasion with Multiple Actions

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 13 Jul 2021 Last Revised: 28 Sep 2022
Davit Khantadze, Ilan Kremer, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz
ISET at Tbilisi State University, University of WarwickHebrew University of Jerusalem and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 365 (137,276)

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Dynamic Persuasion, Information Disclosure

9.
Downloads 287 (177,361)
Citation 26

Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 14 Dec 2011 Last Revised: 09 Feb 2013
Maria Bigoni, Marco Casari, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Giancarlo Spagnolo
University of Bologna - Department of Economics, University of Bologna - Department of Economics, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 149 (324,934)
Citation 18

Abstract:

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folk theorem, prisoner's dilemma, backward induction, termination rule, infinite horizon

Time Horizon and Cooperation in Continuous Time

Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 796
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 17 Nov 2011
Maria Bigoni, Marco Casari, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Giancarlo Spagnolo
University of Bologna - Department of Economics, University of Bologna - Department of Economics, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 138 (345,567)
Citation 1

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folk theorem, prisoner's dilemma, backward induction, termination rule, innite horizon

10.
Downloads 277 (183,940)
Citation 71

Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 25 Aug 2004
Peter M. DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Independent and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 204 (246,501)

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Bidding with Securities: Auctions and Security Design

NBER Working Paper No. w10891
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 22 Nov 2004 Last Revised: 06 Oct 2022
Peter M. DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Stanford Graduate School of Business, Independent and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 73 (535,465)
Citation 18

Abstract:

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11.

Standards Coalitions Formation and Market Structure in Network Industries

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 13 Mar 2003
Nicholas Economides and Andrzej Skrzypacz
New York University - Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 277 (183,940)

Abstract:

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12.

Not Only What but Also When: A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure

American Economic Review, 2014, vol. 104, issue 8, pages 2400-2420
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 14 Jun 2012 Last Revised: 22 Aug 2014
Ilan Guttman, Ilan Kremer, Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University, University of WarwickHebrew University of Jerusalem and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 233 (218,167)
Citation 12

Abstract:

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corporate disclosure, valuation, asset pricing, markets

13.

Random Inspections and Periodic Reviews: Optimal Dynamic Monitoring

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 17-9
Number of pages: 55 Posted: 25 Jan 2017 Last Revised: 06 Mar 2020
Felipe Varas, Ivan Marinovic and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Duke University - Fuqua School of Business - Finance Department, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 198 (253,937)
Citation 5

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Monitoring, Auditing, Dynamic Contracts, Dynamic Games, Reputation

14.

Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 2133; Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 13-4
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 05 Sep 2013
William Fuchs and Andrzej Skrzypacz
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 188 (266,044)
Citation 20

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15.

Network Externalities and Long-Run Market Shares

Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1879
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 24 Jan 2005
Andrzej Skrzypacz and Matthew F. Mitchell
Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and Rotman School of Management
Downloads 181 (275,009)
Citation 8

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16.

Artificial Intelligence and Auction Design

Number of pages: 31 Posted: 16 Feb 2022
Martino Banchio and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Google Research and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 177 (280,515)

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Auction Design, Q-learning, Algorithmic Bidding

17.

Limited Records and Reputation

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 2030, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 54
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 16 Jul 2009
Qingmin Liu and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Columbia University and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 173 (286,171)
Citation 25

Abstract:

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reputation, repeated games

18.

Impossibility of Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Flexible Production

Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1887
Number of pages: 37 Posted: 28 May 2005
Andrzej Skrzypacz and Yuliy Sannikov
Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics
Downloads 168 (293,421)
Citation 4

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Economic theory, microeconomics, dynamic games, collusion

Ratings, Certifications and Grades: Dynamic Signaling and Market Breakdown

Stanford GSB Working Paper No. 1814 (R)
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 09 Oct 2003
Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Independent and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 94 (458,106)
Citation 10

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Ratings, Certifications and Grades: Dynamic Signaling and Market Breakdown

Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1814 (R2)
Number of pages: 50 Posted: 29 Jun 2005
Ilan Kremer and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Independent and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 67 (561,973)

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bargaining, screening, dynamic signaling

20.

Collusion Under Monitoring of Sales

Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1885
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 14 Apr 2005
Andrzej Skrzypacz and Joseph E. Harrington
Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and Johns Hopkins University - Department of Economics
Downloads 117 (390,191)
Citation 7

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21.

Transparency and Distressed Sales Under Asymmetric Information

Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1986, Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 15-14
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 11 Feb 2015
William Fuchs, Aniko Oery and Andrzej Skrzypacz
University of Texas at Austin - Department of Finance, Yale University - Cowles Foundation and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 116 (392,544)
Citation 7

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Adverse selection, Transparency, Distress, Market design, Volume

22.

Dynamic Certification and Reputation for Quality

Number of pages: 60 Posted: 25 Jan 2017
Ivan Marinovic, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Felipe Varas
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and Duke University - Fuqua School of Business - Finance Department
Downloads 111 (405,372)
Citation 8

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Dynamic Certification, Disclosure, Investment trap, Voluntary Disclosure, Certification, Dynamic Games, Optimal Stopping

23.

Trading Information

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 15 Sep 2022
Dmitry Orlov, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Pavel Zryumov
University of Wisconsin School of Business, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and University of Rochester - Simon Business School
Downloads 95 (451,423)

Abstract:

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Bayesian persuasion, stochastic games, real options.

24.

Disclosing a Random Walk

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 09 Feb 2022 Last Revised: 04 Apr 2023
Ilan Kremer, Ilan Kremer, Amnon Schreiber and Andrzej Skrzypacz
University of WarwickHebrew University of Jerusalem, Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 87 (477,024)

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Strategic Disclosure

25.

Rules with Discretion and Local Information

Stanford Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 2117R
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 04 Sep 2012 Last Revised: 25 Jan 2013
T. Renee Bowen, David M. Kreps and Andrzej Skrzypacz
University of California, San Diego, Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 77 (513,097)

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26.

Online Appendix: Persuading the Principal to Wait

Number of pages: 68 Posted: 14 Oct 2019
Dmitry Orlov, Andrzej Skrzypacz and Pavel Zryumov
University of Wisconsin School of Business, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and University of Rochester - Simon Business School
Downloads 50 (636,972)
Citation 1

Abstract:

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strategic communication, bayesian persuasion, dynamic games, real options

27.

Pure-Strategy Equilibrium in the Generalized First-Price Auction

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 4250550
Number of pages: 19 Posted: 19 Oct 2022
Michael Ostrovsky and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 40 (696,787)

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28.

Incentivizing Autonomous Workers

Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 4486754
Number of pages: 56 Posted: 26 Jun 2023
Erik Madsen, Basil Williams and Andrzej Skrzypacz
New York University, New York University (NYU) and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 35 (730,692)

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Incentive pay, non-monetary rewards, worker autonomy, task selection, platform economics

29.

Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction

NBER Working Paper No. w20487
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 15 Sep 2014 Last Revised: 25 Jun 2023
Jonathan Levin and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business
Downloads 15 (898,312)
Citation 6

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30.

It’S Payback Time: New Insights on Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma

IZA Discussion Paper No. 15023
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 19 May 2022
University of Bologna - Department of Economics, Università di Bologna, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 14 (908,045)

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asymmetric strategies, imperfect monitoring, indefinitely repeated games, risk dominance, strategic risk

31.

It's Payback Time: New Insights on Cooperation in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16912
Number of pages: 23 Posted: 04 Feb 2022
University of Bologna - Department of Economics, Università di Bologna, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stockholm School of Economics (SITE)
Downloads 0 (1,029,675)
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Asymmetric strategies, Imperfect Monitoring, indefinitely repeated games, Risk dominance, Strategic risk

32.

Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance Competition in Wireless Services

Journal of Law and Economics, Forthcoming, Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 406
Posted: 08 Feb 2011
Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory L. Rosston and Andrzej Skrzypacz
University of Maryland - Department of Economics, Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business

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auctions, spectrum auctions, market design

33.

Private Monitoring with Infinite Histories

Posted: 25 Jul 2008
Christopher Phelan and Andrzej Skrzypacz
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and Stanford University - Stanford Graduate School of Business

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Private Monitoring, Repeated Games