University of Auckland - Department of Mathematics
simple game, trade robust, rough weights, projective game
Multiset, Additive Linear Orders, Expected Utility Structure
voting rule, manipulation, bribery
Ex-post utility maximization, Choice under ignorance, Multisets, Fictitious play
multi-winner elections, single-peaked electorate, parameterized complexity, NP-hardness, dynamic programming
Nash equilibrium, scoring rule, political competition
Social choice, domain restrictions, Condorcet domains, transitive majority relation.
Voting Rule, Distance Rationalizability
Nash Equilibria, Spatial Election, Hotelling-Downs Model, Best-Worst Rule
simple game, hierarchical game, access structure
Choice function, path independent, abstract convex geometry
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