Andrea Attar

Toulouse School of Economics

21, allée de Brienne

Toulouse, F 31000

France

University of Roma Tor Vergata

2 Via Columbia

00100 Rome

Italy

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

24

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1,836

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Top 18,224

in Total Papers Citations

37

CROSSREF CITATIONS

22

Scholarly Papers (24)

1.

On Multiple-Principal, Multiple-Agent Models of Moral Hazard

Number of pages: 10 Posted: 01 Jun 2005 Last Revised: 26 Aug 2009
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance, Universite du Luxembourg and Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan
Downloads 295 (127,298)
Citation 4

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D82

2.

Costly State Verification and Debt Contracts: A Critical Resume

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 31 Oct 2002
Andrea Attar and Eloisa Campioni
Toulouse School of Economics and University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance
Downloads 257 (146,841)
Citation 1

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Mechanism Design, Costly State Verification, Optimal Debt Contracts

3.

Financial Contracting Along the Business Cycle

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 25 May 2003
Andrea Attar
Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 165 (220,789)

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financial contracts, endogenous fluctuations, costly state verification

4.
Downloads 159 (227,799)
Citation 3

A Note on Common Agency Models of Moral Hazard

Economics Letters, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 23 Oct 2006
Andrea Attar, Gwenael Piaser and Nicolas Porteiro
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite du Luxembourg and University Pablo de Olavide
Downloads 84 (362,708)

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Menus, Common Agency

A Note on Common Agency Models of Moral Hazard

University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 36/06
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 31 Dec 2006
Andrea Attar, Gwenael Piaser and Nicolas Porteiro
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite du Luxembourg and University Pablo de Olavide
Downloads 75 (388,001)
Citation 3

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Menus, Common Agency

5.

Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences

University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 28/06
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 31 May 2005
Toulouse School of Economics, Concordia University, Quebec - Department of Economics, Universite du Luxembourg and University Pablo de Olavide
Downloads 153 (235,204)
Citation 5

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Revelation Principle, Common Agency, Separable Preferences

6.

Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Covenants

CEIS Working Paper No. 261
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Jan 2013 Last Revised: 09 Aug 2014
Toulouse School of Economics, TSE-University of Toulouse 1, Paris School of Economics (PSE) and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 94 (335,078)
Citation 8

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Counterparty Externality, Covenants, Nonexclusive Competition, Strategic Default.

7.

Credit Cycles in a Neo-Austrian Economy

Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 23 Nov 2005
Eloisa Campioni and Andrea Attar
University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 93 (337,365)

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Production processes, Cycles, Complex dynamics

8.

Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market

University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 29/06
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 30 May 2005
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenael Piaser
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance and Universite du Luxembourg
Downloads 81 (367,194)
Citation 2

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Common Agency, Financial Markets, Efficiency

9.

On Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 18 Oct 2006
Arnold Chassagnon and Andrea Attar
University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ) and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 78 (375,303)
Citation 2

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Non-exclusivity, Insurance, Moral Hazard

10.

Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons

CEIS Working Paper No. 159
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 18 Dec 2009
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and Francois Salanie
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 67 (408,035)
Citation 14

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Adverse Selection, Competing Mechanisms, Non-Exclusivity

11.
Downloads 61 (427,979)
Citation 4

On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

CEIS Working Paper No. 314
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 30 Apr 2014
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and Francois Salanie
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 61 (434,005)
Citation 1

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Adverse Selection, Competing Mechanisms, Limit-Order Book.

On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10850
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 29 Sep 2015
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and Francois Salanie
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
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Citation 2
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adverse selection, competing mechanisms, limit-order book

12.

Non-Exclusive Competition Under Adverse Selection

CEIS Working Paper No. 192
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 11 Apr 2011
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and Francois Salanie
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 61 (427,979)
Citation 12

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Adverse Selection, Competing Mechanisms, Non-Exclusivity

13.

Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A Comment

CEIS Working Paper No. 403
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 03 May 2017
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and Francois Salanie
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 39 (516,971)

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Adverse Selection, Entry Proofness, Market Breakdown, Nonexclusivity

14.

Financial Contracting Along the Business Cycle'

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2003/69
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 31 May 2007
Andrea Attar
Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 39 (516,971)

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Optimal Financial Contracts, Endogenous Fluctuations.

15.

Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness

CEIS Working Paper No. 196
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 20 Jun 2011
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance, Universite du Luxembourg and Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan
Downloads 37 (526,577)
Citation 1

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Moral hazard, multiple-principal multiple-agent, simple mechanisms

16.

Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle

CEIS Working Paper No. 201
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 05 Jul 2011
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenael Piaser
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance and Universite du Luxembourg
Downloads 36 (531,599)

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Competing Mechanisms, Exclusivity

17.

Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games

CEIS Working Paper No. 205
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 14 Jul 2011
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenael Piaser
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance and Universite du Luxembourg
Downloads 32 (552,562)
Citation 3

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incomplete information, competing mechanisms, information revelation

18.

On Competing Mechanisms Under Exclusive Competition

CEIS Working Paper No. 441
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 28 Aug 2018
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenael Piaser
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance and IPAG Business School
Downloads 23 (607,631)
Citation 2

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Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Competition, Incomplete Information

19.

Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples

CEIS Working Paper No. 460
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 06 Jun 2019
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole and IPAG Business School
Downloads 21 (621,230)
Citation 1

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Competing Mechanisms, Folk Theorems, Exclusive Competition

20.
Downloads 15 (663,793)
Citation 1

The Social Costs of Side Trading

CEIS Working Paper No. 463
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 10 Jul 2019
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and Francois Salanie
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 15 (688,088)
Citation 1

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Adverse Selection, Side Trading, Second-Best Allocations

The Social Costs of Side Trading

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13872
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 02 Aug 2019
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and Francois Salanie
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
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Adverse Selection, Second-Best Allocations, Side Trading

21.

On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games

CEIS Working Paper No. 421
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 16 Dec 2017
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenael Piaser
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance and IPAG Business School
Downloads 15 (663,793)

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22.

On the Role of Menus in Sequential Contracting: A Multiple Lending Example

CEIS Working Paper No. 409
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 13 Jul 2017
Toulouse School of Economics, TSE-University of Toulouse 1, Paris School of Economics (PSE) and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 15 (663,793)

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Multiple Lending, Menus, Strategic Default, Common Agency, Bank Competition

23.

Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11631
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 14 Nov 2016
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and Francois Salanie
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
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Adverse Selection, Insurance Markets, Multiple Contracting

24.

Negotiation and Take-it or Leave-it in Common Agency with Noncontractible Actions

Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming
Posted: 17 May 2006
Andrea Attar, Gwenael Piaser and Nicolas Porteiro
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite du Luxembourg and University Pablo de Olavide

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Genericity, Direct Mechanisms, Revelation Principle, Common Agency