Andrea Attar

Toulouse School of Economics

21, allée de Brienne

Toulouse, F 31000

France

University of Roma Tor Vergata

2 Via Columbia

00100 Rome

Italy

  • Toulouse School of Economics

    • Tel: +33 5 61128578

  • University of Roma Tor Vergata

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

26

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22

Scholarly Papers (26)

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1.

On Multiple-Principal, Multiple-Agent Models of Moral Hazard

Number of pages: 10 Posted: 01 Jun 2005 Last Revised: 26 Aug 2009
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenael Piaser and Uday Rajan
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance, Universite du Luxembourg and Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan
Downloads 320 (182,356)
Citation 4

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D82

2.

Costly State Verification and Debt Contracts: A Critical Resume

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 31 Oct 2002
Andrea Attar and Eloisa Campioni
Toulouse School of Economics and University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance
Downloads 288 (203,819)
Citation 1

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Mechanism Design, Costly State Verification, Optimal Debt Contracts

3.

A Note on Common Agency Models of Moral Hazard

Downloads 182 (315,984)
Citation 4

A Note on Common Agency Models of Moral Hazard

Economics Letters, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 23 Oct 2006
Andrea Attar, Gwenael Piaser and Nicolas Porteiro
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite du Luxembourg and University Pablo de Olavide
Downloads 95 (528,818)

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Menus, Common Agency

A Note on Common Agency Models of Moral Hazard

University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 36/06
Number of pages: 9 Posted: 31 Dec 2006
Andrea Attar, Gwenael Piaser and Nicolas Porteiro
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite du Luxembourg and University Pablo de Olavide
Downloads 87 (559,971)
Citation 3

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Menus, Common Agency

4.

Financial Contracting Along the Business Cycle

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 25 May 2003
Andrea Attar
Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 181 (317,560)

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financial contracts, endogenous fluctuations, costly state verification

5.

Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences

University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 28/06
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 31 May 2005
Andrea Attar, Dipjyoti Majumdar, Gwenael Piaser and Nicolas Porteiro
Toulouse School of Economics, Concordia University, Quebec - Department of Economics, Universite du Luxembourg and University Pablo de Olavide
Downloads 172 (332,315)
Citation 5

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Revelation Principle, Common Agency, Separable Preferences

6.

Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Covenants

CEIS Working Paper No. 261
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 17 Jan 2013 Last Revised: 09 Aug 2014
Andrea Attar, Catherine Casamatta, Arnold Chassagnon and Jean-Paul Decamps
Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse School of Economics, University Toulouse Capitole (TSM-Research), Paris School of Economics (PSE) and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 156 (361,237)
Citation 7

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Counterparty Externality, Covenants, Nonexclusive Competition, Strategic Default.

7.

Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons

CEIS Working Paper No. 159
Number of pages: 71 Posted: 18 Dec 2009
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 134 (407,839)
Citation 26

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Adverse Selection, Competing Mechanisms, Non-Exclusivity

8.

On Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts

Number of pages: 15 Posted: 18 Oct 2006
Arnold Chassagnon and Andrea Attar
University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ) and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 130 (417,560)
Citation 2

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Non-exclusivity, Insurance, Moral Hazard

9.

Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A Comment

CEIS Working Paper No. 403
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 03 May 2017
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 129 (420,041)

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Adverse Selection, Entry Proofness, Market Breakdown, Nonexclusivity

10.

On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

Downloads 123 (435,555)
Citation 5

On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

CEIS Working Paper No. 314
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 30 Apr 2014
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 123 (437,269)
Citation 1

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Adverse Selection, Competing Mechanisms, Limit-Order Book.

On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP10850
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 29 Sep 2015
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
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adverse selection, competing mechanisms, limit-order book

11.

Non-Exclusive Competition Under Adverse Selection

CEIS Working Paper No. 192
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 11 Apr 2011
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 118 (449,384)
Citation 17

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Adverse Selection, Competing Mechanisms, Non-Exclusivity

12.

Credit Cycles in a Neo-Austrian Economy

Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 23 Nov 2005
Eloisa Campioni and Andrea Attar
University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance and Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 117 (452,260)

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Production processes, Cycles, Complex dynamics

13.

Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market

University Ca' Foscari of Venice, Dept. of Economics Research Paper Series No. 29/06
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 30 May 2005
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenael Piaser
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance and Universite du Luxembourg
Downloads 102 (499,818)
Citation 4

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Common Agency, Financial Markets, Efficiency

14.

The Social Costs of Side Trading

Downloads 72 (617,748)
Citation 2

The Social Costs of Side Trading

CEIS Working Paper No. 463
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 10 Jul 2019
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
Downloads 72 (627,270)
Citation 1

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Adverse Selection, Side Trading, Second-Best Allocations

The Social Costs of Side Trading

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13872
Number of pages: 20 Posted: 02 Aug 2019
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
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Adverse Selection, Second-Best Allocations, Side Trading

15.

Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle

CEIS Working Paper No. 201
Number of pages: 10 Posted: 05 Jul 2011
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenael Piaser
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance and Universite du Luxembourg
Downloads 61 (672,802)

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Competing Mechanisms, Exclusivity

16.

Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness

CEIS Working Paper No. 196
Number of pages: 16 Posted: 20 Jun 2011
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Gwenael Piaser and Uday Rajan
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance, Universite du Luxembourg and Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan
Downloads 59 (683,631)
Citation 1

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Moral hazard, multiple-principal multiple-agent, simple mechanisms

17.

Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms

CEIS Working Paper No. 519
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 02 Nov 2021
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Thomas Mariotti and Alessandro Pavan
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole and Northwestern University
Downloads 53 (717,673)

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Incomplete Information, Competing Mechanisms, Private Disclosures, Signals, Universal Mechanisms, Folk Theorems.

18.

Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games

CEIS Working Paper No. 205
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 14 Jul 2011
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenael Piaser
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance and Universite du Luxembourg
Downloads 53 (717,673)
Citation 3

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incomplete information, competing mechanisms, information revelation

19.

Competing Mechanisms and Folk Theorems: Two Examples

CEIS Working Paper No. 460
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 06 Jun 2019
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni, Thomas Mariotti and Gwenael Piaser
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole and IPAG Business School
Downloads 48 (749,078)
Citation 2

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Competing Mechanisms, Folk Theorems, Exclusive Competition

20.

Financial Contracting Along the Business Cycle'

CORE Discussion Paper No. 2003/69
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 31 May 2007
Andrea Attar
Toulouse School of Economics
Downloads 48 (749,078)

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Optimal Financial Contracts, Endogenous Fluctuations.

21.

On Competing Mechanisms Under Exclusive Competition

CEIS Working Paper No. 441
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 28 Aug 2018
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenael Piaser
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance and IPAG Business School
Downloads 44 (775,938)
Citation 3

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Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Competition, Incomplete Information

22.

On Private Communication in Competing Mechanism Games

CEIS Working Paper No. 421
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 16 Dec 2017
Andrea Attar, Eloisa Campioni and Gwenael Piaser
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance and IPAG Business School
Downloads 34 (851,787)

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23.

On the Role of Menus in Sequential Contracting: A Multiple Lending Example

CEIS Working Paper No. 409
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 13 Jul 2017
Andrea Attar, Catherine Casamatta, Arnold Chassagnon and Jean Dechamps
Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse School of Economics, University Toulouse Capitole (TSM-Research), Paris School of Economics (PSE) and University of Toulouse 1 - Toulouse School of Economics (TSE)
Downloads 32 (868,608)

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Multiple Lending, Menus, Strategic Default, Common Agency, Bank Competition

24.

Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16531
Number of pages: 64 Posted: 22 Sep 2021
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite de Toulouse 1 Capitole and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
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Adverse Selection, Insurance Markets, Multiple Contracting, Regulation

25.

Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11631
Number of pages: 57 Posted: 14 Nov 2016
Andrea Attar, Thomas Mariotti and François Salanié
Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse I and National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA)
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Adverse Selection, Insurance Markets, Multiple Contracting

26.

Negotiation and Take-it or Leave-it in Common Agency with Noncontractible Actions

Journal of Economic Theory, Forthcoming
Posted: 17 May 2006
Andrea Attar, Gwenael Piaser and Nicolas Porteiro
Toulouse School of Economics, Universite du Luxembourg and University Pablo de Olavide

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Genericity, Direct Mechanisms, Revelation Principle, Common Agency