Calle Madrid 126
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics
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Mobile telephony, entry, competition, efficiency, empirical analysis
Alliances, airline, cross-price elasticities, Nash behavior
Regulation, incentives, efficiency, competition, airlines
Contract choice, Cost reduction, Incentives, Public transit
Firm performance, R&D cooperation, Treatment effect
Contract, Public transit, Renegotiation
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File name: JOIE.pdf
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