Kimiko Terai

Keio University - Faculty of Economics

2-15-45 Mita, Ninato-ku

Tokyo 1088345

Japan

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Why Principals Tolerate Biases of Inaccurate Agents

Economics & Politics, Vol. 31, Issue 1, pp. 97-111, 2019
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 11 Feb 2019
Kimiko Terai and Amihai Glazer
Keio University - Faculty of Economics and University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics
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Abstract:

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bureaucracy, principalā€agent problem, special interests