Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
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Market-Share Discounts, Ineffcient Foreclosure, Exclusive Dealing, Antitrust Policy
Anticompetitive Behaviour, Exclusion, Below-Cost Pricing, Antitrust
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Anticompetitive behaviour, Antitrust, Below-cost pricing, Exclusion
Exclusion, Inefficient foreclosure, Monopolisation, Refusal to supply
Monopolization Practices, Vertical Agreements
Monopolization practices, Vertical agreements
Inefficient foreclosure, Tying, Scale economies, Network Externalities
Inefficient foreclosure, network externalities, Scale Economies, Tying
anticompetitive behaviour, foreclosure, buyers' coordination
Exclusive dealing, entry deterrence, mergers, antitrust
Endogenous mergers, foresight, efficiency offence
Innovation, intellectual property rights, labour contracts, poaching, relational contracts, start-ups
Behavioural economics, time-series econometrics, empirical finance, newspapers
Horizontal mergers, innovation, Investments, Network-sharing Agreements
Miscoordination, entry, countervailing power, contractual clauses, exclusion, retailers
Antitrust, deterrence, event studies, fines
Acquisitions, Antitrust, competition policy, Digital Markets, platforms
antitrust fines, business cycles, managing incentives
abuse of dominance, exclusionary practices, network industry, price discrimination, rebates
exclusive dealing, inefficient foreclosure, market-share discounts
Antitrust policy, European Union, Lobbying, Mergers
nascent competitors, Optimal merger policy, selection effect
auctions, brands, Horizontal agreements, oligopoly, online advertising, Search Engines
Adverse selection, Exclusive contracts, Limited liability, Risk