Claudia M. Landeo

University of Alberta - Department of Economics

Associate Professor of Economics

Henry Marshall Tory Building 7-25

Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4

Canada

http://sites.google.com/a/ualberta.ca/claudia-m-landeo-s-home-page/home

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

21

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CITATIONS
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34

Scholarly Papers (21)

Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities

American Economic Review, Forthcoming, Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 604, 3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Papers
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 28 Dec 2009
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 708 (27,366)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Bargaining with Externalities, Contracting with Externalities, Experiments, Exclusive Dealing, Antitrust, Discrimination, Endogenous Payoffs, Communication, Coordination Games, Equilibrium Selection

Naked Exclusion: An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities

NBER Working Paper No. w14115
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 22 Jun 2008
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 123 (188,546)
Citation 9

Abstract:

Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 630
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 17 Apr 2009
Richard R. W. Brooks, Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
Yale University - Law School, University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 402 (57,339)
Citation 7

Abstract:

Exit Mechanisms for Joint Ownership Ventures, Texas Shootout Clauses, Buy-Sell Mechanisms, Shotgun Provisions, Russian Roulette Agreements, Put-Call Options, Cake-Cutting Rule, Bargaining with Common Values, Experiments, Ultimatum Exchange Environments with Endogenous Offer Types

Trigger Happy or Gun Shy: Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts

Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 09-41, CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper
Number of pages: 60 Posted: 10 Jul 2009 Last Revised: 09 Sep 2011
Richard R. W. Brooks, Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
Yale University - Law School, University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 180 (136,459)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Exit Mechanisms for Joint Ownership Ventures, Texas Shootout Clauses, Buy-Sell Mechanisms, Shotgun Provisions, Russian Roulette Agreements, Put-Call Options, Cake-Cutting Rule, Bargaining with Common Values, Experiments, Ultimatum Exchange Environments with Endogenous Offer Types

Trigger Happy or Gun Shy: Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts

RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 41, pp. 649-673, 2010
Posted: 09 Sep 2011 Last Revised: 10 Sep 2011
Richard R. W. Brooks, Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
Yale University - Law School, University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty

Abstract:

Exit Mechanisms for Joint Ownership Ventures, Texas Shootout Clauses, Buy-Sell Mechanisms, Shotgun Provisions, Russian Roulette Agreements, Put-Call Options, Cake-Cutting Rule, Bargaining with Common Values, Experiments, Ultimatum Exchange Environments with Endogenous Offer Categories

3.

Shotguns and Deadlocks

Yale Journal on Regulation, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 46 Posted: 02 May 2013 Last Revised: 15 Aug 2013
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 417 (35,477)

Abstract:

Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlocks, General Partnerships, Limited Liability Companies, Closely-Held Business Entities, Shotgun Provisions, Buy-Sell Clauses, Cake-Cutting Mechanisms, Bargaining with Common Values, Asymmetric Information, Experiments

4.

Cognitive Coherence and Tort Reform

Journal of Economic Psychology, Forthcoming, 2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper
Number of pages: 35 Posted: 19 Feb 2007 Last Revised: 09 Sep 2009
Claudia M. Landeo
University of Alberta - Department of Economics
Downloads 244 (90,249)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Tort Reform, Belief Formation, Split-Award Statute, Coherence-Based Reasoning, Role-Specific Bias, Self-Serving Bias, Motivated Reasoning, Settlement, Litigation, Experiments, Debiasing through Law, Experiments

5.

Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock

University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 21 Jun 2013
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 234 (63,474)

Abstract:

judicial resolution of business deadlocks, general partnerships, limited liability companies, closely-held business entities, Shotgun provisions, buy-sell clauses, cake-cutting mechanisms, auctions, bargaining with common values, asymmetric information, experiments

Split-Award Tort Reform, Firm's Level of Care, and Litigation Outcomes

Number of pages: 48 Posted: 26 Nov 2004
Claudia M. Landeo and Maxim Nikitin
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Higher School of Economics
Downloads 212 (116,679)
Citation 6

Abstract:

Settlement, Bargaining, Litigation, Asymmetric Information

Split-Award Tort Reform, Firm's Level of Care and Litigation Outcomes

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming
Posted: 08 May 2006
Claudia M. Landeo and Maxim Nikitin
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Higher School of Economics

Abstract:

Settlement, Bargaining, Litigation, Asymmetric Information

Deterrence, Lawsuits, and Litigation Outcomes under Court Errors

Number of pages: 49 Posted: 10 Sep 2004
Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin and Scott Baker
University of Alberta - Department of Economics, Higher School of Economics and Washington University in St. Louis - School of Law
Downloads 205 (120,630)
Citation 3

Abstract:

Deterrence, punitive damage awards, bargaining, asymmetric information, court errors

Deterrence, Lawsuits, and Litigation Outcomes under Court Errors

Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 23, No. 1, Spring 2007
Posted: 03 May 2006
Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin and Scott Baker
University of Alberta - Department of Economics, Higher School of Economics and Washington University in St. Louis - School of Law

Abstract:

Deterrence, Punitive Damage Awards, Bargaining, Asymmetric Information, Court Errors

Deterrence, Lawsuits, and Litigation Outcomes Under Court Errors

The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 23, Issue 1, pp. 57-97, 2007
Posted: 17 Jun 2008
Claudia M. Landeo and Maxim Nikitin
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Higher School of Economics

Abstract:

8.

Exclusionary Vertical Restraints and Antitrust: Experimental Law and Economics Contributions

Kathryn Zeiler and Joshua Teitelbaum (eds.), The Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015
Number of pages: 59 Posted: 21 Oct 2012 Last Revised: 02 Mar 2015
Claudia M. Landeo
University of Alberta - Department of Economics
Downloads 204 (93,940)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Vertical Restraints, Experimental Law and Economics, Antitrust, Vertical Integration, Exclusive Dealing Contracts; Bundling; Tying; Communication; Intentionality, Fairness, Reciprocity, Discrimination, Endogenous Payoffs, Coordination Games, Equilibrium Selection, Economic Expert Testimony

Split-Awards and Disputes: An Experimental Study of a Strategic Model of Litigation

Number of pages: 47 Posted: 10 Sep 2004
Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin and Linda Babcock
University of Alberta - Department of Economics, Higher School of Economics and Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management
Downloads 202 (122,338)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Settlement, bargaining, litigation, asymmetric information, experiments

Split-Awards and Disputes: An Experimental Study of a Strategic Model of Litigation

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Forthcoming
Posted: 03 May 2006
Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin and Linda Babcock
University of Alberta - Department of Economics, Higher School of Economics and Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management

Abstract:

Settlement; Bargaining, Litigation, Asymmetric Information, Experiments

10.

Exclusive Dealing and Market Foreclosure: Further Experimental Results

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 27 Posted: 10 Sep 2011
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 148 (122,126)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Exclusive Dealing, Coordination Games, Experiments, Contracting with Externalities, Bargaining with Externalities, Social Preferences, Reciprocity, Intentionality, Regard for Others, Social Proximity, Antitrust

11.

Dollarization, Financial Intermediation and Real Activity: The Inflation Threshold

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 17 Aug 2005
Claudia M. Landeo, Gaetano Antinolfi and Maxim Nikitin
University of Alberta - Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics and Higher School of Economics
Downloads 110 (196,387)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Dollarization, Inflation, Financial Intermediation

12.

Incentive Contracts for Teams: Experimental Evidence

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 69 Posted: 29 May 2014 Last Revised: 10 Sep 2015
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 95 (93,940)

Abstract:

Teams, Effort Complementarity, Principal -- Multi-Agent Framework, Moral Hazard in Teams, Team Cooperation, Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag-Hunt Games, Infinitely-Repeated Games, Communication, Reciprocity, Experiments

13.

Stipulated Damages as a Rent-Extraction Mechanism: Experimental Evidence

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 47 Posted: 19 Jul 2012 Last Revised: 12 Sep 2015
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 75 (175,626)

Abstract:

Stipulated Damages; Rent Extraction; Market Foreclosure; Renegotiation; Social Preferences; Experiments

14.

Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem

Economics Letters, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 31 Posted: 21 Jun 2013 Last Revised: 20 Sep 2013
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty
Downloads 70 (169,618)

Abstract:

Business Deadlock, Shotgun Mechanisms, Asymmetric Information, Experiments

15.

Law and Economics and Tort Litigation Institutions: Theory and Experiments

Kathryn Zeiler and Joshua Teitelbaum (eds.), The Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 16 Dec 2014
Claudia M. Landeo
University of Alberta - Department of Economics
Downloads 52 (206,893)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Law and Economics, Experimental Law and Economics, Scientific Method, Civil Litigation, Institutional Design, Settlement, Litigation, Asymmetric Information, Self-Serving Bias, Pretrial Bargaining, Incentives for Care, Experiments, Caps on Non-Economic Damages, Motivated Reasoning, Divergent Beliefs

16.

Incentives for Care, Litigation, and Tort Reform under Self-Serving Bias

Forthcoming in Thomas Miceli and Mathew Baker (eds.), The Research Handbook on Economic Models of Law, Forthcoming
Number of pages: 43 Posted: 22 Oct 2012
Claudia M. Landeo, Maxim Nikitin and Sergei Izmalkov
University of Alberta - Department of Economics, Higher School of Economics and New Economic School
Downloads 44 (235,957)

Abstract:

Settlement, Litigation, Incentives for Care, Self-Serving Bias, Tort Reform, Damage Caps, Asymmetric Information, Apparent Opponents, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Motivated Reasoning, Divergent Beliefs, Universal Divinity Refinement, Motivated Anchoring, Non-Cooperative Games, Disputes

17.

Dollarization and the Inflation Threshold

Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 628-649, May 2007
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 19 May 2007
Gaetano Antinolfi, Claudia M. Landeo and Maxim Nikitin
Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics, University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Higher School of Economics
Downloads 24 (417,519)
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Abstract:

18.

Financially-Constrained Lawyers: An Economic Theory of Legal Disputes

Number of pages: 82 Posted: 10 Jul 2015 Last Revised: 30 May 2016
Claudia M. Landeo and Maxim Nikitin
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Higher School of Economics
Downloads 20 (112,355)

Abstract:

Civil Litigation; Asymmetric Information; Lawsuits; Settlement; Litigation; Frivolous Lawsuits; Access to Justice; Deterrence; Social Welfare; Financially-Constrained Lawyers; Third-Party Lawyer Lending Industry; Third-Party Litigation Funding

19.

Effective Labor Relations Laws and Social Welfare

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 04 Sep 2015
Claudia M. Landeo and Maxim Nikitin
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Higher School of Economics
Downloads 8 (310,916)

Abstract:

Labor Relations Laws, Social Welfare, Bargaining Impasse, Replacement Teachers Laws, Intermittent Strikes Laws, Non-Cooperative Games, Asymmetric Information, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

20.

Incentives and Contract Frames: Comment

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming
Posted: 10 Sep 2011
Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Harvard University - Law School - Faculty

Abstract:

Contract Frames, Incentives, Experiments

21.

Settlement Escrows: An Experimental Study of a Bilateral Bargaining Game

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 401-417, March 2004
Posted: 27 Nov 2004
Claudia M. Landeo and Linda Babcock
University of Alberta - Department of Economics and Carnegie Mellon University - H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management

Abstract:

Settlement, Bargaining, Litigation, Uncertainty, Experiments