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asymmetric information, stochastic processes, incentives
mispricing, heterogeneous information, information-driven complementarities, volatility, inefficiency, beauty contests
Strategic complementarities, global games, signaling, regime change, market expectations, policy
Transparency, Ambiguity, Coordination, Information
Global games, coordination, multiple equilibria, information dynamics, crises
heterogeneous information, complementarity, volatility, inefficiency, beauty contests
Optimal policy, private information, complementarities, information externalities, social learning, efficiency
information linkage between primary and secondary markets, optimal disclosure policy, stochastic allocations, mechanism design.
Contractual and informational externalities, mechanism design, optimal disclosure policy, sequential common agency, exogenous and endogenous private information
Social value of information, coordination, externalities, transparency
Dispersed information, coordination, complementarities, volatility, inertia, efficiency
Dynamic Mechanism Design, Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, Incentives, Optimal Pay Scheme, Risk-Aversion, Stochastic Process
uniform-price auction, divisible good, strategic role of the seller, endogenous supply, Treasury and IPO auctions.
Incomplete information, coordination, complementarities, externalities, amplification, efficiency
sequential common agency, mechanism design, contracts, endogenous types
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contracts, endogenous types, mechanism design, Sequential common agency
Dynamic mechanism design, Dynamic contracts
Mechanism design, contracts, revelation principle, menus, endogenous payoff-relevant information
income taxation, occupational choice, sales taxes, sector-specific taxation, production efficiency
managerial turnover, termination clauses, dynamic mechanism design, adverse selection, moral hazard
Sequential contracting, mechanism design, menus theorems
Asymmetric Information, Stochastic Process, Dynamic Mechanism Design, Long-Term Contracting
asymmetric information, incentives, Many-to-many matching, platforms, price discrimination