Richard Holden

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Assistant Professor

E52-410

50 Memorial Drive

Cambridge, MA 02142

United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue

Cambridge, MA 02138

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

14

DOWNLOADS
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1,524

CITATIONS
Rank 18,042

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Top 18,042

in Total Papers Citations

18

Scholarly Papers (14)

1.

Insider Trading, Informational Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 05 Jun 2003
Murali Agastya and Richard Holden
University of Sydney - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 294 (82,189)

Abstract:

Efficient Markets, Insider Trading, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Pooling, Public Confidence, Zero Probability Event

2.

Firms in Markets Under Uncertainty

MIT Sloan Research Paper No. 4744-09
Number of pages: 34 Posted: 10 Aug 2009 Last Revised: 08 Sep 2009
Robert S. Gibbons, Richard Holden and Michael L. Powell
Massachusetts Institute of Technology - Sloan School and Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 231 (105,609)

Abstract:

3.

Supermajority Voting Rules

Number of pages: 33 Posted: 01 Dec 2004
Richard Holden
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 217 (107,928)
Citation 1

Abstract:

Supermajority, majority rule, qualified majority, special majority, constitutions, social contract, incomplete contracts

4.
Downloads 151 (160,579)
Citation 4

Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2157
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 02 Jul 2008
Alberto F. Alesina and Richard Holden
Harvard University - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 126 (186,500)
Citation 4

Abstract:

Elections, polarization of platforms, ambiguity, primaries

Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections

NBER Working Paper No. w14143
Number of pages: 28 Posted: 30 Jun 2008
Alberto F. Alesina and Richard Holden
Harvard University - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 25 (428,097)
Citation 4

Abstract:

5.

Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2150
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 11 Jan 2008
Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg and Richard Holden
College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow, Harvard University - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 141 (164,295)
Citation 1

Abstract:

6.

The Rising Incumbent Advantage: What's Gerrymandering Got to Do With It?

Number of pages: 38 Posted: 15 Nov 2005
John N. Friedman and Richard Holden
Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 127 (170,947)
Citation 2

Abstract:

Gerrymandering, incumbent, redistricting

7.

The Nature of Tournaments

Number of pages: 68 Posted: 14 Feb 2008
Robert Akerlof and Richard Holden
Harvard University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 98 (220,295)
Citation 5

Abstract:

Tournaments, incentives

8.

Contracts versus Assets and the Boundary of the Firm

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 25 Jan 2012
Richard Holden and Anup Malani
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and University of Chicago - Law School
Downloads 97 (210,011)

Abstract:

Incomplete contracts, firms mechanisms

The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation: An Empirical Investigation

IZA Discussion Paper No. 8971
Number of pages: 49 Posted: 27 Apr 2015
College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow, University of Zurich - Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and University of Melbourne
Downloads 6 (535,131)

Abstract:

implementation theory, incomplete contracts, experiments

10.

Incentive Compatibility: Everywhere vs. Almost Everywhere

Number of pages: 8 Posted: 30 Aug 2006
Murali Agastya and Richard Holden
University of Sydney - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 39 (355,877)

Abstract:

incentive compatibility, equilibria with a continuum of types

11.

Reviews

Economic Record, Vol. 79, pp. 139-156, March 2003
Number of pages: 18 Posted: 28 Aug 2003
University of Athens - Faculty of the Philosophy and History of Science, Michigan State University - Department of Agricultural Economics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Queensland University of Technology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Flinders University - School of Business Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Australian National University - Economics Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Macquarie University and University of Auckland
Downloads 26 (411,099)

Abstract:

12.

Measuring the Compactness of Political Districting Plans

NBER Working Paper No. w13456
Number of pages: 52 Posted: 05 Oct 2007
Roland G. Fryer Jr. and Richard Holden
Harvard University - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 24 (401,822)
Citation 5

Abstract:

13.

Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem

NBER Working Paper No. w15167
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 21 Jul 2009
Philippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg and Richard Holden
College de France and London School of Economics and Political Science, Fellow, Harvard University - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 6 (487,827)

Abstract:

14.

Optimal Gerrymandering in a Competitive Environment

Posted: 14 Dec 2008
Richard Holden
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

Abstract:

Gerrymandering, redistricting