New Orleans, LA 70118
United States
Tulane University - Department of Economics
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team contest, winners' efforts, temporal structures, ordering of battles
dynamic contests, bias, momentum effect
discrete public good, contribution game, interim incentive efficiency
all-pay auction, free riding, volunteer's dilemma, group-size paradox, private provision of public goods
discrete public good, subscription game, Revelation Principle
rule-making competition, preemption, identity depen-dent externalities, extremism, regulatory thicket
C72, D72, D74, D82
Public Goods, Associations, Dynamic Global Games
all-pay auction, private information, group contest, best shot
Global Warming, Climate Protection, Irreversibilities in Climate Policy, Global Income Shocks
preemption, free riding, dynamic conflict, inter-group conflict, dynamic conflict, incomplete information, waiting
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dynamic conflict, free riding, incomplete information, inter-group conflict, preemption, waiting
weakest link, voluntary provision, public good, interim efficiency, cheap talk
discrete public good, subscription game, interim incentive efficiency
contests, sorting
All-Pay Auction, Groups, Bayes-Nash Equilibrium, Weakest Link, Incomplete Information, Coordination
private provision, categories, restricting donations, heterogeneity, crowding out
best-shot, public good
All-pay auction, correlated equilibrium, public randomization, best shot, weakest link.
All-pay auction, correlated equilibrium, constant elasticity of substitution.
