Stefano Barbieri

Tulane University - Department of Economics

New Orleans, LA 70118

United States

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

13

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638

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13

Scholarly Papers (13)

1.

Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Efficient Equilibria in the Private-Information Contribution Game

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 06 Apr 2007
Stefano Barbieri and David A. Malueg
Tulane University - Department of Economics and University of California Riverside
Downloads 96 (270,603)
Citation 1

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discrete public good, contribution game, interim incentive efficiency

2.

Optimal Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Linear Equilibria in the Private-Information Subscription Game

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 04 Jul 2007 Last Revised: 04 Jun 2008
Stefano Barbieri and David A. Malueg
Tulane University - Department of Economics and University of California Riverside
Downloads 88 (286,096)

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discrete public good, subscription game, Revelation Principle

3.

Private Provision of a Discrete Public Good: Continuous-Strategy Equilibria in the Private-Information Subscription Game

Number of pages: 23 Posted: 10 May 2007
Stefano Barbieri and David A. Malueg
Tulane University - Department of Economics and University of California Riverside
Downloads 66 (337,924)

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discrete public good, subscription game, interim incentive efficiency

4.

Membership in Citizen Groups

Caltech Social Science Working Paper No. 1206
Number of pages: 33 Posted: 05 Feb 2005 Last Revised: 28 Jul 2008
Andrea Mattozzi and Stefano Barbieri
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO) and Tulane University - Department of Economics
Downloads 65 (340,566)

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Public Goods, Associations, Dynamic Global Games

5.

Private-Information Group Contests

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 27 Sep 2014 Last Revised: 29 Sep 2015
Stefano Barbieri and David A. Malueg
Tulane University - Department of Economics and University of California Riverside
Downloads 62 (348,875)

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all-pay auction, private information, group contest, best shot

6.

On the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods with Private Information: The Case of 'Weakest-Link' Public Goods

Number of pages: 37 Posted: 19 Apr 2014
Stefano Barbieri and David A. Malueg
Tulane University - Department of Economics and University of California Riverside
Downloads 59 (357,515)

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weakest link, voluntary provision, public good, interim efficiency, cheap talk

7.

Biasing Unbiased Dynamic Contests

Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2018-06
Number of pages: 44 Posted: 29 May 2018 Last Revised: 02 Oct 2018
Stefano Barbieri and Marco Serena
Tulane University - Department of Economics and Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Downloads 43 (410,664)
Citation 1

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8.

Increasing Fundraising Success by Decreasing Donor Choice

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 02 Apr 2012
Stefano Barbieri and David A. Malueg
Tulane University - Department of Economics and University of California Riverside
Downloads 41 (418,097)
Citation 2

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private provision, categories, restricting donations, heterogeneity, crowding out

9.

The Best-Shot All-Pay (Group) Auction with Complete Information

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 16 Sep 2013
Stefano Barbieri, David A. Malueg and Iryna Topolyan
Tulane University - Department of Economics, University of California Riverside and Mississippi State University
Downloads 35 (442,336)

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all-pay auction, free riding, volunteer's dilemma, group-size paradox, private provision of public goods

10.

Group Contests with Private Information and the 'Weakest Link'

Number of pages: 43 Posted: 26 May 2018
Tulane University - Department of Economics, Chapman University - Economic Science Institute, University of California Riverside and University of Cincinnati - Department of Economics
Downloads 31 (459,948)

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All-Pay Auction, Groups, Bayes-Nash Equilibrium, Weakest Link, Incomplete Information, Coordination

11.

Group Efforts When Performance Is Determined by the 'Best Shot'

Number of pages: 39 Posted: 08 Feb 2013
Stefano Barbieri and David A. Malueg
Tulane University - Department of Economics and University of California Riverside
Downloads 25 (490,394)
Citation 5

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best-shot, public good

12.

Winners' Efforts in Team Contests

Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2019-03
Number of pages: 30 Posted: 21 Feb 2019
Stefano Barbieri and Marco Serena
Tulane University - Department of Economics and Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
Downloads 18 (530,545)

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team contest, winners' efforts, temporal structures

13.
Downloads 9 (584,965)

Preemption Contests Between Groups

Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2019-09
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 29 May 2019
Stefano Barbieri, Kai A. Konrad and David A. Malueg
Tulane University - Department of Economics, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance and University of California Riverside
Downloads 9 (610,041)

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preemption, free riding, dynamic conflict, inter-group conflict, dynamic conflict, incomplete information, waiting

Preemption Contests between Groups

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP13738
Number of pages: 39 Posted: 22 May 2019
Stefano Barbieri, Kai A. Konrad and David A. Malueg
Tulane University - Department of Economics, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance and University of California Riverside
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dynamic conflict, free riding, incomplete information, inter-group conflict, preemption, waiting