Oguzhan Celebi

Stanford University - Department of Economics

Landau Economics Building

579 Serra Mall

STANFORD, CA 94305-6072

United States

  • Stanford University - Department of Economics

SCHOLARLY PAPERS

7

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1,186

TOTAL CITATIONS

0

Scholarly Papers (7)

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1.

Priority Design in Centralized Matching Markets

Number of pages: 72 Posted: 21 May 2019 Last Revised: 24 Jul 2021
Oguzhan Celebi and Joel P. Flynn
Stanford University - Department of Economics and Yale University
Downloads 370 (172,867)

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Matching Theory, Market Design, Priority Design, Allocative Efficiency

2.

Adaptive Priority Mechanisms

Number of pages: 98 Posted: 08 Apr 2020 Last Revised: 11 Apr 2024
Oguzhan Celebi and Joel P. Flynn
Stanford University - Department of Economics and Yale University
Downloads 339 (190,280)

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Matching Theory, Market Design, Allocative Efficiency, Affirmative Action, Instrument Choice

3.

Segmented Trading Markets

Boston University Questrom School of Business Research Paper No. 4119978
Number of pages: 75 Posted: 01 Jun 2022 Last Revised: 29 Apr 2025
Kerry Back, Oguzhan Celebi, Ali Kakhbod and A. Max Reppen
Rice University - Jesse H. Jones Graduate School of Business, Stanford University - Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley and Boston University - Questrom School of Business
Downloads 264 (247,641)

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OTC vs Exchange. Heterogeneous venues. Fragmentation. Competition.

4.

Substitutability in Cooperation and Bilateral Enforcement

Number of pages: 52 Posted: 18 Nov 2021 Last Revised: 18 Aug 2022
Oguzhan Celebi
Stanford University - Department of Economics
Downloads 67 (723,517)

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networks, reciprocity, bilateral enforcement, cooperation

5.

Diversity Preferences, Affirmative Action and Choice Rules

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 20 Jul 2022 Last Revised: 18 Aug 2022
Oguzhan Celebi
Stanford University - Department of Economics
Downloads 51 (829,290)

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Matching Theory, Market Design, Affirmative Action

6.

Best-Response Dynamics in the Boston Mechanism

Number of pages: 34 Posted: 24 Oct 2022
Oguzhan Celebi
Stanford University - Department of Economics
Downloads 48 (852,859)

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Matching Theory, Market Design, Boston Mechanism, Best-Response Dynamics

7.

International Unions and Integration

Number of pages: 62 Posted: 16 Jun 2022 Last Revised: 09 Dec 2022
Oguzhan Celebi and Elias Papaioannou
Stanford University - Department of Economics and London Business School
Downloads 47 (861,089)

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International Agreements and Observance, International Organizations, Public Goods