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London School of Economics (LSE)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
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corporate governance; blockholder monitoring; institutional investors; reputation concerns; strategic complementarity
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $5.00 for this paper.
File name: DP11507.
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File name: DP6374.
Career concerns, institutional investors, return predictability, trading behaviour
Governance, Exit, Delegated Portfolio Management, Career Concerns
blockholder monitoring, activist hedge funds, competition for flow, corporate governance, delegated portfolio management
File name: DP9409.
Career concerns, Corporate governance, Hedge funds, Shareholder activism
herding, career concerns, institutional investors
File name: DP7804.
career concerns, institutional herding, price impact
mutual funds, activism, business ties, proxy vote disclosure
D72, G23, G34, G38, K22
File name: DP4034.
Delegated portfolio management, career concerns, churning
File name: SSRN-id885953.
Financial equilibrium, career concerns, information cascades, mispricing
Financial Contagion, Exchange Rate, Institutions, Bayesian Model Averaging
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