7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku
Tokyo 113-0033
Japan
University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics
Implementation, Decentralized Mechanism, Smart Contract, Oracle Problem, Self-Judgment
Free-Rider Problem, Global Commons, Sovereignty Protection, Rule Sustainability, Cautious Commitment Rule.
epistemological mechanism design, unique information elicitation, common knowledge of all agents’ selfishness, intrinsic preference for honesty, quadratic scoring rule.
unique implementation, asymmetric information, honesty, no common knowledge on selfishness, information diversity
adversarial agents, conformity, social network, honest society, detail-free mechanism, uniqueness
Information Good, Network
Conflicting Criteria, Ethical Social Choice, Multiunit Auctions, Single-Crossing, Strategy-Proofness.
Triage, Multiple Criteria, Ethical Social Choice Theory, Procedure and Aggregation, Ethical Dictatorship, Informational Basis.
unique implementation, weak honesty, common knowledge on selfishness, ethical social choice function, quadratic scoring rule
