Albertus Magnus Platz
Cologne, NRW 50923
Germany
University of Cologne
SSRN RANKINGS
in Total Papers Citations
Returns to education quality, higher education, marriage market, regression discontinuity, Chile
Optimal mechanism design, Robustness, Incentive compatibility, Individual rationality, Ambiguity aversion
optimal mechanism design, robustness, incentive compatibility, individual rationality, ambiguity aversion
Recursive saddle point, recursive contracts, dynamic programming
Dynamic Programming, Duality, Dynamic Contracts
Citizen-candidate model, political economy, private provision of public goods, wage for politicians
Optimal mechanism design, Ambiguity aversion, Incentive compatibility, Individual rationality
strategic voting, runoff rule, plurality rule, equilibrium refinement, trembling hand perfection, coalition-proofness
Dynamic Contracts, Duality, Dynamic Programming
Supermajority rules, learning, investment, option value
optimal mechanism design, ambiguity aversion, incentive compatibility, individual rationality