Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Universitat Pompeu Fabra - Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences
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Experiment, Hidden Information, Optimal contract, Production Team, Wage Rigidity
Pharmaceutical industry, generics, vertical product
firm networks, contagion, risk sharing
Global games, risk dominance, equilibrium selection, incomplete information, common knowledge
Implementation, Experiments, Mechanisms
Networks, information transmission, search, organization design
Entry, excess capacity, forward induction, equilibrium selection, first-mover advantage
Insurance, contract theory, mechanism design, truthful revelation
Estimation Methods, Learning, Unobserved Heterogeneity
Contract theory, mechanism design, envy, social preferences, skill segregation
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $5.00 for this paper.
File name: DP8127.
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network formation, peer effects, welfare
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