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Raleigh, NC 27695-8109
North Carolina State University - Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics
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contracts, tournaments, moral hazard, multiple agents, regulation, D820, L140, L150, Q130
Capital theory, discrete time optimal control, forest management
Productivity; Demand-specific Factors; Poultry
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agency contracts, heterogeneity, moral hazard, optimal incentives, risk aversion
bankruptcy, contracts, moral hazard, multiple agents, tournaments, G330, Q130
hedging, price and yield uncertainty, yield futures contracts, G130, Q120
capital theory, discrete time optimal control, uneven‐aged forest management, Q230
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alternative marketing arrangements, hogs, market power
private information, production contracts, rank-order tournaments, structural estimation
efficiency wage, post-contractual opportunism, property rights theory
Production contracts, under-investment
Career concerns, ratchet effect, comparative performance information
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