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Investment, Short-Termism, Managerial Myopia, Vesting, CEO Incentives
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $5.00 for this paper.
File name: DP10145.
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CEO Incentives, Managerial Myopia, Short-Termism, Vesting
Stock Liquidity, Innovation, Hostile Takeover, Institutional Ownership
Stock Liquidity, Corporate Governance, Hedge Fund Activism, Blockholders, Exit, Voice
Executive Compensation, Inside Debt, Corporate Debt Contracts
Regulation SHO, Pilot Program, Short Selling, Earnings Management, Fraud Discovery, Price Efficiency
Stock Market Liquidity, Firm Performance, Feedback Mechanism, Managerial Compensation, Blockholder Intervention
Institutional Investors; Mutual Funds; Corporate Governance; U.S. GAAP; Financial Statement Comparability; Auditor Selection; Analyst Forecasts
Repurchases, M&A, Short-Termism, CEO Incentives, Managerial Myopia, Vesting
File name: DP12305.
Repurchases; M&A; Short-Termism; CEO Incentives; Managerial Myopia; Vesting
Accounting Errors; Reporting Bias; Fraud; Accounting Regulation; Earnings Response Coefficient; Fraud Detection; Textual Analysis
Financial Statement Comparability; Earnings Informativeness; Common Informativeness; Individual Informativeness; Implied Volatility; Fundamental Correlation; Fundamental Volatility; Financial Crisis; Recession; Merger Waves
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