Tore Ellingsen

Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics

P.O. Box 6501

Sveavagen 65

S-113 83 Stockholm

Sweden

Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) - Department of Economics

Helleveien 30

N-5035 Bergen

Norway

  • Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics

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    • Tel: +46 8 736 9260
    • Fax: +46 8 31 3207
SCHOLARLY PAPERS

24

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236

CROSSREF CITATIONS

361

Scholarly Papers (24)

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1.

What You Sell is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts

Downloads 1,060 (35,342)
Citation 164

What You Sell is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts

EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings, ECGI - Finance Research Paper No. 71/2005
Number of pages: 54 Posted: 15 Nov 2004
Mariassunta Giannetti, Mike Burkart and Tore Ellingsen
Stockholm School of Economics, Swedish House of Finance and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics
Downloads 1,031 (36,224)
Citation 37

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Trade credit, contract theory, collateral, moral hazard

What You Sell is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts

Number of pages: 55 Posted: 13 Apr 2005
Mike Burkart, Mariassunta Giannetti and Tore Ellingsen
Swedish House of Finance, Stockholm School of Economics and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics
Downloads 29 (799,920)
Citation 19
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Moral hazard, trade credits, collateral, contract theory

What You Sell is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts

Review of Financial Studies, Forthcoming
Posted: 05 Mar 2008
Mariassunta Giannetti, Mike Burkart and Tore Ellingsen
Stockholm School of Economics, Swedish House of Finance and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics

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Trade credit, contract theory, collateral, moral hazard

2.

The Stock Market as a Screening Device and the Decision to Go Public

Number of pages: 30 Posted: 14 Apr 1998
Tore Ellingsen and Kristian Rydqvist
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and State University of New York at Binghamton - School of Management
Downloads 666 (66,603)
Citation 21

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3.

Civic Capital in Two Cultures: The Nature of Cooperation in Romania and USA

Downloads 643 (69,702)
Citation 8

Civic Capital in Two Cultures: The Nature of Cooperation in Romania and USA

Number of pages: 61 Posted: 24 Nov 2012 Last Revised: 08 Jan 2014
Tore Ellingsen, Benedikt Herrmann, Martin Nowak, David G. Rand and Corina Tarnita
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics, University of Nottingham - School of Economics, Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Princeton University - Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology
Downloads 565 (80,920)
Citation 10

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cooperation, culture, public goods game, reward, punishment, antisocial punishment, spite

Civic Capital in Two Cultures: The Nature of Cooperation in Romania and USA

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4042
Number of pages: 61 Posted: 03 Jan 2013
Tore Ellingsen, Benedikt Herrmann, Martin Nowak, David G. Rand and Corina Tarnita
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics, University of Nottingham - School of Economics, Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and Princeton University - Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology
Downloads 78 (515,707)
Citation 3

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4.

Do People Care About Social Context? Framing Effects in Dictator Games

Number of pages: 54 Posted: 14 Sep 2011 Last Revised: 13 Jun 2012
Anna Dreber, Tore Ellingsen, Magnus Johannesson and David G. Rand
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Downloads 380 (131,384)
Citation 17

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preferences, beliefs, altruism, cooperation, framing effects

5.

In-Kind Finance

Downloads 301 (168,933)
Citation 3

In-Kind Finance

Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics, Discussion Paper No. 421
Number of pages: 32 Posted: 25 Oct 2002
Mike Burkart and Tore Ellingsen
Swedish House of Finance and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics
Downloads 274 (185,220)
Citation 4

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credit rationing, trade credit, input monitoring

In-Kind Finance

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 13 Oct 2002
Mike Burkart and Tore Ellingsen
Swedish House of Finance and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics
Downloads 27 (816,663)
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Credit rationing, trade credit, input monitoring

6.

Why are Long Rates Sensitive to Monetary Policy?

Downloads 246 (207,170)
Citation 20

Why are Long Rates Sensitive to Monetary Policy?

IGIER Working Paper No. 256, Riksbank Working Paper No. 5
Number of pages: 45 Posted: 14 Mar 2004
Tore Ellingsen and Ulf Söderström
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and Central Bank of Sweden - Research Department
Downloads 229 (221,372)
Citation 22

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Term structure of interest rates, yield curve, central bank private

Why are Long Rates Sensitive to Monetary Policy?

Number of pages: 35 Posted: 25 May 2004
Tore Ellingsen and Ulf Söderström
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and Central Bank of Sweden - Research Department
Downloads 17 (910,692)
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Term structure of interest rates, yield curve, central bank private information, excess sensitivity

7.

Trade Finance in a Liquidity Crisis

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5136
Number of pages: 24 Posted: 20 Apr 2016
Tore Ellingsen and Jonas Vlachos
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and Stockholm University - Department of Economics
Downloads 236 (215,670)

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Debt Markets, Emerging Markets, Economic Theory & Research, Access to Finance, Trade Law

8.

Trade Credit: Contract-Level Evidence Contradicts Current Theories

Riksbank Research Paper Series No. 139, Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series No. 315
Number of pages: 40 Posted: 19 May 2016
Tore Ellingsen, Tor Jacobson and Erik L. von Schedvin
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics, Sveriges Riksbank - Research Division and Sveriges Riksbank
Downloads 183 (272,746)
Citation 6

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Trade credit, Credit contracts, Financing constraints

9.

A Model of Countertrade

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. EI03
Number of pages: 38 Posted: 11 Jul 2008
Tore Ellingsen
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics
Downloads 113 (400,694)

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10.

Efficiency Wages and X-Inefficiencies

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Efficiency Wages and X-Inefficiencies

Stockholm School of Economics Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 180
Number of pages: 21 Posted: 18 Feb 1998
Tore Ellingsen
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics
Downloads 105 (424,865)

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Efficiency Wages and X-Inefficiencies

Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 99, No. 4, December 1997
Posted: 18 Feb 1998
Tore Ellingsen
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics

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11.

Paying for Staying: Managerial Contracts and the Retention Motive

NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 8/2012
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 02 Apr 2012
Tore Ellingsen and Eirik Gaard Kristiansen
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and NHH Norwegian School of Economics
Downloads 104 (425,141)
Citation 1

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12.

Indebtedness and Unemployment: A Durable Relationship

Stockholm School of Economics Working Papers in Economics and Finance No. 186
Number of pages: 36 Posted: 19 Mar 1998
Tore Ellingsen and Steinar Holden
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and University of Oslo - Department of Economics
Downloads 99 (439,961)
Citation 3

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13.

Disagreement and Authority

Jena Economic Research Paper No. 2007-037
Number of pages: 15 Posted: 18 Oct 2007
Tore Ellingsen and Topi Miettinen
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and Hanken School of Economics - Helsinki Graduate School of Economics
Downloads 83 (491,633)

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Authority, Bargaining, Commitment, Disagreement, Transaction Costs

14.

Fixed or Flexible?: Wage Setting in Search Equilibrium

Stockholm School of Economics Working Papers in Economics and Finance No. 185
Number of pages: 22 Posted: 15 Mar 1998
Tore Ellingsen, Asa Rosen and Asa Rosen
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and Stockholm University - Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI)University of Oslo
Downloads 83 (491,633)
Citation 8

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15.

Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5768
Number of pages: 42 Posted: 19 Sep 2006
Tore Ellingsen and Magnus Johannesson
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics
Downloads 57 (601,116)
Citation 16
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Motivational crowding out, esteem, incentives, framing, social preferences

16.

Menu Costs and Asymmetric Price Adjustment

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5749
Number of pages: 26 Posted: 23 Aug 2006
Tore Ellingsen, Richard Friberg and John Hassler
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and Stockholm University - Institute for International Economic Studies (IIES)
Downloads 21 (842,966)
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asymmetric price adjustment, downward rigidity, menu costs, Phillips curve

17.

The Private Provision of Excludable Public Goods: An Inefficiency Result

Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 96, No. 9-10, 2012
Posted: 14 Nov 2015
Tore Ellingsen and Elena Paltseva
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)

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Contracting, Externalities, Club goods, Free-riding

18.

Confining the Coase Theorem: Contracting, Ownership, and Free-Riding

The Review of Economic Studies, Forthcoming
Posted: 14 Nov 2015
Tore Ellingsen and Elena Paltseva
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics (SITE)

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Contracting, Renegotiation, Ownership, Property rights

19.

Mandated Countertrade as a Strategic Commitment

Journal of International Economics, Vol. 40, No. 1, 1996
Posted: 19 Feb 2014
Lars Stole and Tore Ellingsen
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics

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Mandated countertrade, Trade policy, Asymmetric information

20.

Does Evolution Solve the Hold-Up Problem?

Games and Economic Behaviour, Vol. 39, pp. 28-53, 2002
Posted: 27 Jan 2010
Tore Ellingsen and Jack Robles
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and Victoria University of Wellington - Te Herenga Waka - School of Economics & Finance

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Evolution, Hold-Up problem, Agent, Investment, Contract, Barganing, Nash demand, Ultimatum game

21.

In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit

American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 3, June 2004
Posted: 04 Nov 2004
Mike Burkart and Tore Ellingsen
Swedish House of Finance and Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics

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22.

Externalities vs. Internalities: A Theory of Political Integration

Stockholm School of Economics WPS 63
Posted: 12 Jun 1998
Tore Ellingsen
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics

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23.

Sticky Consumption and Rigid Wages

Stockholm School of Economics WPS62
Posted: 20 May 1998
Tore Ellingsen and Steinar Holden
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics and University of Oslo - Department of Economics

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24.

Long-Term Contracts, Arbitrage and Vertical Restraints

Posted: 16 Oct 1996
Tore Ellingsen
Stockholm School of Economics - Department of Economics

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