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Bocconi University - Department of Economics
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Takeovers, free-rider problem, efficiency of control transfers
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $5.00 for this paper.
File name: SSRN-id912477.
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takeover regulation, mandatory bid, squeeze-out, sell-out, minority shareholder protection
Family Firms, Legal Protection, Corporate Governance
File name: DP3234.
Corporate governance, law and finance
tender offers, leverage, holdout problem
File name: DP3964.
Tender offers, leverage, free-rider problem
Family firms, corporate performance, management style
File name: SSRN-id933143.
corporate governance, ownership structure, takeovers, minority blockholder, post-takeover share value
File name: SSRN-id834604.
Large shareholder, takeover premia
Takeover Premia, ownership concentration, free-rider problem
succession, family firms, inheritance law, growth, investment
Succession, Family Firms, Inheritance Law, Growth, Investment
File name: DP6977.
Family firms, Inheritance law, Investor protection
transparency, tax pressure, investment, access to finance
File name: DP8939.
access to finance, tax pressure, Transparency
File name: Dp2532.
Internal capital markets, managerial incentives, winner-picking
legal investor protection, takeover, takeover outcome, corporate control
Takeovers, Legal Investor Protection
Takeovers, Financial Constraints, Legal Investor Protection
File name: DP8397.
corporate control, efficiency, investor protection, takeovers
File name: Dp2708.
Corporate governance, law and finance, ownership structure
Ownership concentration, legal protection, agency conflicts
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