Economics Department
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom
University of Birmingham - Department of Economics
SSRN RANKINGS
in Total Papers Citations
strategic voting, real options, tenure
Differential game, non-linear strategies, catching up optimal, Folk Theorem
commons, capital markets, perfect foresight, extinction, resource curse, storage
pillage, cooperative game theory, core, stable sets, algorithm
Signalling, non-profit, wage differential, donations, altruism, two-sided market
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formal proof, mechanized reasoning, auction theory
Commons, capital markets, Washington Consensus, property rights
pillage games, cooperative game theory, stable sets, Hausdorff dimension
pillage, cooperative game theory, stable sets
pillage games, cooperative game theory, core, stable sets
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cooperative game theory, stable sets, algorithm, core
