c/o University of Geneva
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
CH-1211 Geneva 4
University of Lausanne
Swiss Finance Institute
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dynamic capital structure, private benefits of control, structural estimation
Cash, agency conflicts, structural estimation
product market competition, cash holdings, financing decisions
Dynamic agency, q-theory, dynamic contracting, managerial compensation, structural estimation, capital structure
Capital Structure, Agency Conflicts, Corporate Governance, Structural Estimation
This is a CEPR Discussion Paper. CEPR charges a fee of $5.00 for this paper.
File name: DP11243.
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agency conflicts, Capital Structure, corporate governance, structural estimation
Corporate liquidity, cash, credit lines, debt capacity, leverage, corporate investment, hedging
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